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Abstract 
Based on a reflection of the emergency sector as critical infrastructure and with reference to the 
concepts of preparedness and prevention as well as criticality, the dissertation examines to what 
extent software applications can be used to support the planning and evaluation of practical 
exercises in civil protection and disaster response. A network-theoretical approach is chosen 
which allows to model scenario-based exercises as dynamic networks. In particular, it is thereby 
achieved that actions and structures from the exercise can be represented and analyzed in their 
temporal context through different types of relationships or interactions.  
First of all, the unique dual role of the emergency sector in the system of infrastructures is 
addressed and the importance of the practical exercise as a training method and for simulating 
real operations for the sector is explained. Based on a literature review and interviews with 
practice partners from different organizations and authorities of civil protection and disaster 
response in Germany, the exercise will be analyzed with regard to its objectives and the methods 
used. In this context, especially practical approaches and problems will be discussed and 
compared. The analysis shows that each exercise is very different in terms of its underlying 
objectives and approaches and depends strongly on the needs of the respective organizations 
and authorities. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that especially the planning of such exercises 
is very complex and therefore there is a need for support tools for the development of scenarios 
and the definition of exercise boundaries. Also in connection with the evaluation of the 
exercises, there is a need for a software solution to support the processes. It is apparent that, 
despite the existing awareness of the importance of evaluations, hardly any systematic 
procedures are available for this purpose, and that the evaluation as a whole is often not carried 
out with the necessary consistency, partly due to time constraints. It is particularly noticeable 
that communication between the participants is often identified as a potential for errors during 
the exercise, but that the actual communication interactions taking place during the exercise 
are not yet systematically recorded and analyzed.  
In addition to the analysis of the practical exercise, the dissertation also evaluates the relevant 
research literature from the fields of organizational research, emergency management and risk 
and criticality research. The potential of social network analysis for the aspects of planning and 
evaluation of exercises is identified and decisively worked out, which, supported by statements 
from practice, allows to define requirements for a software system. In order to meet the specific 
requirements of the exercise, a concept for a network-based support software is designed and 
implemented in a tablet-based demonstrator application called ScenarioBuilder BOS. The 
application supports the user in modeling and developing exercise scenarios as well as in 
analyzing and evaluating them in various ways. For example, simulations of cascading effects 
can be carried out or the centrality of the various actors in the network can be compared. The 
aim of the application is to enable the user to develop interpretation approaches and to question 
actions and relationship structures by presenting the scenario in different perspectives. In order 
to evaluate the application and the benefit of social network analysis as a methodology to 
support the planning and evaluation of exercises, the thesis describes four use cases for the 
ScenarioBuilder BOS, three of which are evaluations of real civil protection exercises in different 
organizations and authorities. The fourth case describes the use of the application to develop 
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the scenario of a fictitious exercise and serves to validate the simulation and other functions of 
ScenarioBuilder BOS. The use cases show that the application and the associated methodology 
of social network analysis has a great potential especially for the evaluation of exercises. It 
enables a systematic recording and evaluation of communication relationships in particular and 
can therefore make a valuable contribution, for example, to assessing the workload of actors, 
analyzing compliance with command structures or explaining dynamics in teams. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Ausgehend von einer Betrachtung des Notfallsektors als kritische Infrastruktur und unter 
Bezugnahme auf die Konzepte der Preparedness und Prevention sowie der Kritikalität wird im 
Rahmen der Dissertation untersucht, inwieweit Software-Anwendungen zur Unterstützung der 
Planung und Evaluation von praktischen Übungen im Bevölkerungsschutz eingesetzt werden 
können. Hierbei wird ein netzwerktheoretischer Ansatz gewählt der es ermöglicht, Szenario-
basierte Übungen als dynamische Netzwerke zu modellieren. Insbesondere wird dadurch 
erreicht, dass Handlungen und Strukturen aus der Übung durch verschiedene Arten von 
Beziehungen bzw. Interaktionen in ihrem zeitlichen Zusammenhang dargestellt und analysiert 
werden können.  
Zunächst wird auf die besondere Doppelrolle des Notfallsektors im System der Infrastrukturen 
eingegangen und die Bedeutung der praktischen Übung als Trainingsmethode und zur 
Simulation realer Einsätze für den Sektor erläutert. Darauf aufbauend wird auf Basis einer 
Literaturrecherche und Interviews mit Praxispartnern aus unterschiedlichen Organisationen 
und Behörden des Bevölkerungsschutzes in Deutschland die Übung in Bezug auf die mit ihr 
verfolgten Ziele und die verwendeten Methodiken hin analysiert. Hierbei werden insbesondere 
Handlungsweisen und Problemstellungen aus der Praxis thematisiert und verglichen. Dabei 
stellt sich heraus, dass jede Übung im Hinblick auf ihre zugrunde liegenden Ziele und 
Herangehensweisen sehr unterschiedlich ist und stark von den Bedürfnissen der jeweiligen 
Organisationen und Behörden abhängt. Weiterhin zeigt sich, dass insbesondere die Planung 
solcher Übungen sehr komplex ist und daher ein Bedarf an Unterstützungstools für die 
Entwicklung von Szenarien und die Definition der Übungsgrenzen besteht. Auch im 
Zusammenhang mit der Auswertung der Übungen besteht der Wunsch nach einer 
Softwarelösung zur Unterstützung der Abläufe. Es zeigt sich, dass trotz des vorhandenen 
Bewusstseins über die Bedeutung von Evaluationen hierzu kaum systematische Verfahren zur 
Verfügung stehen und dass die Evaluation als Ganzes, auch aus Zeitgründen, oft nicht mit der 
notwendigen Konsistenz durchgeführt wird. Besonders auffällig ist, dass die Kommunikation 
der Beteiligten untereinander häufig als Potenzial für Fehler während der Übung identifiziert 
wird, die tatsächlich stattfindenden Kommunikationsinteraktionen während der Durchführung 
der Übung jedoch noch nicht systematisch erfasst und analysiert werden.  
Neben der Analyse der praktischen Übung wird in der Dissertation auch die einschlägige 
Forschungsliteratur aus den Bereichen der Organisationsforschung, des Notfallmanagements 
sowie der Risiko- und Kritikalitätsforschung ausgewertet. Dabei wird das Potenzial der sozialen 
Netzwerkanalyse für die Aspekte der Planung und Auswertung von Übungen identifiziert und 
dezidiert herausgearbeitet, um damit, gestützt durch Aussagen aus der Praxis, Anforderungen 
für ein Softwaresystem zu definieren. Um den spezifischen Anforderungen an die Übung 
gerecht zu werden, wird ein Konzept für eine netzwerkbasierte Unterstützungssoftware 
entworfen und in einer Tablet-basierten Demonstrator-Anwendung namens ScenarioBuilder 
BOS umgesetzt. Mit Hilfe der Anwendung wird der Anwender bei der Modellierung und 
Entwicklung von Übungsszenarien sowie bei deren Analyse und Auswertung auf verschiedene 
Weise unterstützt. So können Simulationen zu Kaskadeneffekten durchgeführt oder die 
Zentralität der verschiedenen Akteure im Netzwerk verglichen werden. Ziel der Anwendung ist 
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es, den Benutzer in die Lage zu versetzen, Interpretationsansätze zu entwickeln und 
Handlungen und Beziehungsstrukturen in Frage zu stellen, indem das Szenario in 
verschiedenen Perspektiven dargestellt wird. Um die Anwendung und den Nutzen sozialer 
Netzwerkanalyse als Methodik zur Unterstützung der Planung und Auswertung von Übungen 
zu evaluieren, beschreibt die Dissertation vier Anwendungsfälle für den ScenarioBuilder BOS, 
von denen drei Auswertungen realer Katastrophenschutzübungen in verschiedenen 
Organisationen und Behörden sind. Der vierte Fall beschreibt den Einsatz der Anwendung zur 
Entwicklung des Szenarios einer fiktiven Übung und dient der Validierung der Simulation und 
anderer Funktionen des ScenarioBuilder BOS. Die Anwendungsfälle zeigen, dass die 
Anwendung und die damit verbundene Methodik der sozialen Netzwerkanalyse ein großes 
Potenzial insbesondere für die Auswertung von Übungen hat. Sie ermöglicht eine systematische 
Erfassung und Auswertung speziell von Kommunikationsbeziehungen und kann damit einen 
wertvollen Beitrag zum Beispiel zur Einschätzung der Arbeitsbelastung von Akteuren, zur 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Emergency Services – A Critical Infrastructure 
“Infrastructure in general and critical infrastructure in particular are the lifeblood of modern, 
efficient societies. […] Therefore, ensuring the protection of this infrastructure is a key function 
of security-related preparedness measures taken by industry and government agencies […]” 
(BMI, 2009a, p. 3). These are the words with which the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
introduces the German “National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection” and thus 
directly addresses two central aspects of the discourse within this context. On the one hand, the 
importance of infrastructures and especially critical infrastructures is highlighted and on the 
other hand the significance of the protection of these complex socio-technical systems is 
emphasized. Critical infrastructures (CIs) are defined as “organizational and physical structures 
and facilities of such vital importance to a nation's society and economy that their failure or 
degradation would result in sustained supply shortages, significant disruption of public safety 
and security, or other dramatic consequences” (BMI, 2009a, p. 4). An awareness of critical 
infrastructures and the term ‘critical infrastructure’ has increasingly emerged in the 1990s and 
gained greater political relevance in Germany after the terrorist attacks in New York 2001, 
Madrid 2004 and London 2005 as well as the summer flood in 2002 (BMI, 2005, BMI, 2009a;). 
CIs can be divided into different sectors, whereby a distinction is made between two broader 
categories: technical basic infrastructures and socio-economic services infrastructures (BMI, 
2009a). The technical basic infrastructures include power supply, information and 
communication technology, transport as well as water supply and sewage disposal. Examples 
of socio-economic services infrastructures are public health, food, government and 
administration, finance as well as media and culture (ibid.). Another sector belonging to the 
socio-economic services infrastructures are the emergency and rescue services as well as the 
disaster response and management, which are the focus of this work.  
Compared to other infrastructure sectors, the emergency sector incorporates a special dual role 
as critical infrastructure due to the tasks assigned to it and its function for society. By providing 
“[...] a wide range of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery services during both 
steady-state and incident management operations” it is responsible for the safeguarding and 
protection of the general public and other critical infrastructure sectors (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2015, p. 3). Through these central tasks, the emergency sector as an 
infrastructure itself becomes a protection strategy in dealing with infrastructural functional 
crises and forms the main actor in the implementation of measures for preparedness and 
prevention (Haimes et al., 2008). The sector includes all authorities and organizations with 
security functions (Behörden und Organisationen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben – BOS), i.e. all 
governmental and non-governmental actors that perform tasks to maintain public security 
(BBK, 2019a; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). These include among others the 
police, the fire brigade, private aid organizations or the civil protection authorities, whereby 
this work focuses on the non-police actors. As in other sectors, emergency services are 
dependent on other critical infrastructures, which can lead to complex vulnerabilities and 
potential cascading effects (Rinaldi et al., 2001). The “Emergency Service Sector-Specific Plan” 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015), which is an annex to the national 
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infrastructure protection plan, lists in particular such interdependencies with the sectors energy, 
information and communication, transport, water as well as public health.  
The most important asset within the emergency sector is its personnel (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2015). It is composed of professionals and volunteers, the latter 
representing the vast majority of non-police actors in Germany. In order to enable this personnel 
to carry out the tasks assigned to the sector, continuous training and exercises are of great 
importance (BMI, 2009b; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). The relevance and 
importance, especially with regard to the exercise, can be emphasized by considering the 
concept of preparedness and prevention and that of criticality, both of which are commonly used 
in infrastructure research (Engels, 2018).  
The concept of preparedness and prevention describes the developed knowledge and capacities 
to anticipate, mitigate and react to damaging events, enhanced by preparatory strategies and 
measures to prevent these events from happening in the first place (Haimes et al., 2008; 
UNISDR, 2009). Due to their components that cannot be clearly separated, preparedness and 
prevention are considered as a conjoint concept as argued by King (2007) and Crespo et al. 
(2018) and provide strategies to act preventively, protectively, responsively and restoratively 
(Haimes et al., 2008). Measures and implications of preparedness & prevention should not only 
be understood as a forecasting process based on past events, but also as a dynamic adjustment 
process in which strategies are regularly reviewed even without an event having taken place, 
thus maintaining their effectiveness even as the complexity of the systems increases (Crespo et 
al., 2018). In this sense, preparedness and prevention measures take over attributes and 
functions from the resilience framework and have a positive effect on achieving resilience 
(Engels et al., 2018; Haimes et al., 2008).  
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the concept of preparedness and prevention has 
been strongly linked to the emergency sector and especially to disaster control (Crespo et al., 
2018; Hémond and Robert, 2012). Furthermore, the critical infrastructure of the emergency 
sector can, according to Haimes et al. (2008), be regarded as a ‘supporting infrastructure’ and 
thus as a preparedness & prevention measure for other infrastructures. Within the emergency 
sector, the exercise plays a central role in terms of preparedness and prevention (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). It allows strategies and plans to be validated and 
capacity limits to be identified. Exercises also enable the targeted strengthening of the 
preparedness & prevention capacity of all actors involved (ibid.). Adey and Anderson (2012) 
argue that the exercise has received the most attention in literature and discussion on 
preparedness & prevention and state that it can be seen as a function of preparedness and, by 
extension, prevention. The exercise therefore is an important part of the security apparatus 
(ibid.). In addition to this, Ellebrecht et al. (2013) note with regard to Germany that, in the 
light of the discussion on preparedness & prevention, exercises are increasingly moving away 
from their traditional forms and large scale exercises are more frequently being practiced. 
A different view of the exercise is given by the concept of criticality. According to the German 
national strategy for critical infrastructure protection criticality is defined as “a relative measure 
of the importance of a given infrastructure in terms of the impact of its disruption or functional 
failure on the security of supply, i.e. providing society with important goods and services” (BMI, 
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2009a, p. 7). Thus, criticality is a measure that is determined in relation to another system (e.g. 
another infrastructure) or a function performed by another system (Dombois et al., 2018; 
Lukitsch et al., 2018). The concept is often described in the literature with the help of specific 
characteristics or properties (Dombois et al., 2018). In comparison to risk analysis, where the 
impact of a damaging event is assessed in relation to the organization or system under 
consideration, criticality analysis tends to assess the impact on society (Theoharidou et al., 
2009). Due to the relationship to other systems and their construction based on a perception of 
crisis (Fekete, 2011), the criticality of a system is dynamic and can change over time, which is 
particularly evident in the case of cascading effects (Hempel et al., 2018). In research, different 
approaches are used to determine the criticality of a system. The most widespread is the 
consequence-based approach that also emerges from the aforementioned definition and 
measures criticality on the basis of the effects in case of system failure (Lukitsch et al., 2018; 
Theoharidou et al., 2009). Another approach is the pragmatic one which ascribes criticality 
primarily on the basis of changing discussions or where criticality is defined as a means of 
expressing urgency or social pressure (Lukitsch et al., 2018).  
When investigating the criticality of different sources of information within the emergency 
sector in a preliminary work for this dissertation the exercise was identified as particularly 
critical (Dombois et al., 2018). The rationale behind this was that the exercise, through the 
practical implementation of plans and processes, provides participants with knowledge and 
information that is difficult to retrieve from other sources (ibid.). In this respect, the exercise 
represents a critical source of information and acts as a central element of the training. 
From the perspective of the observed concepts, the relevance of the exercise to the emergency 
sector as critical infrastructure is evident. Especially the strong dependence of the sector on its 
personnel as the most important asset and the necessity to enable these personnel through 
training and exercises to cope with the tasks of the emergency service make clear how important 
it is to focus on this part of the infrastructure sector. The present work, which was developed 
in the context of the interdisciplinary research training group KRITIS (GRK 2222 – Critical 
infrastructures: Construction, function crises, and protection in cities), is intended to focus on 
the exercise in civil protection and disaster response (Bevölkerungsschutz) and to examine it as 
an essential part of the emergency sector in the federal system of Germany.  
Amendment Concerning the Corona Crisis 
The finalization of this work overlapped with the phase of a strong increase in the number of 
people infected with the new coronavirus Sars-CoV-2 in Germany. The corona crisis was 
classified as a global pandemic by the World Health Organization in March 2020 and shows a 
variety of effects on infrastructures and especially the emergency sector (WHO Europe, 2020). 
Although the crisis has not been explicitly investigated in the present dissertation, it illustrates 
the relevance of exercises in civil protection and disaster response and the importance of the 
exercise in the context of the preparedness and prevention of the emergency sector. In 
particular, this can be seen in the fact that many measures are implemented during the crisis 
that have previously been simulated and tested in exercises and included in pandemic plans 
following the exercise evaluation. For example, the “Interministerial and Interstate Crisis 
Management Exercise” (see section 3.4) in 2007 was based on the scenario of a global influenza 
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pandemic and the results obtained in this exercise provided important insights for national 
pandemic plans and strategies that are used today (BBK, n.d.). By analyzing exercises and 
developing and implementing support tools for their planning and evaluation, this dissertation 
thus undertakes to contribute to future crises such as the current pandemic. 
 
1.2. Research Aim and Objectives 
The organization and structure of civil protection and disaster response in Germany is divided 
between the federal government and the individual states and is therefore managed differently 
in some cases. In this context, the distinction between urban and rural regions also plays a role. 
For example, only cities with a population of 100,000 inhabitants or more have a professional 
fire brigade and consequently a larger number of professional personnel (§ 7 HBKG, 2018). On 
the other hand, in rural regions or smaller towns civil protection is almost exclusively carried 
out by volunteers. Also, civil protection and disaster response is made up of many different 
actors. In addition to the civil protection authorities, fire brigades and various other 
organizations come together so that overall a heterogeneous field of actors and a considerable 
need for inter-organizational coordination can be assumed. While requirements for the training 
of e.g. fire brigade personnel are regulated centrally in service regulations (AFKzV, 2012), there 
are no clear specifications for the frequency and design of the exercise. Only the obligation to 
conduct exercises is regulated by law (§ 29, § 32, § 57 HBKG, 2018). Due to the different 
requirements and prerequisites placed on the exercises by the various actors, their planning, 
conduct and evaluation is very time- and resource-intensive. Furthermore, exercises are often 
planned and implemented on top of the regular tasks, which is why the evaluation of the 
exercise may not be carried out with the same consistency.  
The problems described show the need for tools and methods to support exercises, which is the 
starting point for this work. The primary goal is to investigate to what extent software 
applications can support the planning and evaluation of exercises in civil protection and disaster 
response and which requirements are placed on the systems and organizations. The work 
focuses on scenario-based exercises in civil protection in Germany and thus follows the trend in 
practice towards large-scale exercises with a broad range of different actors. The scenarios of 
such exercises are composed of a multitude of individual situations that build on each other, 
each of which can be characterized by different relationships or interactions between various 
actors. In particular, the relationships and interactions that occur include different forms of 
communication or sequences of actions. Within the scenarios, relationships can occur both 
between human actors and between or with technical systems and other objects. With these 
characteristics, scenario-based exercises can be understood as dynamic networks. For the 
analysis and interpretation of such networks, social network analysis has established itself as 
the most important analytical method in many research areas, especially in the social sciences. 
This is particularly true for the empirical analysis of inter-organizational networks (Raab, 
2010), which are often given in exercises in civil protection. Despite its widespread use in 
research, social network analysis has not yet been applied in the practice of civil protection and 
disaster response in Germany. With the help of software applications the dissertation tries to 
create possibilities to model scenario-based exercises as networks and examines to what extend 
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social network analysis can be used as an analytical methodology within the planning and 
evaluation of exercises. 
At first, the situation of the exercise in practice will be analyzed in order to derive requirements 
for software concepts. Following this, a concept for a software application will be developed, 
which is based on network analysis and can be used as a support tool in the planning and 
evaluation of exercises. To evaluate the software on the one hand and the benefit of social 
network analysis in planning and evaluation of exercises on the other hand, the software will 
be implemented and evaluated by means of case studies. In summary, the following objectives 
are pursued with this work: 
• Analysis of the situation of exercises in civil protection and disaster response in Germany 
involving various actors. 
• Development of a concept for a software application based on social network analysis 
to support exercise planners and leaders in the planning and evaluation phase of 
exercises. 
• Implementation of a demonstrator application to verify the technical feasibility of the 
developed software concept. 
• Validation and evaluation of the demonstrator application on different use cases to 
assess the benefit of social network analysis as a methodology for planning and 
evaluating exercises in civil protection and disaster response. 
 
1.3. Methodology and Approach 
Methodologically, this dissertation is based on an in-depth review and analysis of the relevant 
literature. The related work as well as regulations and recommendations for action have been 
analyzed specifically with regard to the understanding of the emergency sector as a critical 
infrastructure, the role and structure of the exercise in civil protection and disaster response as 
well as the use of social network theory in the context of organizational and emergency 
management research and in the context of risk and criticality research. In addition to reviewing 
the literature, various methods (see Kurz and Kubek, 2017) were used to collect empirical data 
from practice. In particular, practitioners were interviewed in two iterations to analyze the 
situation of the exercise in civil protection and disaster response and to define the requirements 
for the developed software concept. In the first iteration, various practitioners from fire brigades 
(professional and voluntary), fire brigade schools as well as from authorities at municipal, 
supra-regional, state and federal level were interviewed by means of informal discussions on 
the various topics of civil protection and disaster response and in particular regarding exercises. 
Building on the information communicated in the informal discussions, a second iteration of 
interviews with predefined questions was conducted with selected practitioners. A number of 
conditions were defined for the selection of the interview partners. For example, different 
administrative levels as well as different groups of actors were to be represented. The interview 
partners were also supposed to be active in the exercise control of their respective organizations 
and thus be familiar with all areas of the exercise and their coordination. Table 1.1 lists the 
interview partners with whom expert interviews in the second iteration were conducted.  
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Table 1.1: List of interview partners for the semi-structured expert interviews 
 
For the expert interviews an interview guideline with nine topics on exercises and requirements 
for support tools was defined that was based on the information communicated in the informal 
discussions and which served as a basis for open discussions. The interviews focused, among 
other things, on the objectives pursued by exercises and their role in training and everyday 
working life. In addition, the interviewees were asked about the specifications and requirements 
that are placed on the planning of exercises and about the actors involved in the planning 
process. Other topics were emerging problems and criteria for evaluation as well as their 
methods. Finally, the interview partners were asked about the requirements for potential 
modeling and analysis tools and in which phases of the exercise their use would be appropriate. 
The requirements for the software tool extracted from the expert interviews and the related 
work were compared with existing solutions for the analysis of networks in the context of civil 
protection and disaster response and a concept for a software application was developed. 
Furthermore, the concept was implemented in a tablet-based demonstrator application for 
technical verification. As can be seen from the title of the thesis, the developed software concept 
and the implemented application based on it put special emphasis on the modeling and analysis 
of exercise scenarios using multilayer graph networks. These are dynamic network structures 
which are visualized in the form of graphs. The simultaneous use of multiple layers allows to 
represent and analyze temporal changes as well as different types of relationships. Thus, the 
tool enables the user to model various dependencies and interconnections within a scenario. 
The possible network structures range from communication networks to dependency networks, 
for example to be able to represent cascading effects, and combinations of the two as they occur 
in exercise scenarios. In order to test the application with the underlying concept for 
functionality and usability as well as to assess the added value of network analysis as a 
methodology for planning and evaluation of exercises, an exercise evaluation was planned and 
conducted on the basis of several use cases. The procedure was divided into two steps. First, for 
each exercise data was collected on the basis of a systemic observation and in some cases 
Interview Organization/Department Date of Interview
Interview 1
LÜKEX project group at the Federal Office of 
Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)
26 February 2019
Interview 2




Department of Crisis Management and 




Department of Red Cross Work & Civil 
Protection at the Institute for Education and 
Communication (German Red Cross) 
18 March 2019
Interview 5
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additional information could be obtained from staff software. An exemplary evaluation was 
then carried out using the software application. The evaluations were prepared in a report 
format without the participation of the practice partners and made available to the exercise 
leaders. In a second step, based on the presented evaluations, feedback discussions were held 
with the practice partners and a question-based written feedback was obtained from them. The 
questions addressed the previous knowledge of social network analysis on the one hand and 
the evaluation of the exercises on the other. In this context, questions regarding the 
comprehensibility of the presentation and its added value were asked. Furthermore, possible 
problems and missing functions were discussed and it was asked whether the tool could 
contribute to an overall improvement in the evaluation of exercises. Optionally, there was also 
the possibility to give an assessment for the use of the application in exercise planning. 
 
1.4. Structure of the Work 
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters. After this chapter has introduced the emergency 
services as a critical infrastructure and the objectives of the work, chapter 2 focuses specifically 
on civil protection and disaster response in Germany. First of all, the structures and 
responsibilities at federal level are discussed, followed by the municipal and state levels using 
the state of Hessen as an example. In both cases, the relevant terms are introduced and the 
regulatory basis explained. Finally, the second chapter addresses the work of crisis management 
staffs, which are frequently used in major damage situations.  
Building on the fundamentals of civil protection and disaster response, the third chapter 
examines the exercise in its various forms. First of all, it discusses the objectives pursued by 
conducting exercises and how they can be differentiated according to the actors involved. It 
then proceeds to explain and compare the different forms of exercise as they are practiced 
today. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the methodological procedure within the exercise, 
from planning to conduct and evaluation. A special focus is laid on the LÜKEX exercise as an 
interministerial and interstate crisis management exercise, which was first held in Germany in 
2004. Finally, the third chapter analyzes the exercise as it is lived in practice today and examines 
working methods and problems.  
As the present study follows a network theoretical approach, forth chapter introduces the 
relevant principles of social network analysis. First, the social network fundamentals are 
explained in order to get an overview of the origins and ways of thinking in network research. 
Following on this, graph theory as the mathematical basis of networks is discussed and the 
central definitions and formulas are introduced. A particular focus of this section is on 
multilayer networks and their forms of modeling. In the following, the chapter addresses the 
concept of centrality as one of the most widespread in network research and discusses the 
different calculation methods and their implications. The last section of the fourth chapter 
focuses on the visualization of networks as it is one of the reasons for the wide use of this 
approach.  
On the basis of the two previous chapters, the fifth chapter analyzes to what extent social 
network analysis is suitable as a methodology for planning and evaluating exercises. For this 
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purpose, the related work from the fields of organizational research and emergency 
management on the one hand and from the field of risk and criticality research on the other 
hand are examined and positive and negative aspects in the context of social network analysis 
are worked out. In the following section the gathered findings are summarized and analyzed 
with regard to their use for the exercise. Possible implications and limitations are elaborated 
and explained. In the last section of the fifth chapter, building on the insights gained, 
requirements for a software solution are formulated and compared with already existing 
applications.  
In the sixth chapter a software concept for a network-based support tool for exercise planning 
and evaluation is designed and explained based on the defined requirements. First of all, the 
software objectives and the underlying use cases are discussed and the various functionalities 
of scenario development and analysis are subsequently explained and discussed. For scenario 
development, special attention is paid to the modeling of scenario data in networks and the 
representation of their dynamics. In the analysis, the simulation and the assessment of centrality 
are in the foreground. Finally, the sixth chapter looks at the practical use of the software concept 
in various exercises and discusses possibilities for extension. 
Based on the developed concept, the seventh chapter introduces the demonstrator application 
for the verification of the technical feasibility, which was implemented in the context of the 
present work. At first general implementation decisions are explained and the graph library 
“GraphStream” used in the demonstrator is introduced. Afterwards the data structure and the 
data storage are explained. The last section of the seventh chapter addresses the user interface 
and the different workflows for modeling and analyzing scenarios.  
The evaluation of the demonstrator application developed in this dissertation and described in 
the previous chapter is presented in the eighth chapter. For this purpose, the chapter first 
introduces the four evaluated use cases and then discusses each use case individually. Building 
on a short introduction, the use of the software and exemplary results are described. Each 
section concludes with a use case specific discussion of the results and feedback from the 
practitioners. The eighth chapter ends with a concluding discussion of the software application 
and the methodological use of social network analysis in exercises.  
Finally, the ninth chapter summarizes the work and highlights the research contribution. 
Furthermore, the future work and potential of the work are discussed.  
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2. Civil and Disaster Protection in Germany 
In Germany’s federal political system, responsibility for civil protection and disaster control is 
distributed between the 16 federal states (Länder) and the federal government as constituted 
by the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This chapter will give an overview of the 
“Bevölkerungsschutz” as a general term for all tasks and measures related to this area and 
explain the most relevant organizations and characteristics. The perspective of the federal states 
is shown using the example of the state of Hessen. At the end of the chapter, the leadership 
structure in disaster control through staff work is also examined. 
Bevölkerungsschutz describes all non-police and non-military measures taken by municipalities 
as well as the federal states in the field of disaster control (Katastrophenschutz) and by the 
federal government in the field of civil protection (Zivilschutz). The term covers both the 
protection of the population and the animals as well as their livelihoods. The terminology 
Bevölkerungsschutz applies to the effects of catastrophes and emergencies as well as to armed 
conflicts or wars (BBK, 2019a).  
 
2.1. “Zivilschutz” – Civil Protection at Federal Level 
Article 73, subsection 1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG) stipulates that civil protection 
(Zivilschutz) is the responsibility of the Federal Government, ensuring the defense and 
protection of the population in times of war (Art. 73 GG, 2019). The tasks regarding Zivilschutz 
are defined in the “Zivilschutz- und Katastrophenhilfegesetz” (ZSKG) and include not only 
measures to protect the population but also their homes, civil services, etc.. In addition to the 
actual protection against the effects of war and its consequences, the tasks also include their 
elimination or mitigation. Civil protection is intended to supplement the self-help of the 
population (§ 1 ZSKG, 2009). The Zivilschutz thus does not cover disaster control in peacetime, 
which is why the legislative competence remains with the states according to the provisions of 
the Basic Law (Art. 70 subsection 1 GG, 2019; Art. 30 GG, 2019).  
In the context of administrative co-operation (Amtshilfe) and disaster assistance 
(Katastrophenhilfe) under Article 35 of the Basic Law, the federal government and the states 
are further interlinked. In the event of a natural disaster or a severe accident, for example, a 
federal state can request support from the federal police or the federal armed forces 
(Bundeswehr) as well as from the administrations of other federal states and the federal 
government (Art. 35 subsection 2 GG, 2019). Furthermore, in the event of a natural disaster or 
a severe accident in which more than one federal state is affected, the federal government may 
order the states to make police forces available (Art. 35 subsection 3 GG, 2019). The federal 
government thus has limited emergency competence in supraregional problems (Robbe and 
Grill, 2007, p. 12). 
With the “New Strategy for the Protection of the Population in Germany”, the Conference of 
German Ministers and Senators of the Interior (Innenministerkonferenz – IMK) started adopting 
a new framework for the Bevölkerungsschutz in 2002. This was preceded by the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 and the floods in the Danube and Elbe rivers in 2002. With the aim of 
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improving cooperation between the federal government and the federal states in the 
preparation and management of major supraregional damage situations (BBK, 2010; Robbe 
and Grill, 2007). One of the central elements of the new strategy is the Federal Office of Civil 
Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe 
– BBK), which was established in 2004 as a federal information and coordination office. In 
addition, joint hazard analyses, new equipment concepts and the “Interministerial and 
Interstate Crisis Management Exercise” (Länderübergreifende Krisenmanagement Exercise – 
LÜKEX), a regular federal and state exercise, were established (BBK, 2010; Robbe and Grill, 
2007).  
The framework concept was legally transferred to the ZSKG in 2009 (BBK, 2010). In addition 
to the principle of disaster assistance, the ZSKG also defines that the federal government is 
materially involved providing disaster control equipment (§ 13 ZSKG, 2009) and complements 
the training programs offered by the federal states (§ 14 ZSKG, 2009). It can also undertake 
coordination tasks in the event of major emergencies if requested to do so by the states (§ 16 
ZSKG, 2009). With the institutions and structures created or modified in the new framework a 
simple cooperation between the federal government and the states within the meaning of 
Article 35 of the Basic Law can be facilitated (Robbe and Grill, 2007). In conclusion, the federal 
government takes on tasks primarily in the context of preparedness and prevention, while its 
role in operational crisis management remains limited (Lamers, 2016, p. 115). 
The Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, 
für Bau und Heimat – BMI) is responsible for civil protection at federal level. As the supreme 
federal authority, it coordinates the crisis units of the individual ministries and maintains 
numerous authorities and organizations that support the BMI in its tasks. The Federal Agency 
for Technical Relief, commonly referred to as Technical Relief Agency (Technisches Hilfswerk 
– THW) and the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) are particularly 
noteworthy (BMI, 2015; Knigge, 2019).  
The central task of the THW, as defined in the “Gesetz über das Technische Hilfswerk” (THW-
Gesetz), is to provide technical assistance in civil defense as well as in disaster relief, public 
emergencies and major damage situations at the request of the local and state authorities in 
charge of emergency response. In addition, the THW also performs the task of technical 
assistance on behalf of the federal government outside of Germany (§ 1 THW-Gesetz, 2013). 
The THW is organized in local associations and is carried out almost exclusively by volunteers 
(Terberl, 2015). The BBK is a key player in the organization of the Federal civil protection and 
serves as its coordination and service hub (BMI, 2009b; Terberl, 2015). It has an 
interdisciplinary orientation and performs many conceptual, planning and advisory tasks for 
the federal government and the states (BBK, 2009b). The BBK itself describes its activities as 
interdisciplinary and takes all areas of civil security into account (BBK, n.d.). In addition to its 
diverse tasks, the BBK also houses the “Joint Information and Situation Centre of the Federal 
Government and the Federal States” (Gemeinsames Melde- und Lagezentrum – GMLZ) and the 
“Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection” (Akademie für 
Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz – AKNZ). They take on important roles in 
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the joint assessment of the situation and the exchange of information as well as in training and 
further education (BBK, 2011a). 
 
2.2. “Katastrophenschutz” – Disaster Control at State and Municipal Level 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the legislative competence in disaster control in 
Germany lies with the states (Art. 70 subsection 1 GG, 2019; Art. 30 GG, 2019). They have 
established disaster control authorities at several levels. The lowest level is made up of the 
administrative districts and the cities, while the highest level is always made up of the ministries 
at state level. In some cases, there is also a middle level representing the regional administrative 
levels of the state (Fritzen, 2010). In order to support cooperation between the individual states 
at the political level, the ministers of the interior of the states meet twice a year at the so-called 
“Innenministerkonferenz” (IMK). An integral part of this conference of ministers of the interior 
is working group V, which, deals with disaster control and thus creates a permanent exchange 
on this topic. Through this exchange, country-specific rules and processes can be discussed and 
coordinated with each other, thus preventing divergent legislation (IMK, n.d.). In order to 
further explain the tasks and structures of disaster control, the example of the state of Hessen 
is used below.  
In Hessen, disaster control is regulated in the “Hessisches Brand- und 
Katastrophenschutzgesetz” (HBKG). The HBKG defines disaster as “[…] ein Ereignis, das Leben, 
Gesundheit oder die lebensnotwendige Versorgung der Bevölkerung, Tiere, erhebliche Sachwerte 
oder die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen in so ungewöhnlichem Maße gefährdet oder beeinträchtigt, 
dass zur Beseitigung die einheitliche Lenkung aller Katastrophenschutzmaßnahmen sowie der 
Einsatz von Einheiten und Einrichtungen des Katastrophenschutzes erforderlich sind” (§ 24 HBKG, 
2018). Accordingly, a disaster refers not only to events in which parts of the population are 
exposed to great danger but also includes animals, the environment or material assets of great 
value, such as infrastructures. Whether there is an event that is so extraordinary in its extent 
that the state of disaster must be declared is to be examined for each individual case by the 
‘lower’ disaster control authority in accordance with the requirements of the HBKG (HMdIS, 
2016a).  
Hessen distinguishes between three levels of disaster control authorities. The ‘lower’ level is 
made up of the 26 councilors (Landräte) in the administrative districts (Landkreise) often 
referred to as counties and the mayors in the cities that are not counties. They are primarily 
responsible for supra-local fire protection, general aid and disaster control (Fritzen, 2010; 
HMdIS, 2016a). One level above this are the three regional councils (Regierungspräsidien) of 
the state of Hessen as the ‘upper’ disaster control authority. The Hessian Ministry of the Interior 
(HMdIS) represents the ‘highest’ authority in disaster control (HMdIS, 2016a). In principle, the 
‘lower’ disaster control authority affected is always responsible for disaster control. According 
to § 35 HBKG, in individual cases the responsible regional council can transfer responsibility to 
another administrative district or an independent town if the defense against the disaster from 
this area is more effective. Furthermore, especially in the case of supra-regional events, the 
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‘upper’ and the ‘highest’ disaster control authorities can take over responsibility (§ 35 HBKG, 
2018; HMdIS, 2016a). 
According to § 7 HBKG every municipality in Hessen must have a public (voluntary) fire brigade 
ready. For cities with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, there must also be a 
professional fire brigade which is supplemented by the voluntary fire brigade (§ 7 HBKG, 2018). 
Furthermore, according to § 5 of the “Hessisches Rettungsdienstgesetz” (HRDG), administrative 
districts and independent cities are responsible for the organization and establishment of the 
rescue service and according to § 4 HBKG for a central control center which is always ready for 
operation (§ 4 HBKG, 2018; § 5 HRDG, 2018). The rescue service can be carried out by the 
districts and cities themselves (e.g. by the fire brigades) or commissioned to the relief 
organizations recognized in disaster control (Fritzen, 2010). The fire brigades, the rescue 
service and the control centers form the daily non-police emergency response. The emergency 
response units are always fully involved in disaster control and are supported in their tasks by 
other public and private aid organizations (HMdIS, 2016a).  
Normally, a catastrophe begins as a regular emergency response operation. As the complexity 
and size of the mission increases, the ‘lower’ disaster control authority can determine a disaster 
according to § 34 HBKG and establish the mission as a disaster operation (§ 34 HBKG, 2018; 
HMdIS, 2016a). In order to cope with a disaster, various aid organizations have committed 
themselves to cooperate with the states. In the field of medical and rescue services these are 
the “Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB)”, the German Red Cross (DRK), the “Johanniter-Unfall-
Hilfe (JUH)” and the “Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD)” (Fritzen, 2010). The “Deutsche Lebens-
Rettungs-Gesellschaft (DLRG)” supports the fire brigade in water rescue (ibid.). As mentioned 
in the previous section, the states can also call on the Technical Relief Agency (THW) and the 
German Federal Armed Forces in the course of administrative assistance under Article 35 of the 
Basic Law (GG) for disaster control assistance (ibid.). Apart from the German Federal Armed 
Forces, the majority of disaster control organizations are relying on the work of volunteers 
(ibid.). An overview of the non-police organizations is given in Table 2.1. In addition to public 
and private organizations, § 28 HBKG requires all municipal, administrative district and state 
offices to assist at the request of the disaster control authorities (§ 28 HBKG, 2018). 
Table 2.1: Overview of the non-police organizations in disaster control according to Fritzen (2010, p. 12) 
 
A disaster situation requires a distinctive management organization. In Hessen, the “Zwei-Stabs-






▪ German Red Cross (DRK)
▪ Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (JUH)
▪ Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD)
▪ Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-
Gesellschaft (DLRG)
Federation (Bund) Technical Relief Agency (THW) German Federal Armed Forces
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three central components, is used (AFKzV, 1999; HMdIS, 2016a; Lamers, 2016). At the highest 
level is the overall political responsibility, called disaster control management 
(Katastrophenschutzleitung – KatSL) in Hessen. It is performed by the ‘lower’ disaster control 
authority and thus either the district administrator or the mayor. The tasks include coordination 
and responsibility for all measures, both with regard to strategy and administration. It uses an 
operational-tactical and an administrative-organizational component for processing (AFKzV, 
1999; HMdIS, 2016a).  
The operational-tactical component, which is provided by the “Katastrophenschutzstab” (KatS-
Stab), coordinates all technical-tactical measures. This includes, among other things, the 
definition of the focal points of operations, the spatial devision and the planning and 
organization of forces. The technical-tactical component, which is comprised of all subsequent 
command levels, is subordinate to the KatS-Stab (see Figure 2.1). The KatS-Stab mainly consists 
of representatives of the fire brigade and the organizations involved in the mission (AFKzV, 
1999; HMdIS, 2016a). The administrative-organizational component, known in Hessen as the 
administrative staff or “Verwaltungsstab” (Vw-Stab), is concerned with the administrative tasks 
associated with an incident. The offices involved coordinate their procedures, taking into 
account the legal, financial and political requirements. Typical tasks include, for example, the 
planning of accommodation and care for the population in the event of an evacuation (AFKzV, 
1999). The demand for the three components is also to be transferred analogously to the ‘upper’ 
and the ‘highest’ disaster control authorities (HMdIS, 2016a). 
With the “Zwei-Stabs-Modell” Hessen follows the recommendations of the FwDV 100 similarly 
to some other federal states (e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia). Beyond that, however, two further 
structures have established themselves in Germany in different federal states. While the 
structures in the KatS-Stab are uniform throughout Germany, there are differences at the 
administrative level in particular. In Bavaria and Saxony, for example, a disaster staff is set up 
that resembles an administrative staff but has standard subject areas (see Figure 2.1). The 
operational command is subordinated to it. Alternatively, in Berlin or Hamburg, for example, a 
general staff with operational-tactical and administrative-organizational components is used 
(Lamers, 2016). 
In addition to the three components described, § 29 HBKG also defines the establishment of an 
information and communication center (ICT center or IuK-Zentrale) for Hessen. Furthermore, 
a hazardous substance monitoring center (Gefahrstoff-ABC-Messzentrale) is to be available at 
all levels of the disaster control authorities for major events involving hazardous substances. 
Both facilities are subordinate to the KatS-Stab and support it in its operational tasks (§ 29 
HBKG, 2018; HMdIS, 2016b). The technical-tactical component, which is subordinate to the 
KatS-Stab is represented by the technical operations management (Technische Einsatzleitung – 
TEL) and the operational sections (Einsatzabschnitte – EA) in Hessen. In general, the KatS-Stab 
sets up at least one TEL, however, depending on the size and the focus of the mission, several 
technical operations management units can be defined. Each TEL in turn defines different 
operational sections which coordinate the tasks in their section. A typical operational section is, 
for example, the “EA deployment”, which coordinates the area to which the forces that are 
moving up arrive before they receive concrete deployment orders. An overview of the 
management structures in the event of a disaster in Hessen is given in Figure 2.1. Arrows drawn 
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through represent the subordination, whereas dashed arrows represent communication and 
information relationships (AFKzV, 1999; HMdIS, 2016a, HMdIS, 2016b). 
 
Figure 2.1: Management structures in the event of a disaster in Hessen according to HMdIS (2016b, p. 5)  
 
2.3. “Stabsarbeit” – Staff Work in Crisis Management 
Heimann and Hofinger (2016) describe a staff as a (temporary) advisory and support element 
that works for a leading person and uses the available information flows for this purpose. The 
actors in a given staff adopt specific roles so that tasks are clearly distributed. They are always 
used when, for example, there is an increased need for coordination due to a large number of 
personnel or the amount of information can no longer be processed by one person. Furthermore, 
in such situations special expertise for decision making must be provided and uniform 
leadership is required (Heimann and Hofinger, 2016). 
In Hessen, the KatS-Stab and the TEL are regularly managed on a staff basis. In addition, 
individual administrative staffs also use this form of management. The structure of the staff in 
in disaster control or the fire brigade is described in FwDV 100 and can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
Each staff always consists of a head of staff and various subject areas. The subject areas always 
cover personnel, situation, deployment and supply. If required, press and media relations as 
well as information and communications (ICT) can also be set up. The staff is supplemented by 
various consultants and liaisons (see Figure 2.2) from other organizations, authorities and 
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Figure 2.2: Staff structure according to AFKzV (1999, p. 13)  
In order to be able to work an operation in a structured manner, clear tasks are assigned to 
each subject area. The S1 department is responsible for personnel matters. This includes 
alerting the emergency forces and calling in specialist consultants if the situation requires them. 
Furthermore, the department plans the reserve especially for longer missions and coordinates 
the required deployment areas. Another important task is the management of a force overview, 
which for example is relevant, when planning the supply (AFKzV, 1999).  
The S2 department is responsible for determining and visualizing the situation. This includes, 
in particular, the continuous acquisition and evaluation of information on the deployment and 
the merging of it in a situation map. Furthermore, the S2 provides various deployment 
overviews, such as an overview of the operational sections. The department is also responsible 
for ensuring that information is reported to other departments as well as to the general public. 
The department keeps the mission diary and writes the final report on the mission (AFKzV, 
1999). 
The tasks of subject area S3 include, in particular, assessing the situation and deciding on the 
measures to be taken. They define the main areas of deployment and initiate immediate 
measures in the event of danger to the population. All in all, the S3 assesses the damage area 
and manages the responsibilities of the resulting measures. They can issue orders directly and 
instruct forces on the tasks to be performed, but are also responsible for monitoring said tasks. 
In addition, the department is responsible for conducting the situation reviews (AFKzV, 1999). 
The supply during the mission is administered by the subject area S4. It organizes necessary 
aids and consumables such as fuel or building materials. In addition, it is responsible for the 
catering of the emergency forces and their accommodation as well as materials for self-
protection (AFKzV, 1999). 
If the subject areas S5 and S6 are represented in the staff, they are responsible for press and 
media relations as well as communications. Press and media work includes collecting and 
preparing mission information for the public and writing statements. In addition, the S5 
department is responsible for the support and coordination of the press officers and involves 



















responsible for ensuring communication and passing on information. They oversee the 
allocation and adherence to the radio channels and transmit commands and information to the 
emergency forces. In addition, they ensure communication security and keep in contact with 
other authorities and institutions (AFKzV, 1999). 
Cooperation within the staff is very important so that large-scale and complex operations 
requiring staff leadership can be handled efficiently. In particular, in order to assess the 
situation, subject areas S2 and S3 must cooperate and coordinate their actions. The subject 
areas must also coordinate when it comes to the additional request of task forces and the 
organization of provision areas (i.e. areas close to the place of action where the emergency 
forces gather) (S1 and S3 in both cases) as well as the planning of supplies (S4 and S1). In 
addition, the staff management must be involved in decisions and expert knowledge must be 
drawn from the specialist consultants (Lamers, 2016). 
One goal of staff work is the establishment of a shared mental model. It symbolizes the common 
knowledge shared in the team and also includes the experiences and values of the individual 
actors. The aim is to ensure that all persons base their decisions on the same grounds (Lamers, 
2016; Zinke and Hofinger, 2016). For example, it must be clear to each staff member who takes 
on which tasks and who has which skills. In order to develop a shared mental model, it is 
important for a staff to exchange information at regular meetings (Zinke and Hofinger, 2016).  
A staff should be rather small, but with qualified personnel. Training is therefore very important 
for staff work. Although there are already corresponding seminars, Lamers (2016) states in his 
theses on future staff work that the training and further development of personnel in particular 
must be intensified even more. He explains that many problems can still be traced back to 
inadequate training and that it is important to have a pool of specialists with the appropriate 
key competences. 
A very relevant form of training for disaster control is the exercise. For example, § 29 HBKG 
regulates which preparatory measures are to be implemented by the disaster control authorities 
in Hessen and mentions in particular the exercise which is to be used, among other things, to 
test the interaction of all forces and parties involved in disaster control (§ 29 HBKG, 2018; § 32 
HBKG, 2018). It is precisely these exercises that the next chapter focuses on and describes their 
various types and their development in disaster control. 
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3. Exercise in Civil and Disaster Protection 
Exercising plays an important role in the field of civil protection and disaster response. Glass 
(2012) describes the regular exercise in combination with training and operation as a 
coordinated system, which in its entirety guarantees the readiness of all forces in civil 
protection. This chapter will address this in more detail. After a brief historical overview of the 
fire brigade and disaster control exercise the various objectives associated with the exercise will 
be analyzed. Furthermore, the chapter gives an overview of the different forms of the exercise 
and the methodology for planning, implementation and evaluation. With the LÜKEX exercise 
series, a special exercise in Germany will be outlined in the following. At the end of the chapter, 
the situation of the exercise in practice is described and discussed. 
With the foundation of the voluntary fire brigade in the 19th century, exercise assumes a role 
with increasing importance in fire and disaster protection. Since these areas were from then on 
the responsibility of the fire brigade as an organization, the approaches and measures especially 
in fire protection shifted from a preventative to a preparative character. The exercise was part 
of everyday operations and led to the forming of routines and the strengthening of preparedness 
among the emergency forces (Ellebrecht et al., 2013). In combination with the inherent 
discipline of operations the exercise became a classic feature of the fire brigade and promoted 
the inner calmness of its members while reducing susceptibility to errors (ibid.). In addition to 
this professionalization of forces, the exercise was given a further task in modern times. As such 
it served to increase the confidence of the population in the abilities of the fire brigade. This 
was achieved by staging large-scale public exercises, a procedure which is still practiced today 
where especially large exercises take place in the presence of representatives of the media and 
political leaders (ibid.). 
 
3.1. Exercise Objectives 
In addition to the confidence-building approach the exercise in civil protection and disaster 
response fulfils a number of other objectives. A very dominant aspect is the experience of the 
disaster described by Ellebrecht et al. (2013) in order to be able to prepare for crises. This 
incorporates the idea of uncertainty and enhances the exercise into a tool to avoid turning 
threatening events into a disaster. In particular, it is about mental preparation for crisis events 
(BBK, 2011b) or according to Anderson and Abbey (2011, p. 1093) “making affectively present 
a space-time [...] so that the exercise can function as a technique of equivalence, allowing future 
events to be rendered governable”. This objective was confirmed in an interview with the 
professional fire brigade Darmstadt underlining the importance of simulating and training 
events that rarely occur in everyday life (Interview 5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May). 
A further fundamental objective of the exercise is the training of emergency forces and other 
actors. In the context of an exercise they will be enabled to test and validate concepts, protocols 
and capabilities in a low-risk environment. Actors can also familiarize themselves with their 
own role and related tasks in the overall system and exercising promotes interaction and 
communication between the different actors and organizations involved (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013). Exercises will enable the emergency services, administrators and 
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decision-makers to understand the impact of their own decisions and improve responsiveness 
through the routine gained (Adey and Anderson, 2012; Anderson and Adey, 2011; BSI, 2008). 
In an interview held on March 18th 2019 the department for crisis management and research at 
the State Fire Service Institute North Rhine Westphalia it was also explained that exercises give 
actors a sense of security in their actions (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 
March). The department of fire and disaster control at the regional council of Kassel (‘upper’ 
disaster control authority) emphasized in an interview the importance of the exercise especially 
for non-specialist personnel of e.g. administrations. Training and repetition are often the only 
possibility to internalize special requirements which occur in connection with large-scale 
damage situations (Interview 2, 2019, personal communication, 05 March). According to Glass 
(2012), exercises also strengthen the motivation of the emergency forces. 
The training of the personnel is directly accompanied by another objective of exercising, namely 
the verification and application of processes. Often only the application of specific processes 
and protocols shows their feasibility (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016). This includes in particular the 
verification of assumptions made as listed by the BSI (2008). The exercise enables all 
stakeholders to identify capacity gaps in the defined structures and processes and to create 
opportunities for improvement (O’Grady, 2016). Practitioners also attributed a high degree of 
relevance to this goal (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). Moreover, it is 
stated that in addition to the defined processes it is also important to obtain knowledge 
regarding the equipment used and the tactical approach (Interview 5, 2019, personal 
communication, 13 May). 
One goal that is repeatedly mentioned, especially in the context of the LÜKEX exercise series, 
is to deal with a specific disaster scenario (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; Haritz, 2016). Through 
the intensive planning, execution and evaluation of an exercise, the actors are prompted to deal 
with the scenario at hand and gain specific insights. From the point of view of an administrative 
staff, the aim is to gain an understanding of the respective situation and the actors relevant to 
it (Interview 2, 2019, personal communication, 05 March). This is accompanied by the belief 
that exercises should take place regularly in order to cover different scenarios and to recognize 
individual characteristics. Anderson and Adey (2011, p. 1092) take up this aspect in their brief 
definition of the exercise as “rehearsals of response and recovery from a range of disruptive 
events”. This objective can be summarized by saying that the exercise is part of everyday life 
within the fire brigade and thus a crucial tool in everyday life and training (Interview 3, 2019, 
personal communication, 18 March). 
Finally, a very important objective of the exercise is to improve cooperation and networking. In 
crisis events it is very relevant to “know your friends before you need them” (equivalent to the 
German “in der Krise Köpfe kennen”) as Haritz (2016, p. 265) puts it. This applies on the one 
hand to the deepening of cooperation within the staff and the direct environment (Bédé and 
Hofinger, 2016), but also between the various organizations involved in the situation (Anderson 
and Adey, 2011). Since crisis situations are often associated with stress, it is advantageous if 
the actors already know each other through recurring exercises and can understand and assess 
each other (ibid.). This serves in particular to avoid mistakes in the field of communication and 
is important in cooperation in crises (Interview 5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May). 
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3.2. Types of Exercises 
Nowadays, the organizations involved in disaster control have established various forms of 
practice. These differ above all in their central function, the effort involved in planning and 
implementation and whether they are discussion-based or operation-based. In the following, 
the most important forms of exercises are presented and explained.  
One of the most common exercises is the drill. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (2013, p. 2-5), a drill constitutes a “coordinated, supervised activity usually employed 
to validate a specific function or capability in a single agency or organization”. The drill is used 
to maintain routine handling of the equipment as well as to reduce execution errors. For 
example, putting on respiratory protective equipment or the handling of salvage tools is 
practiced regularly in drills, as Ellebrecht et al. (2013) explain. In addition to the drill, function 
tests also apply to the frequent and regular forms of exercise. During function tests sub-
processes, procedures and systems are checked for their functionality and sequences are revised 
(BSI, 2008). These can be for example restart protocols in factories or critical infrastructures 
but also a regular siren test of the fire brigade. 
Another form of exercise is the table top exercise (TTX). This is a scenario-based discussion 
exercise in which a hypothetical emergency situation is simulated. The TTX is intended to 
promote general awareness and is mainly used to practice communication and the order of 
spatial location (Ellebrecht et al., 2013). Also concepts and procedures are played through and 
different ways of solving a situation are discussed (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013). In the table top exercise the practitioners play their role and communicate their actions 
and decisions verbally. For easier understanding, common notes or graphical models can also 
be created (Ellebrecht et al., 2013). During the exercise, practitioners are encouraged to engage 
in deeper discussions. The aim is to analyze different problem-solving strategies and to achieve 
a deeper understanding of the scenario (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Table 
top exercises can be extended by a pre-defined script and made more complex for the 
participants. The exercise instructor makes changes to the scenario with so-called “injects” to 
which the participants have to react. The injects can be introduced into the scenario in different 
ways, e.g. by simulated telephone calls or emails (ibid.).  
A special form of TTX is the “Stabsübung” which translates to staff exercise commonly used in 
Germany. The focus here is on cooperation within the staff and its working methods and only 
staff members are trained (BSI, 2008; Hofinger et al., 2016). Table top exercises and staff 
exercises are particularly suitable for untrained staffs that are on technical and content level 
and can be used as preparation for functional or full exercises (Hofinger et al., 2016). TTX 
require relatively little preparation and are easy to implement as they involve less personnel in 
the exercise coordination (ibid.). The scenarios in a table top exercise can also be from areas 
not related to the subject (e.g. the control of a cruise ship). This could have the advantage that 
the trainees can more easily get involved in their role and the scenario (Zinke et al., 2016). 
The “Stabsrahmenübung” is an extension of the staff exercise and forms a transition to the 
functional exercises. In addition to the staff, command posts such as the technical operations 
management (TEL) are also practiced, but there is no actual implementation of the orders (Bédé 
and Hofinger, 2016; BSI, 2008). During the exercise, the staff receives periodic injects from the 
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exercise management or a control group and must work through these as if in an operational 
situation with the aid of the subordinate command levels (Hofinger et al., 2016). The 
Stabsrahmenübung supports the members of the staff in being able to act in complex situations 
(Bédé and Hofinger, 2016). Furthermore, functional exercises are used if aspects of 
implementation are to be trained in addition to the mental processing of the situation. 
The functional exercise which corresponds to the German “Rahmenübung” (framework 
exercise) is an operation-based exercise. Functional exercises are designed to evaluate the 
participants’ capabilities and practice plans, procedures and command and control functions. 
Routines in the practical handling of processes and equipment will be facilitated. Functional 
exercises always move within the limits of a defined scenario in which they are held through 
the use of injects (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). They represent excerpts from 
possible emergency situations and vary in duration and scope. The participants can thus carry 
out the organizational processes and actions in a realistic time and environment. In recent years, 
the scope of functional exercises in Germany has increased more and more, and large-scale 
exercises with a large number of actors are taking place more frequently. With the help of 
simulations, disaster scenarios are being played out more and more frequently with functional 
exercises (Ellebrecht et al., 2013). 
The most complex and resource-intensive form of exercise is the full-scale exercise (FSE). In 
this type of exercise all aspects of a scenario are practiced. Depending on the scenario, different 
hierarchical levels and often several organizations are involved and the exercise is carried out 
in real-time (BSI, 2008; Ellebrecht et al., 2013; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
To ensure that the scope of the exercise remains manageable and does not become too complex, 
full-scale exercises are planned in clearly defined spatial areas and with clearly defined 
participants (Ellebrecht et al., 2013). The FSE tries to create a stressful environment in order 
to depict missions as close to reality as possible and to prepare the participants ideally for 
corresponding situations (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
In addition to the previously mentioned forms of exercise, seminars and workshops are also 
held specifically to impart theoretical knowledge (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013) and create reviews aimed at discussing and evaluating previously defined plans and 
procedures (BSI, 2008). Regular alarming exercises should also be carried out to check the 
procedures and protocols as well as the technical equipment for reporting and alarming (ibid.). 
All these exercise types can be subdivided into categories for easier differentiation. The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (2013) differentiates between discussion-based and 
operations-based exercises. Using this classification the Stabsrahmenübung forms a special case. 
It includes both the aspects of discussion and operation, so that both categories apply to it. 
Another way to distinguish between exercises is whether or not they are based on scenarios. An 
overview of all exercises and their categories is shown in Table 3.1. In principle, the exercises 
never stand alone but build on each other. Both theory and practice have to be trained regularly. 
Therefore it often makes sense to develop a multi-year exercise and training plan that defines 
applicable learning goals and requirements and relates exercises to one another (BSI, 2008; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
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3.3. Exercise Methodology 
In regard to crisis management in Germany there are hardly any regulations or guidelines on 
exercise methodology (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March), especially from 
official regulatory bodies. Only the “Feuerwehr-Dienstvorschrift 2” (FwDV 2), which stipulates 
the training of voluntary fire brigades, defines the performance of practical exercises as 
components of various training courses. However, it does not deal with the training 
methodology either (AFKzV, 2012). The “BSI Standard 100-4” on emergency management 
provides an overview of the various types and the conduct of exercises as well as the documents 
required, but it is primarily aimed at businesses and public agencies (BSI, 2008). Support in the 
planning and implementation of crisis management exercises is offered by some fire brigade 
schools in Germany which are each set up by the federal states. They offer seminars and training 
courses for administrative districts (Landkreise) and cities (IdF NRW, n.d.; SFSG, n.d.). In the 
international area, more precise specifications are given in some cases. The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, for example, provides a complete guide to exercise methodology in the 
form of the “Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program” (HSEEP) (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013). 
The methodology for conducting exercises is generally based on three phases: exercise planning 
and preparation, also known as the design and development phase, exercise conduct and 
exercise evaluation. Looking at the long-term development of the organization and its members 
of staff, improvement planning is also seen as the fourth phase (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; BSI, 
2008; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). How much time and effort is involved in 
the planning, conduct and evaluation of the exercise depends on the type of exercise and its 
boundary conditions. However, Bédé and Hofinger (2016) quote a ratio of 60% (planning) to 
10% (conduct) to 30% (evaluation) as a rule of thumb for scenario-based exercises (especially 
the Stabsrahmenübung) (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016, p. 244). Accordingly, the planning and 
preparation of an exercise takes by far the most time and effort. The actual implementation on 
the other hand requires less effort even though it has the greatest external impact.  
In the planning phase, the overall concept of the exercise is defined and personnel planning is 
carried out for the entire duration of the exercise, including preparation and follow-up. The 
type of exercise is also defined and the associated exercise objectives are discussed and 
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Scenario-based














established. In the case of a scenario-based exercise, the scenario is designed and the documents 
required are created, in particular the exercise script. For a successful evaluation of the exercise, 
its objectives are already defined in the planning phase and the evaluation is planned 
accordingly (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; BSI, 2008; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013). 
The overall concept which is to be developed throughout the planning of the exercise should 
serve as a guideline for the control and leadership group and must be approved by the 
management of the organization, authority or company (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016). It includes 
general information and framework conditions, such as the name of the exercise and the reason 
why it is required. In addition, the information includes cost and expense planning and the 
specifics of the exercise (ibid.). These and other details, such as the type of exercise, the level 
of participation and the duration of the exercise, form its scope and help the exercise leader to 
define the correct size and complexity and to make the exercise feasible (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013).  
In addition to the aspects already mentioned, the overall concept also includes the exercise 
objectives and the scenario, if there is one. It goes into more detail about the time schedule and 
sets dates for the planning sessions. Another important aspect is the definition of the target 
group, i.e. the question of who should practice. Are different areas involved and do they come 
from different organizations? Should other external actors be involved in the exercise? The 
concept contains further information on the exercise surroundings. It lists the members of the 
exercise leadership team as well as the observers and describes the procedure for the 
documentation and evaluation of the exercise (including the evaluation goals). Last but not 
least, it contains the location where the exercise is to take place and what needs there are with 
regard to supply, security and other resources required (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016). Since this 
information is often not available in detail at the beginning of the planning process, a two-stage 
approach has been established. First, a rough concept is drawn up and only after approval a 
detailed planning is carried out (BSI, 2008). 
For each exercise, clear exercise goals must be defined at the beginning of the planning process. 
These should always be measurable, realistic and achievable (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016). They 
should also be relevant for all actors involved in order to achieve a better identification with 
the exercise (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). When defining the exercise goals, 
the level of knowledge of the exercise participants should be considered, so that the exercise 
specifically promotes the participants’ abilities. The goals can be process-related or content-
related, or they can specifically address the team, for example, in a communication exercise 
(Bédé and Hofinger, 2016).  
On the basis of the exercise objectives, a reference scenario is selected that provides the 
foundation for the exercise. The scenario must be chosen in such a way that it enables the 
accomplishment of the exercise objectives and challenges the participants, but does not 
overburden them. In addition, the reference scenario should be related to the participating 
organizations or the region in which the exercise is conducted (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). It is therefore common for scenarios to be selected 
on the basis of risk analyses or past events (BBK, 2011b). In his article, Alexander (2015, p. 6) 
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expressed it with “we plan for the last event, not the next one”. He referred in particular to the 
availability of resources. For an exercise to be as realistic as possible, it can only be based on 
resources that are actually available. This should be reflected in particular in the selection of 
the scenario.  
In most cases, the scenario methodology is used to develop the exercise scenario (Bédé and 
Hofinger, 2016). As Alexander (2005) explains, this technique is particularly suitable for three 
areas: the development of plans and procedures, the prediction of future events and the 
development of hypothetical emergency situations. The scenario describes a sequence or 
evolution of events or provides a framework or model for the events and the related exercise 
(Alexander, 2015; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). It is an exploratory tool with 
which different consequences and outcomes can be modelled and that allows for different 
framework conditions to be incorporated (Alexander, 2015). The procedure for the 
development of scenarios is usually iterative. Based on the defined reference scenario and some 
input conditions, possible processes and consequences of events are assumed and formulated. 
Afterwards, follow-up developments are generated and the plausibility of the resulting process 
is checked on the basis of the reference scenario and the initial consequences. Thus, it is possible 
that a scenario can result in a variety of outcomes (ibid.). The sequence of events results in a 
narrative event timeline which forms the basis for action (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013). In free-running exercises, scenarios can also develop in unplanned directions, 
which is why various injects are planned during the conception of the scenario to guide the 
participants back closer to the initial situation (Alexander, 2005). The scenario and planned 
injections are documented in the form of a tabular script and, in addition to the description of 
the content, contain information on the time of the event or the injection, the form of 
communication, the sender and the recipient. Furthermore, the expected reaction or required 
tools can be described as well (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; BSI, 2008). An example of such a 
script is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Exercise script according to BSI (2008, p. 88) 
 
After the planning phase, the exercise can be conducted. The date chosen for this is usually 
announced to the participants and should influence the normal course of operations as little as 
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by the exercise leader. During the briefing the active participants are introduced to the scenario 
and their roles as well as the schedule are explained (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Also, there should be hints regarding the behavior 
and confidentiality of the exercise. All materials used in an exercise must be clearly identifiable 
as exercise materials. Furthermore, for the purpose of external communication, it must be made 
clear that an exercise is conducted. For genuine emergencies during an exercise, a keyword 
must be defined that allows a clear identification of the emergency (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016).  
During the exercise, various people take on special tasks and functions in addition to the active 
players. The exercise leader and the steering group are central to this. They make sure that the 
exercise moves within the framework planned beforehand and take corrective action in the 
event of excessively large deviations through injects or interventions (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; 
BSI, 2008; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). While doing so they still try to ensure 
that the development and play of the exercise is as free as possible (BSI, 2008). The formal 
decision-making power and responsibility is incumbent on the exercise leader. In case of 
unforeseeable events or external effects, he or she can also abort the exercise (Bédé and 
Hofinger, 2016). In addition to the input of information on the situation, the steering group 
also takes care of the project management and the documentation of the exercise. They answer 
questions from the participants and take care of logistical matters (ibid.). In addition to these 
functions, observers are also included, especially in larger exercises. They are not actively 
involved in the exercise and therefore do not participate in the communication between the 
participants (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Much 
more they observe certain areas of the exercise from the outside and document their results and 
assessments. In discussion-based exercises, observers can also ask questions that can be 
discussed in the group of participants (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). In order 
for the observers to consider aspects relevant to the exercise in their assessments, it is important 
that the exercise objectives are clearly communicated to them. It is also useful to have previously 
created checklists according to which observations can be made (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016).  
After the contents of the script have been worked through, the exercise is finished by the 
exercise leader and the disassembly begins. Each exercise should be followed by a debriefing in 
which a summary of the exercise and the satisfaction of the leader are communicated (Bédé 
and Hofinger, 2016; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Also, any problems or 
successes that are noticed can be expressed in the form of a pre-evaluation (BSI, 2008). In 
addition, the participants should be given the opportunity of direct feedback and discussion of 
strengths and weaknesses in the debriefing or in the final discussions of the respective areas 
(also called “hot wash”) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
The evaluation, which already begins with the debriefing after the execution, is a central 
component of each exercise (Bédé and Hofinger, 2016). During the evaluation the exercise 
should be assessed with regard to the defined objectives and form the transition to the 
improvement planning (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). Osarek (2016) argues 
that the importance of evaluation lies in obtaining reliable statements about the actors’ 
competences and their ability to act. The author pleads for specific expectations of the 
evaluation and the observers to be addressed in advance of the exercise and for evaluation 
concepts with checklists to be drawn up for orientation. The observations made may differ 
 
  Page 25 
between discussion-based and operations-based exercises. While in discussions attention is 
often paid to the correct integration of plans and procedures, in operational exercises the focus 
is also on the execution and on what basis decisions have been made (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013). Other topics on which observers can give estimates include how 
authorities or other organizations were involved in decisions and executions, whether the 
organizational and command structures were adhered to, how and which information was 
shared and how overall communication took place (ibid.).  
In addition to the information provided by the observers, the exercise protocols and the 
assessments of the participants (active players, steering group and exercise leader) are also used 
for the evaluation (BSI, 2008; Osarek, 2016). In order to be able to establish a certain 
systematic, question and feedback sheets as well as audio and video material are partially used 
(Osarek, 2016). The aim of this data analysis is not only to identify what happened but why it 
happened, i.e. to carry out a root-cause analysis (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
The evaluation ends with the preparation of a final report for the exercise which is subsequently 
presented to the responsible persons of the organization, the authority or the company (Bédé 
and Hofinger, 2016; BSI, 2008; Osarek, 2016). 
 
3.4. LÜKEX – An Interministerial and Interstate Crisis Management Exercise 
The “Interministerial and Interstate Crisis Management Exercise” (Länderübergreifende 
Krisenmanagement Exercise – LÜKEX) is a special exercise in Germany. It is the only exercise 
that pursues an overarching societal approach and targets the strategic level, i.e. the highest 
decision-makers from the federal government, the states and companies (especially operators 
of critical infrastructures) (Haritz, 2016). The national crisis management is practiced with a 
“worst-case scenario” across departments and states (BBK, 2019b). The aim is to involve the 
entire social security system in the preparation and conduct of the exercise. This also includes 
the police, the German armed forces and the intelligence services as well as the actors of civil 
protection and the operators of critical infrastructures. Another aim of the security system is the 
citizens’ ability to help themselves (BBK, 2019b). With its approach, LÜKEX serves to review 
this precautionary system and works to improve cooperation between the various levels and 
actors (BBK, 2011b). 
LÜKEX was created after the major damage situations at the beginning of the 2000s, in 
particular the Elbe flood, and the recognition of the need for improvement in coping with such 
interstate events (BBK, 2019b; Haritz, 2016). LÜKEX was anchored in law through the “Zivil- 
und Katastrophenhilfegesetz” (ZSKG) in 2009 (BBK, 2019b; § 14 ZSKG, 2009). The first LÜKEX 
was carried out in 2004 and has since been conducted every two to three years with changing 
scenarios. The last LÜKEX took place in November 2018 where the scenario was a gas shortage 
in southern Germany during an extreme winter. The next LÜKEX is planned for 2021 (BBK, 
2019b; Haritz, 2016). Table 3.3 gives an overview of the eight LÜKEX exercises and the 
respective scenarios that have been carried out so far. 
An essential aspect at LÜKEX besides the implementation is the networking in all phases of the 
exercise. Here, LÜKEX generates a platform that enables joint work and the exchange of 
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information independent of scenarios and the configuration of organizations and actors (Haritz, 
2016). The exercise cycle at LÜKEX is comparable with the phases of other forms of exercise. 
First, in the planning phase (approx. 6 - 8 months) the exercise topic and a rough scenario are 
defined (BBK, 2019b). Furthermore, in this phase the exercise objectives are specified and it is 
clarified which actors are involved in the exercise and how intensive their participation is. For 
example, at LÜKEX 18 twelve federal states participated in the exercise, but only the states of 
Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg practiced intensively (ibid.). General exercise goals can 
include, for example, reviewing overarching cooperation, improving information management 
or optimizing media and public relations work (BBK, 2011b). In the subsequent preparatory 
phase, the scenario is further elaborated and the script is prepared. In addition, weak points 
and possible optimizations relating to the scenario are analyzed (BBK, 2019b). The preparation 
phase, which takes approx. 9 - 12 months, is pivotal for the network formation and the intensive 
discussion of the scenario by the preparation team of the exercise participants. The scenario is 
developed in an iterative and discursive process. This results in partial scenarios for the various 
participants, which must be linked accordingly (BBK, 2011b). The preparation is followed by 
the execution (approx. 2 - 3 months) of the exercise and the subsequent evaluation (approx. 4 
- 6 months) (BBK, 2019b). Different methods are used for the evaluation in order to enable a 
comprehensive verification. Observers and questionnaires are used and various evaluation 
sessions are carried out. At the end an internal and a public report will be produced (ibid). The 
overall management of LÜKEX is the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The 
individual phases from planning to evaluation are managed by a BBK project group (ibid.). 
Overall, LÜKEX is regarded as a success and has contributed to an improved coordination and 
decision-making culture (Glass, 2012; Haritz, 2016). 
Table 3.3: Overview of previous LÜKEX scenarios according to BBK (2019b, p. 9) 
 
 
3.5. The Exercise in Practice 
As Ellebrecht et al. (2013) explain, various representatives of the authorities predict an age of 
practice and describe it as an essential element in the security apparatus. The exercise enables 
a reduction of complexity and creates security in dealing with uncertainties (ibid.). It is an 
established and important tool of preparedness and prevention within civil protection 
LÜKEX 04 Extreme winter, power failure, terror
LÜKEX 05 Terrorism in connection with the 2006 World Cup
LÜKEX 07 Worldwide influenza pandemic
LÜKEX 09/10 Terrorist threat with chemical and radioactive agents
LÜKEX 11 Threat to IT security from massive cyber attacks
LÜKEX 13 Exceptional biological threats
LÜKEX 15 Storm surge on the North Sea coast
LÜKEX 18 Gas shortage in Southern Germany
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(Ellebrecht et al., 2013; Glass, 2012). If one looks at current practice, however, it quickly 
becomes clear that there is no “one” exercise. Rather, it depends on the organization or 
authority which role exercises play in everyday life or which objectives and structures are in the 
foreground. In order to be able to sketch a more distinguished picture of this, interviews and 
discussions with several actors on the context of exercise planning were conducted in the 
present work, the results of which are presented below. In order to better classify the 
statements, the actors are briefly introduced (cf. section 1.3).  
From the point of view of the professional fire brigade in Darmstadt exercises are described as 
an integral part of everyday life. Exercises and other forms of training have fixed times and are 
scheduled weekly (Interview 5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May). This statement is also 
confirmed by the team of the department for crisis management and research at the State Fire 
Service Institute North Rhine Westphalia taking the perspective of firefighting schools 
(Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). In this interview is was further 
explained that exercises are the decisive tool in everyday life as well as training and that they 
are also part of the examinations at the end of training courses. In contrast, the department of 
fire and disaster control at the regional council of Kassel explained from the perspective of the 
“upper” disaster authorities and the administrative level that exercises can, depending on the 
people involved, play a subordinate role in everyday life (Interview 2, 2019, personal 
communication, 05 March). While LÜKEX as described above inherently is not a part of 
everyday life, there have also been noticeable improvements in regard to processes and 
communication among regular participants. The focus here continues to be on networking 
among the exercise controllers and the planning team, as the BBK’s LÜKEX project group 
emphasizes (Interview 1, 2019, personal communication, 26 February).  
The lack of handouts for the planning of exercises is often viewed critically. Here, one can speak 
of a “weakness in the system” with which the individual organizations and authorities have to 
struggle (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). Some practitioners argue that 
this could be remedied by checklists and experienced exercise planners and controllers 
(Interview 5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May). Above all, however, it is important that 
each actor in the exercise has a task and feels needed to perceive the exercise as a positive 
experience. A proper allocation of exercise control with the aim of reflecting the crisis 
management staff is also an important criterion for the success of the exercise (Interview 2, 
2019, personal communication, 05 March). For scenario-based exercises, it is particularly 
important during planning to ensure that the scenario is as realistic as possible and that the 
documents used for the scenario look real. This is important because the scenario is often used 
as a vehicle for motivation and increases the acceptance of the users as long as they can relate 
to it (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). 
For most exercises, planning teams are often formed in the organizations that also carry out the 
exercise themselves. Alternatively the exercise is developed and carried out in the context of a 
seminar at the state fire brigade schools or the “Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency 
Planning and Civil Protection” (AKNZ). In addition, there are also some concepts based on joint 
planning by several actors. This is the case, for example, with the LÜKEX exercises (Interview 
1, 2019, personal communication, 26 February) or in a structure that is being planned for the 
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city of Darmstadt using a working group for exercises with experts from all organizations and 
various consultants (Interview 5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May).  
Different methods and software are used for the different phases of the exercise. In the planning 
and preparation phase, for example, these are mainly classic office software applications since 
most of the exercise material is text and list based (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 
18 March). In the context of the methodology, the question of the exercise type is the most 
important, as emphasized by the department for red cross work and civil protection at the 
Institute for Education and Communication of the Westphalia-Lippe regional association of the 
German Red Cross (Interview 4, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). Similar to the 
scenario development within the LÜKEX group workshops, there are some iterative workshops 
to develop the exercise framework and the scenario (Interview 2, 2019, personal 
communication, 05 March). In the implementation phase, the systems employed by the 
respective departments in everyday life are used and practiced accordingly. These are, for 
example, crisis management tools (Interview 5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May) or 
information systems and databases (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). 
Research is developing methods for the evaluation of exercises, but these have not yet found 
their way into practice (Interview 4, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). 
The time required for planning, carrying out and evaluating the exercises is high overall and 
depends on many factors. As an example, crisis and administration staffs must take into account 
the fact that personnel are required for two shifts and that an additional reserve must be 
available. This has a major impact on the exercise sessions, as the number of people to be 
trained is high and additional organizational aspects such as shift changes should also occur in 
exercises (Interview 2, 2019, personal communication, 05 March). Another factor is that even 
a high degree of experience can only lead to a limited reduction in the planning and preparation 
phase, as a certain minimum load is always present. In most cases exercises are secondary to 
day to day tasks, which can lead to time problems for the people involved. In some cases, this 
means that the follow-up to the exercises is no longer carried out under the same pressure 
(Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). This is accompanied by the problem 
that there is no “state of the art” for uniform criteria for preparation and follow-up (Interview 
4, 2019, personal communication, 18 March).  
Other challenges include difficulties regarding foresighted thinking in developing the scenario 
as well as defining the exercise boundaries (Interview 4, 2019, personal communication, 18 
March), especially with regard to the spatial and temporal aspects. The scenario is intended to 
introduce the players to the situation and to challenge them, but not to overwhelm them 
(Interview 2, 2019, personal communication, 05 March). Further difficulties in the context of 
the scenario are the high effort required for data collection for the respective area and the 
involvement of the relevant specialist groups or experts (Interview 3, 2019, personal 
communication, 18 March). Due to the complexity, especially with larger exercises, it is often 
necessary to involve several consultants in the planning process in order to make them as 
realistic as possible (Interview 1, 2019, personal communication, 26 February). In addition, 
simulations are difficult to carry out and some assumptions have to be made (Interview 4, 2019, 
personal communication, 18 March). In order to avoid subsequent uncertainties or missing 
data, assumptions are made leading to exercise artificialities. However, it can be noted that the 
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excessive use of such exercise artificialities is to be evaluated critically, since they can lead to a 
dilution of the exercise results. In general, the identification of topics including the definition 
of the objectives of the exercise as well as the selection of the actors involved must be reflected 
upon and sometimes smaller module exercises, which only consider individual aspects, are 
better suited than highly complex scenarios in which many assumptions have to be made 
(Interview 5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May).  
A general challenge for exercises in cities and administrative districts is scheduling, especially 
for larger exercises where many volunteers are involved. Here it is important to ensure that the 
exercises have as little impact as possible on the everyday tasks of the participants (Interview 
5, 2019, personal communication, 13 May). With the strategic exercises of LÜKEX, one problem 
lies in finding participants, especially from different areas. In addition, it can be challenging to 
harmonize the actors so that the output of the individual can be maximized. Since many people 
are involved in LÜKEX exercises, the flow of information between the players as well as within 
the steering group is always a challenge that should not be underestimated and must be well 
organized (Interview 1, 2019, personal communication, 26 February). Public relations work 
which is of great importance within LÜKEX often poses a difficulty for exercises on a smaller 
level. This is especially applicable to the administrative staff and its actual implementation due 
to the lack of resources. Still, it can be emphasizes that public relations and the role of social 
media should be regularly addressed in exercises. Finally, in many areas it is perceived as a 
challenge to present and analyze the actual communications that take place. These can vary 
considerably, especially in the case of free-running exercises, which are generally sought out 
(Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). 
An essential aspect of an exercise is its evaluation. What is interesting here, however, is that 
systematic evaluations are exceedingly rare, as Ellebrecht et al. (2013) also note with regard to 
simulation exercises (Interview 2, 2019, personal communication, 05 March). Practitioners 
describe the evaluation of the exercise as a “major construction site” which is often neglected 
and where standards would both be possible and useful (Interview 5, 2019, personal 
communication, 13 May). In general, evaluations of the exercise are obtained by assessments 
of the participants in the exercise. Normally, players and observers are recorded separately, 
sometimes using questionnaires (Interview 3, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). The 
evaluations are strongly oriented towards the defined exercise objectives and their focus lies 
primarily on internal processes and communication (Interview 2, 2019, personal 
communication, 05 March). However, an explicit evaluation of communication does not take 
place (Interview 3 and 4, 2019, personal communication, 18 March). A final report is drawn 
up at the end. An exceptional case here is the LÜKEX exercise. Here, the final report is 
intensively coordinated in advance between all parties involved and focusses on an assessment 
rather than a rating. It formulates recommendations for action for the various aspects 
considered (Interview 1, 2019, personal communication, 26 February).  
Exercises in civil protection have great potential and form an important foundation of 
preparedness and prevention (Ellebrecht et al., 2013; O’Grady, 2016). They can be used to 
sensitize actors and improve processes, communications and actions (Osarek, 2016). The 
planning, implementation and evaluation of exercises, however, also involve a great deal of 
effort and expertise, for which there have been only few standards and minimal software 
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support so far. This applies in particular to the planning and evaluation of exercises for which 
a number of supporting capabilities can be identified. Methods and software tools that support 
the development of scenarios and reduce uncertainties appear to be particularly helpful. They 
should also create opportunities for a systematic evaluation and thus support a better error 
culture, as Lamers (2016, p. 278) outlines with one of his theses on future staff work. In order 
to develop such a tool, this work examines social networks and their analysis procedures that 
have already established themselves in many areas. Therefore, the next chapter turns to the 
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4. Social Network Analysis 
As can be seen from the observation of exercises, scenarios, or the various situations from which 
they are constructed, are composed of dynamic chains of various interactions between different 
actors. These interactions can represent dependencies or causal relationships, or they can 
represent action sequences or processes. Interactions can also be found manifold in exercise 
scenarios in the form of communication. In all cases the focus is on the interaction or 
relationship between the actors and not on the actors themselves. For example, it is not the 
"storm" that is decisive in an exercise scenario, but the effect or relationship it has on a dyke 
due to the rising water level. Similarly, especially in complex exercises, it is not so much the 
individual actors, but their cooperation and communication that are relevant to the 
management of a situation. By this characteristic, exercises can be described as interaction or 
relationship networks, which offers many possibilities for analysis and interpretation. 
Networks are an integral part of today’s world. They can be found in almost all areas of science 
and technology. Newman (2018), for example, distinguishes four scientific fields in which 
network theory and analysis play an important role. Among these he counts technology, 
information, social and biological networks. Technology networks include, for example, large 
infrastructure networks such as road or transport networks as well as energy supply and 
telecommunication grids. Information networks can be citations or peer-to-peer networks for 
instance. Social networks usually describe relationships between entities such as friendship or 
links between organizations. An example of biological networks on the other hand are the 
branched neurons in the human brain (ibid.). This multitude of areas and applications also 
explains why network research is a very interdisciplinary field (Marin and Wellman, 2011). For 
the analysis and interpretation of networks, social network analysis has established itself as the 
most important approach in many research areas. Despite its widespread use in science, the 
concepts and methods of social network analysis have not yet been applied in practice. In order 
to investigate the use of networks in the context of exercises in civil protection and disaster 
response, this chapter first outlines the theoretical basics. The focus is on social networks and 
their analysis. At the beginning, a look is taken at the fundamentals of social networks and their 
terminology. After that, the chapter presents relevant aspects of graph theory as the 
mathematical representation of networks. With this background, the concept of centrality as 
one of the central concepts in the analysis of social networks is further discussed. The chapter 
ends with a description and discussion of techniques for the visualization of networks. 
 
4.1. Social Network Fundamentals 
According to Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 3), the focus of social network analysis is on 
“relationships among social entities and on the patterns and implications of these relationships”. 
This focus is based on the assumption that social life originates from and is shaped by 
relationships and patterns arising from these relationships (Marin and Wellman, 2011). 
Furthermore, the representation of these relationships in networks creates possibilities for 
structural and behavioral analysis, as Tavassoli (2018) explains. The origins of social network 
analysis in its current form go back to Jacob Moreno and Helen Jennings (1934) (Borgatti et 
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al., 2009; Freeman, 2004), who in their work ‘Who shall survive?: A new approach to the 
problem of human interrelations’ established a technique for the graphic representation of 
relationships between individuals with ‘sociometry’ (Borgatti et al., 2009; Moreno, 1934). 
Sociometry made it possible to visualize abstract social structures and make them tangible 
(Borgatti et al., 2009). According to Wasserman and Faust, some conditions apply to the 
definition of social networks. For example, actors are not regarded as independent of each other 
and in the analysis of individual actors, the network structure is interpreted as creating 
opportunities or obstacles for the individual to act (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
In network analysis, the entities whose relationship structures form the respective network are 
often referred to as nodes or actors. They can have different characteristics or attributes to make 
them distinguishable from each other (Borgatti et al., 2018). A node in a network can in 
principle be almost anything, including both actors capable of action and objects incapable of 
action (Albrecht, 2010; Borgatti et al., 2018). Furthermore, a node is not limited to a single 
acting entity or an individual but can also symbolize a group of actors such as an organization, 
a company or a country (Haas and Malang, 2010). A central problem in network analysis is the 
definition of the class of actors which is dependent on the relations to be investigated (Butts, 
2009). Since a change in the node set can have a significant impact on the network and its 
implications for the analysis, it should be defined in a way that it includes all relevant entities. 
Relevant entities are all those that are able to form at least one of the investigated relationships 
(ibid.). 
Relations, also referred to as ties, between the nodes of a network are the primary focus in 
network analysis whereas the attributes that a node associates with itself are subordinate to 
them (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The relations can be of very different types. Borgatti et al. 
(2018) distinguish between two groups of relations, the relational states and the relational 
events. Relational states represent relationship types which are continuous, i.e. constant for 
their period of existence. These include similarities, relational roles and relational cognition. 
The three groups can be further specified. For example, Borgatti et al. (2018) list location for 
the group of similarities or the kinship as a relational role. An example for relational cognition 
is perception, which can be used to map relationships such as ‘who knows whom’. Unlike 
relational states, relational events represent relationships that have a defined end. Here 
interactions like ‘who talks to whom’ or flows such as streams of information or resources can 
be categorized (ibid.).  
In the social network analysis, not only the relations between node pairs are considered, but in 
particular the patterns of relations in different areas and the overall network (Marin and 
Wellman, 2011). This also reveals a great strength of the network approach, namely the effect 
of indirect connections (relations between actors that exist exclusively via other actors) 
(Borgatti et al., 2018). Network analysis also assumes that similarities between actors do not 
arise on the basis of their attributes and characteristics, but rather on the basis of their social 
structure and position in the network. The concept of positions or centrality is one of the most 
important concepts in social network analysis, as it provides an insight into the perceptions and 
possibilities of action by the actors (see also section 4.3) (Marin and Wellman, 2011; Stegbauer, 
2010).  
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In conclusion, a social network can be described as a finite set of nodes that are connected by 
one or more types of relations and whose structures and patterns can provide indications of the 
actors’ possibilities for action (Marin and Wellman, 2011; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The 
description of a phenomenon in a network is characterized by assumptions about the relevant 
actors, the inherent relationships and interactions as well as the time period in which these take 
place (Butts, 2009). As Marin and Wellman (2011) put it, in social network analysis one cannot 
speak of a theory or a methodology, but rather of perspectives. Accordingly, the analysis of 
social networks does not show predictions about expected events, but instead creates 
opportunities to look at a problem and understand it. 
 
4.2. Graph Theory – The Mathematical Representation of Networks 
With the help of graph theory, social networks can be formalized. It forms the mathematical 
basis on which many tools for the analysis and representation of networks are based on. The 
following section describes the basic theorems for social networks from graph theory that are 
relevant in the next chapters. Here the standard works of Wasserman and Faust (1994), Steen 
(2010) and Newman (2018) are used as a basis. Most of the formulas and definitions presented 
in this section derive from these works on complex and social networks from the fields of 
mathematics, physics and sociology. 
In its simplest definition, a network or graph 𝐺 consists of a set of nodes or vertices 𝑉 and a set 
of edges 𝐸, so that 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) applies. For each edge 𝑒 it also applies that it connects two nodes 
𝑣1, 𝑣2 with each other and thus defines an unordered pair 𝑒 = 〈𝑣1, 𝑣2〉. The number of nodes is 
declared with 𝑛, so the set of nodes can be described with 𝑉(𝐺) = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛}. Equivalent to 
this is the number of edges is denoted by 𝑚 and the set of edges equals 𝐸(𝐺) = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑚}. 
This form of graph is also called undirected graph. Directed graphs on the other hand are those 
with edges pointing from an origin to a target node. Edges in directed graphs are called directed 
edges or arcs and are formalized by ordered pairs 〈𝑣1, 𝑣2⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗〉. In addition to a direction, edges in 
graphs can also have a weight. This is especially relevant if an edge or relation is not only 
dichotomous, i.e. exists or does not exist, but has a value or a strength. Weights in graphs 
correspond to real-valued numbers which can be both positive and negative (Newman, 2018, 
p. 109). A graph that has edges with weights is thus aptly called a weighted graph. Furthermore, 
if two nodes in a graph or network are connected by one edge at most and the structure contains 
no self-edges, i.e. edges which connect a node to itself, it constitute a simple graph or simple 
network. Otherwise, if a graph has multiple edges between two nodes (multiedges) or self-edges, 
it is called a multigraph. Figure 4.1 shows the different types of graphs that have been 
introduced. For all four types of graphs, the nodes and layout are identical and only the edges 
are different. Figure 4.1 (a) shows a simple undirected graph while Figure 4.1 (b) is directed. 
Figure 4.1 (c) corresponds to the first graph with the distinction that the edges have different 
weights, which is illustrated by the thickness of the edges. For example, edge 〈𝑣𝐷 , 𝑣𝐸〉 has a 




Networks and graphs can also be represented mathematically in matrices. The adjacency matrix 
𝐴 of a simple undirected graph is a symmetric 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix with elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 so that:  
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
1   𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗,
0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.                                                               
(4.1) 
The adjacency matrix can also be used to formalize directed graphs. In this case, however, the 
matrix is not necessarily symmetrical. While they can still be mapped by a single matrix, formula 
4.1 cannot be applied to define the matrix elements for simple weighted graphs or multigraphs. 
In the case of simple weighted graphs, the edge weight is used as matrix element whereas for 
multigraphs, the matrix element represents the number of edges. Accordingly, it is not possible 
to map weighted multigraphs using a single adjacency matrix. The matrices can be used to 









Figure 4.1: Four graphs with different edges. (a) A simple undirected graph, (b) a simple directed graph, (c) a simple 
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An important network property is the degree 𝑑 of a node, i.e. the number of edges connected to 
it. This can be determined via the adjacency matrix. For an undirected graph, the degree of a 
node 𝑣 is:  




Since each edge has two ends, the sum of the degrees of all nodes in an undirected graph is 
2𝑚. This allows the mean degree of the graph to be calculated by: 




With directed graphs the degree can be distinguished between incoming and outgoing edges. 
The indegree 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛 corresponds to the number of all incoming edges, while the outdegree 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑡 
measures the number of all outgoing edges of a node:  
𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛(𝑣) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1




Here, each edge is counted exactly once in the calculation of the indegree and once in that of 
the outdegree. Therefore, the average indegree or outdegree of a graph is: 




Another network property is the density 𝜌 of a graph. For simple graphs the density describes 
the ratio of the actually present edges to the maximum possible ones. In other words, the density 
of a graph is equivalent to the probability that two randomly selected nodes are connected by 
an edge (Newman, 2018, p. 128). The value of the density is in the range of 0 < 𝜌 < 1. For 











In networks, not only the direct connections between two neighboring nodes are interesting for 
the structural understanding, but also the indirect connections of two nodes, i.e. those that run 
through other nodes (Borgatti et al., 2018). For the analysis of such connections, distance 
measures are used in graphs. A distinction is made between walk, trail and path. A (directed) 
walk 𝑊(𝑣0, 𝑣𝑘) in graph 𝐺 denotes an alternating sequence [𝑣0, 𝑒1, 𝑣1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑣𝑘−1, 𝑒𝑘, 𝑣𝑘] of 
nodes and edges with 𝑒𝑖 = 〈𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑣𝑖〉, or 𝑒𝑖 = 〈𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑣𝑖⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ 〉 in case of a directed graph. It thus 
describes a route through the graph from a start to a target node. A walk is called a closed walk 
if 𝑣0 = 𝑣𝑘. During a walk, nodes and edges may be visited several times. If one restricts this 
condition to the effect that each edge in a sequence must be distinct, it is called a trail. In 
addition, if each node may only be passed once, it then constitutes a path in 𝐺. The length of a 
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walk, trail or path is defined as the number of edges present in the respective sequence. A path 
that is particularly relevant for many analyses of networks is the shortest path or geodesic path. 
It describes the path with the minimum length, i.e. the smallest number of edges, between two 
nodes. The length of the shortest path is also called geodesic distance. If no such path exists 
between two nodes in a graph, the distance is given as ∞. From all shortest paths of a graph its 
diameter can be determined. It is equal to the distance of the longest existing shortest path 
between two nodes in the graph.  
A concept of graphs related to the paths is that of connectivity. Thus, two nodes in a graph are 
called connected if at least one path exists between them. If two nodes are not connected, they 
are located in different components of the graph. A component is thus defined as a subset of 
nodes or for which at least one path exists for each node pair within the subset. If a graph 
consists of only one component, it is called connected. Otherwise it is considered disconnected. 
With directed graphs there is a further distinction: Such a graph is called strongly connected if 
there is a direct path between each of its node pairs. If this is not the case, it can be called weakly 
connected if the undirected version of the graph is connected. 
Multilayer and Dynamic Networks 
With increasingly complex or dynamic systems, simple graphs reach their limits. Although 
multigraphs can be used to define several relationships between two nodes, the relationships 
are not easily distinguished from one another. Multilayer or multidimensional networks can be 
used to map systems composed of different nodes and edges. Newman (2018) describes them 
as “[...] a set of individual networks, each representing nodes of one particular type and their 
connections, plus interlinking edges between networks.” He uses the example of a transport 
network. This is composed, for example, of the railway and bus networks, which each have 
certain stops (nodes) and are connected by edges. Additionally, there are some stops where one 
can transition from one network to the other on foot.  
A special form of multilayer networks are the so-called multiplex networks that are very common 
in social networks. Multiplex networks can be defined as networks consisting of a sequence of 
graphs which are also called layers 𝐿. Each layer 𝑙[𝛼] (where 𝛼 ∈ {1,… ,𝑀}) in turn consists of a 
set of nodes 𝑉[𝛼] and edges 𝐸[𝛼]. For multiplex networks, the node sets are normally the same 
in all layers or at least a subset of nodes overlap. In addition, the edge set in each layer 
represents a different type of relation or interaction respectively (Kivelä et al., 2014; Tavassoli, 
2018). The theoretically possible interlayer edges, which in multiplex networks can only be 
defined between two identical nodes in different layers, are often ignored in practice (Newman, 
2018). Network properties such as the degree of a node are described as vectors analogous to 
the description of multiplex networks. So the degree of a node 𝑣 in a multiplex network is given 
with 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣) = (𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣)[1], … , 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣)[𝑀]), where 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣)[𝛼] is the degree in layer 𝛼 (Boccaletti et 
al., 2014). If the nodes are identical in all layers, multiplex networks can be transformed into 
monoplex networks for simplification. One way to do this is by using so-called projected networks. 
With these a connection between two nodes is indicated in the resulting monoplex graph if it 
existed in at least one of the layers of the multiplex system. The elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗̅̅ ̅̅  of the 
corresponding adjacency matrix ?̅? are defined by (Boccaletti et al., 2014): 
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𝑎𝑖𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ = {
1   𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 1 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀,
0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.                                        
(4.8) 
Another customary way to simplify multiplex to monoplex networks is through aggregation 
(Kivelä et al., 2014). Unlike the previously defined projected networks, the edges are weighted 
in the aggregation if they are present in multiple layers. Battiston et al. (2014) call these 
aggregated or weighted edges the edge overlap. The elements 𝑜𝑖𝑗 of the corresponding overlap 
matrix 𝑂 are given by: 





The temporal network is a special multilayer or multiplex network where aggregation is often 
used. Temporal networks are dynamic networks whose structures change over time (Holme and 
Saramäki, 2012; Newman, 2018). Here, too, social networks are typical examples, for instance 
when different interactions take place over time in a communication network or when different 
structures develop in a friendship network. In a temporal network, the layers of the network 
typically represent a single point in time with its actors and interactions (Holme and Saramäki, 
2012). Through aggregation, static graphs for time periods can be generated, which can be 
more easily examined for their structure. However, when simplifying multiplex networks, it 
must be considered that useful information may be lost or wrong conclusions may be drawn. 
For example, Holme and Saramäki (2012) describe the problem that an edge 〈𝑣1, 𝑣2〉 could be 
defined in a temporal network at a certain point in time 𝑡1, while there is no such edge in time 
𝑡2. Instead in time 𝑡2, there could be an edge 〈𝑣2, 𝑣3〉. If one aggregates the two times to a static 
graph, one can falsely assume that there is a direct path between 𝑣1 and 𝑣3 via 𝑣2, which does 
not exist in the underlying multiplex network. Battiston et al. (2014) also explain that 
information about the individual layers and the origin of an edge can be lost during projection 
or aggregation. To counteract this, they propose various metrics for analyzing the roles of 
individual layers, which reduce the loss of information. In addition to the forms of 
representation of multilayer networks described above, other forms of representation are 
discussed in the literature. Especially the representation of networks as higher-order tensors 
has to be mentioned (Boccaletti et al., 2014; De Domenico et al., 2013). Under the assumption 
of non-interconnected multiplex networks, multigraphs can also be used in combination with 
visualization techniques such as edge-coloring. Here, a specific color is assigned to a layer and 
each edge of the layer is represented in this color (Kivelä et al., 2014). 
 
4.3. Centrality in Networks 
The centrality concept is one of the most common concepts in social network analysis (Borgatti, 
2005). Centrality is seen as an important structural feature of social networks and is relevant 
for the organization of groups (Freeman, 1978). In principle, the analysis of centrality raises 
the question of the relevance or importance of the nodes in a network. The aim is to identify 
central nodes and actors, since specific abilities such as control, influence or power are assigned 
to them based on their relationships in the network (Borgatti et al., 2018; Iacobucci et al., 
2017). For example, nodes may have special relevance for a network if their loss results in the 
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network no longer being connected (Borgatti et al., 2018). As Borgatti et al. (2018) point out, 
it is important to note that these attributions are not definitions but hypotheses about the 
possible consequences for the nodes (or the groups in which they are involved) according to 
their centrality. Mutschke (2010) summarizes three properties in the description of centrality: 
On the one hand, centrality is a node-related measure that does not make any direct statements 
about the considered network as such but only enables the localization of central actors. On the 
other hand, centrality describes the degree of involvement of the actors in the network and is 
only dependent on the network’s structure. Finally, with the help of centrality, a linear order 
across the nodes can be achieved. With regard to exercises in civil protection, the concept of 
centrality offers possibilities to draw conclusions about the respective actors involved on the 
basis of existing relationship structures. For example, in an exercise it is possible to identify 
particularly well networked actors in the evaluation or potentially critical nodes in the planning. 
The literature contains a multitude of different centrality measures, each representing a 
different interpretation. As such these measure are based on a specific basic intention regarding 
the structural properties of the interaction processes in the network (Freeman, 1978). Borgatti 
(2005, p. 56) formulates this with “[...] the formulas for these different measures make implicit 
assumptions about the manner in which things flow in a network”. In his work ‘Centrality and 
network flow’ Borgatti (2005) further introduces a topology of different network flows and 
explains that the different centrality measures are not automatically meaningful for all kinds of 
flow and that this should be considered accordingly when choosing the analysis methodology.  
On the question of choosing the ‘right’ centrality measure, Iacobucci et al. (2017) explain that 
the different methods are rather robust and that the centrality measures often correlate to a 
certain degree. In network research it is generally accepted that the different centrality 
measures are not mutually exclusive but complement each other (Mutschke, 2010). According 
to Mutschke (2010) and Landherr et al. (2010), centrality should be seen as a multidimensional 
concept that requires a variety of measures to get a clear picture of the actors in the network. 
In the following, some of the most common centrality measures are presented and the 
respective basic intentions are explained. To illustrate this, the example network in Figure 4.2 
is examined for its central actors with the respective measures. The centrality is illustrated 
graphically by the size of the nodes. The larger the node’s size, the more central the actor is. 
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Degree centrality  
The simplest and most frequently used centrality measure for undirected networks is the degree, 
also called degree centrality, i.e. the number of direct connections of a node as defined in the 
last section (Borgatti et al., 2018; Iacobucci et al., 2017). 
𝐶𝐷(𝑣) = 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣) (4.10) 
The degree centrality can be normalized through the division by 𝑛 − 1 and thus made 
independent of the respective network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Borgatti (2005, p. 62) 
describes degree centrality as “[...] a measure of immediate influence - the ability to infect 
others directly or in one time period”. In a friendship network, for example, it can be assumed 
that people who have many friends also have access to a lot of information and have 
correspondingly greater influence (Newman, 2018). Such persons can also be described as 
channels for information (Freeman, 1978, p. 219). Typical questions that can be answered with 
degree centrality are, for instance, questions about the most influential or least influential 
nodes. But also the question of nodes that can quickly retrieve resources can be investigated 
when applying the concept of degree centrality (Cambridge Intelligence, 2019a). Borgatti 
(2005, p. 62) explains that degree centrality is particularly suitable for walk-based transfer 
processes. Figure 4.3 shows the result of the degree centrality calculation for the sample 
network. It is clearly visible that actor K occupies the most central position in the network, 
having five direct connections to other nodes. Actors A, C, E and J have the least influence in 
the network, since they are only bound to the rest of the network via one connection. 
 
Figure 4.3: Sample network with node size corresponding to the degree centrality 
Degree centrality can also be calculated for directed networks. A distinction is made here 
between indegree and outdegree centrality. Depending on the type of relation the two can be 
interpreted differently, whereby outdegree can always be seen as the initiation capacity of 
network flow while indegree rather describes a receiving capacity. Degree centrality can 
furthermore be easily extended for weighted networks. In this case not the number of edges is 
relevant, but their total weight. Under the assumption of multilayer networks without interlayer 
edges, as they are understood in the further course of this work, the degree centrality can also 
be extended to multilayer networks. As described by Tavassoli (2018), the calculation is 
performed for each layer individually. 
𝐶𝐷












Closeness centrality is another measure of centrality. It is described as the inverse of the sum of 
the geodesic distances from the investigated node to all others in the network. The geodesic 
distance between two nodes is marked with 𝑑(𝑢, 𝑣). The closeness centrality in simple 





Peripheral nodes receive a large value for closeness centrality, while very central nodes are 
given a small one (Borgatti et al., 2018). Like degree centrality, closeness centrality can be 
normalized dividing it by 𝑛 − 1 (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Looking at closeness centrality 
in terms of network flow, it is assumed that, for example, information flowing through a 
network quickly reaches central actors (Borgatti et al., 2018). Information from central actors 
also has a high fidelity, since it is to be expected that misunderstandings become more frequent 
each time information is passed on (ibid.). It is important, however, that the flow is always 
assumed to run along the shortest path (Borgatti, 2005). Closeness is usually most informative 
when the relationships in the network are not very dense, otherwise many nodes might have a 
similar closeness value (Cambridge Intelligence, 2019a). In general, it can be used to answer 
questions about the efficiency of actors in obtaining or disseminating information in the 
network (Cambridge Intelligence, 2019a; Freeman, 1978). Figure 4.4 illustrates closeness 
centrality using the example network from Figure 4.2. It can be seen that node K appears as the 
most central node in the network. Node H, which previously played only a marginal role in 
degree centrality, is also located much more centrally. In contrast, nodes A, C and J, which are 
located at the periphery of the network, have a very low closeness centrality. 
 
Figure 4.4: Sample network with node size corresponding to the closeness centrality 
Closeness is only defined for connected networks and cannot easily be applied to directed 
networks (Borgatti et al., 2018). A use with weighted networks is generally possible, but in this 
case the optimal path between two nodes has to be defined exactly (ibid.). Similar to degree 
centrality, closeness centrality can also be extended for multilayer networks. The calculation is 
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Betweenness centrality 
Another measure is the betweenness centrality. According to Freeman (1977), betweenness 
describes how often an actor is on the shortest path between two other nodes in the network. 
With 𝛿𝑣(𝑠, 𝑡) as the number of shortest paths passing node 𝑣 and 𝛿(𝑠, 𝑡) as the number of all 
shortest paths between nodes 𝑠 and 𝑡 with 𝑠, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑣, the betweenness centrality for simple 
undirected networks can be calculated as follows (Tavassoli, 2018): 
𝐶𝐵(𝑣) = ∑
𝛿𝑣(𝑠, 𝑡)
𝛿(𝑠, 𝑡)𝑠,𝑡 ∈ 𝑉
(4.14) 
The betweenness can be normalized by dividing it by 
𝑛2−3𝑛+2
2
 (Freeman, 1977). Unlike closeness 
centrality, betweenness centrality can also be calculated for disconnected networks because the 
number of paths between two nodes is relevant and not the path itself (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). Betweenness describes a dependency of two nodes on a third one, so that nodes with a 
high betweenness centrality are often referred to as brokers (Mutschke, 2010; Newman, 2018). 
Freeman (1977) explains that such brokers can promote, block or even change information and 
thus potentially cause a disruption of network flow. This ability is reduced if the broker node is 
not on all shortest paths of a node pair. Questions that can be investigated using betweenness 
centrality include those that ask for the nodes with the greatest control over information flow, 
or those that investigate where the network flow could fail (Cambridge Intelligence, 2019a). If 
the betweenness centrality is calculated for the example network from Figure 4.2 as shown in 
Figure 4.5, a line structure of central nodes can be seen, which is most evident in the nodes K, 
H and L. Any information flowing from the left to the right side of the network or the other way 
around must pass through these three nodes, which causes their central position. 
 
Figure 4.5: Sample network with node size corresponding to the betweenness centrality 
Brandes (2008) has proposed some variants to make the betweenness centrality generalizable 
for directed and weighted networks. Similar to the degree and closeness centrality, the 
betweenness centrality can also be extended for multilayer networks as shown by Tavassoli 
(2018), if no interlayer connections are considered. 
Eigenvector centrality and PageRank 
The eigenvector centrality is an extension of the degree centrality which measures the influence 
of a node not only by the direct connections but also by the centrality of the connected nodes 
(Newman, 2018). Bonacich and Lloyd (2001) argue that the attribution of an actor as being 











eigenvector centrality for simple undirected networks is calculated accordingly (Bonacich and 




∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐸(𝑣𝑗)
𝑗 ∈ 𝑉
(4.15) 
Here, 𝜆 is the maximum eigenvalue of the adjencency matrix 𝐴 (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001; 
Borgatti et al., 2018; Newman, 2018). According to Mutschke, the eigenvector centrality 
assumes that the centrality of a node cannot be considered by itself but results from the 
interconnectedness in the network, which in turn affects the centrality of other nodes. 
Eigenvector centrality is especially suitable for influence processes (Borgatti, 2005). A node can 
exert a lot of influence even if it is only connected to one node, if this node itself has influence 
on many other nodes. The eigenvector centrality can, for example, answer questions about 
nodes with a far-reaching influence on the network (Cambridge Intelligence, 2019a). Figure 
4.6 illustrates the calculation of the eigenvector centrality for the example network. Here, a 
phenomenon can be seen that occurs with eigenvector centrality when the network structure, 
as in the present case, resembles a ‘bow-tie’. As Borgatti et al. (2018, p. 195) point out the 
centrality for all the nodes in the smaller subgroup (left of node H) will uniformly be lower than 
for the nodes in the larger subgroup (right of node H). This is an aspect that should be 
considered when interpreting the results. Another issue with eigenvector centrality in the case 
of disconnected networks is that for all nodes in the smaller components the centrality values 
are zero (ibid.). 
 
Figure 4.6: Sample network with node size corresponding to the eigenvector centrality 
When generalizing from eigenvector centrality to directed networks, various difficulties arise. 
However, there are some variants of eigenvector centrality that address these problems 
(Borgatti et al., 2018; Newman, 2018). One of these variants is the PageRank centrality or 
PageRank (Page et al., 1999). It determines the influence of a node based on the indegree and 
can be calculated as shown in (Newman, 2018): 
𝐶𝑃(𝑣𝑖) = 𝛼∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝐶𝑃(𝑣𝑗)
max(𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝑣𝑗), 1)𝑗 ∈ 𝑉
+ 𝛽 (4.16) 
As Newman (2018) explains, the centrality derived on nodes 𝑣𝑖 from its neighbors is 
proportional to their centrality divided by their outdegree. If the corresponding node has no 
out-going edges the centrality value is one. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are positive constants, where 𝛽 is used to 
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enable a ranking of websites and is part of Google’s ranking algorithm (Newman, 2018; Page 
et al., 1999). Figure 4.7 illustrates the calculation of the PageRank for the example network. In 
this case, the results overlap with those of degree centrality. Both eigenvector centrality and 
PageRank can be used for weighted networks (Borgatti et al., 2018). Their application for 
multilayer networks is also possible if going layer by layer similar to the centrality measures 
already discussed. 
 
Figure 4.7: Sample network with node size corresponding to the PageRank centrality 
 
4.4. Network Visualization 
The visual representation is a central element in the analysis of graphs and networks. Graphical 
representations of network information can have an explanatory or understanding-enhancing 
effect (Stegbauer and Häußling, 2010). Borgatti et al. (2018, p. 115) describe the explanation 
capacity of network representations as being able to communicate a qualitative understanding 
which is difficult to determine quantitatively. Compared to, for example, a tabular 
representation of the information in a given network, the graph representation is an intuitive 
form of visualization that can be quickly grasped by the human mind (Cambridge Intelligence, 
2019a; Devaux, 2019a). Since each network can be represented in a variety of ways and thus 
allows certain aspects to be highlighted and others to be pushed into the background, networks 
can be very flexible and insightful (Cambridge Intelligence, 2019a; Stegbauer and Häußling, 
2010). 
The flexibility of the network representation is provided in particular by two aspects, namely 
the visual properties of nodes and edges and the layout of the network. By using visual 
properties, it is possible to display attributes and structural features of nodes and edges. For 
nodes, the graphical elements include the size, color or shape of the node (Krempel, 2010). For 
example, as seen in the previous section for ease of illustration, the size of a node may depend 
on its centrality (see Figure 4.7). Also, different properties or the type of a node can be 
represented by its color or shape (Borgatti et al., 2018; Freeman, 1999; Krempel, 2010). Figure 
4.8 illustrates this using the example network established in section 4.3. Two colors and two 
shapes are used to represent different categories of information and to increase the 
understanding of the network. The network could, for instance, represent the working 
relationships within a company. While the shape of the node represents the associated 
department, the blue color of individual nodes indicates that these actors are management 
personnel. As a result, the network is directly able to gain more far-reaching insights than what 











that communication between the departments only takes place at the management level. With 
regard to degree centrality (see Figure 4.3) it can also be seen that with actor K in one 
department, the management level occupies the most central position, while in the other 
department this role is assigned to a normal employee with actor F. Visual properties of edges 
can be the thickness of the line or the line style (solid, dashed, dotted etc.) as well as its color. 
For example, the thickness of the line can be used to illustrate the relative weight of an edge. 
Especially with multilayer networks the type of relation can be described with the help of the 
color and the line style (Borgatti et al., 2018; Krempel, 2010). 
 
Figure 4.8: Sample network with multiple node styles 
The layout describes the arrangement of the nodes in the diagram and thus their spatial 
configuration (Krempel, 2010). Borgatti et al. (2018, p. 116) describe it as “the most important 
aspect of network visualization”. It can help the viewer to understand the underlying network 
information or, in case of a bad layout, obscure it and lead to wrong interpretations of the 
situation (Borgatti et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2007). There are different approaches to creating 
layouts. Most common are layout algorithms. These can be characterized either by a heuristic 
or an optimization function (Borgatti et al., 2018). An example for layout algorithms with 
heuristics is the circular layout which arranges all nodes on a circular path (Huang et al., 2007). 
Figure 4.9 illustrates the example network from Figure 4.8 using a circular layout. The nodes 
can also be ranked according to one or more attributes, such as the degree. Radial layouts or 
centrality maps are based on a similar principle. These place the nodes on several concentric 
circles on the basis of various network metrics such as the centrality of the node, whereby its 
distance to the center, for example, corresponds to its relative centrality (Brandes et al., 2006; 
Huang et al., 2007; Krempel, 2010).  
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Figure 4.9: Sample network with a circular layout 
Layout algorithms that place nodes on the basis of an optimization function often focus on the 
clarity of the network and an optimal node distribution (Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991). For 
example, the frequently used algorithm of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) defines that the 
edge length between all nodes must be the same and that nodes that are directly connected 
should be placed close to each other. Furthermore, nodes should not be placed too close to each 
other so that they can be clearly differentiated. The algorithm belongs to the so-called force-
directed algorithms, where the arrangement of the network is based on attracting and repulsive 
forces (Krempel, 2010). Another approach for generating layouts is the attribute-based scatter 
plotting (Borgatti et al., 2018). Here, the nodes are placed along axes in the diagram using 
continuous attributes. For example, a trading network of different countries could be 
represented by coordinates, with latitude and longitude representing the respective axes (ibid.). 
Overall the effect of layouts is more pronounced with graph novices than with experts and 
should always be selected depending on the user and the analysis objective (Huang et al., 
2007). 
Beside the described visual properties of nodes and edges as well as the network layouts there 
are further possibilities to support the visualization of networks. In large networks, for example, 
node filtering can be used to remove nodes from the network that are not relevant for analysis, 
thus making the network more manageable (Borgatti et al., 2018; Krempel, 2010). Overall, 
social network analysis offers a good opportunity to graphically represent and analytically 
investigate social relationships. How the methodology is used in the context of civil protection 
and disaster response and which possibilities arise in regard to supporting the planning and 
evaluation of exercises will be shown in the next chapter. In particular, the requirements for 
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5. Social Network Analysis in Civil Protection and Disaster Response 
With the help of social network analysis the structures of networked systems can be examined 
in a variety of ways based on their relationships. This methodology has established itself across 
disciplines in many areas and is used for a wide variety of problems. This chapter examines the 
extent to which the use of social network analysis is also appropriate in the context of exercises 
in civil protection and disaster response. For this purpose, approaches and studies from the 
related work that use network analyses as their methodology are evaluated. The areas covered 
include organizational research, research on disaster response and emergency management as 
well as risk analyses and cascades in infrastructure research. The related work is analyzed with 
regard to the application of social network analysis as a methodology for the planning and 
evaluation of exercises in civil protection and disaster response and an interim conclusion is 
drawn. Building on this, requirements for a possible software support system are formulated in 
the further course of the chapter. For this, existing software solutions as well as literature and 
requirements communicated in interviews with practitioners are considered. 
 
5.1. Social Network Analysis in Organizational Research and Emergency 
Management 
Social network analysis is a widely used method in organizational research to conceptualize, as 
Tichy et al. (1979) state, organizations in static and dynamic aspects. Cross et al. (2002) 
describe social network analysis in their work as elementarily important in the analysis of 
informal networks. They describe the method as particularly effective for collaboration within 
groups and their integration after restructuring measures. It is argued that in informal networks 
cooperation with central actors in the network is particularly effective for the management since 
the actors often do not find themselves in central positions without justification. In their work 
they particularly emphasize the significance of network visualizations and highlight the fact 
that in many cases the visualizations alone have already led to a multitude of recommendations 
and action strategies for decision makers. Furthermore, one of the problems identified is the 
fact that despite the great potential of social network analysis, its application is primarily in 
research and the transition into practice is not yet sufficient. They argue for a more 
contextualized perspective of the method in order to make it more useful for practitioners.  
Many of these statements are supported by Raab (2010). He also argues that social network 
analysis can be used to investigate informal relationship structures and that this has established 
itself as a central instrument in organizational research. In particular, he identifies inter-
organizational network analysis as a relevant method for analyzing the interdependencies and 
joint work of various organizations. The author particularly highlights the communication and 
coordination relationships for the analysis of organizations and argues that network 
visualization can lead to a direct gain in knowledge without further analysis, especially for 
networks with less than 50 nodes. 
The methodology of network analysis is also used in a variety of ways in emergency 
management and disaster response research. For example, Houghton et al. (2006) conducted 
a study on the performance of teams and organizations in emergency trainings using the 
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example of the fire brigade and the police. The important actors were identified with the help 
of centrality measures and an interpretation based on the centrality calculation and the 
visualization of the networks was carried out. The authors recorded the actual communications 
between the individual actors over the course of the exercises. Important actors were 
characterized as those whose centrality value was above the one sigma environment.  
In their study, Choi and Brower (2006) examined the disparities between existing plans and 
actually practiced networks for emergency services at the municipal level. They found that 
network analysis is an effective tool for policy makers and provides both researchers and 
practitioners with a good insight into the structures of actors. In particular, according to the 
authors, it enables an evaluation of the effectiveness of the network. With regard to their 
questions, they were able to state that emergency service networks are more efficient and less 
prone to errors if the structure and leadership are clearly presented and visible to all 
participants. The authors however emphasize that a static analysis of such networks is not 
effective and that the static analysis of the centrality for the whole network does by itself not 
provide sufficient information. Rather, networks of this kind must take the inherent dynamics 
into account in order to be able to record changing centralities over time. 
Stojmonovic and Lindgaard (2014) also used social network analysis to investigate 
communication failures during emergency response trainings. Through the results from two 
exercises they tried to show how the use of social network analysis can support the planning of 
future exercises. For the analysis, the number of communications between the individual actors 
during the training period was recorded and mapped in a weighted network. The relevance of 
individual actors was measured by different centrality measures. The authors argue that the 
method provides great added value, especially in decisions on structural development and 
communication leadership, and is suitable for mapping communication and coordination in real 
situations and exercises provided the relevant data is collected. Like Choi and Brower (2006), 
Stojmenovic and Lindgaard explain that the findings of network analysis are limited in a static 
network and argue for the consideration of temporality. They suggest to subdivide the exercise 
into different sections and to analyze them individually in order to illustrate the dynamics of 
the system. It is also argued that the methodological gain in knowledge is more substantial with 
a larger number of actors and therefore the data should be collected from as many participants 
as possible. According to the authors the method is limited in that it cannot distinguish between 
effective and ineffective communication and thus does not provide any insights into why 
miscommunications occurred.  
A similar study was conducted by Mohammadfam et al. (2015). Again, social network analysis 
was used to investigate the effectiveness of team coordination in an emergency rescue team. In 
contrast to Choi and Brower (2006) and Stojmenovic and Lindgaard (2014), the data collection 
was carried out in the form of structured interviews in which the participants were asked about 
all other actors with whom they had coordinated. In addition to centrality, the authors also 
considered other structural network characteristics such as the density of the coordination 
network. The results overlap with those of the previously mentioned works. Here, too, the 
authors describe social network analysis as a logical and qualitative method for analyzing 
coordination. 
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In contrast to the work described above, Kapucu and Hu (2016) examined multiplex 
relationships between organizations in the context of emergency management. They were 
particularly interested in the impact of friendship relationships on collaboration networks 
within disaster preparedness and response. They also analyzed whether collaboration in 
disaster response networks can be predicted on the basis of friendship networks and disaster 
preparedness networks. As a data basis, the authors used questionnaires in which they asked 
who the respective person knew from other organizations and with whom they collaborated in 
disaster preparedness and response. They found out that in existing friendship relations 
collaborations in the preparedness and response phase were more frequent. Furthermore, the 
authors concluded that the analysis of multiplex relationships leads to a better understanding 
of interorganizational networks. With regard to collaboration between different teams, they 
concluded that the formation of multiplex relationships has a positive effect on future 
collaboration.  
In their work on a corruption scandal in the Czech Republic, Diviák et al. (2019) also considered 
the interplay of different types of relationships and the structure of the network. They 
investigated a total of three different types of relationships in the network, attempting to first 
determine which actors make up the core network, secondly to identify how the various 
relationship networks overlap, thirdly to determine which actors occupy central positions and 
lastly to ascertain how they differ in the various relationship types. The authors first analyzed 
the multilayer network structure by aggregating the individual layers and then analyzed each 
layer individually. Diviák et al. (2019) used degree and betweenness centrality as centrality 
measures to identify important actors in the network. In conclusion they stated that the 
consideration of multilayer networks provided a variety of interesting information about the 
network, assuming that the corresponding data was available in the required quality. 
Within a literature review, Kapucu et al. (2017) investigated how the method of social network 
analysis is used in public administration research. The authors state that network analysis is 
used to understand dynamic relationship structures and to investigate social processes using 
different types of relations. The data of the studies are often based on interviews or field 
surveys. Most studies consider the entire network and the respective network structures. The 
most commonly used method on the node level is centrality. The authors see particular potential 
in the analysis of changes in networks over time. 
Jones and Faas (2017a), in their book “Social Network Analysis of Disaster Response, Recovery, 
and Adaptation”, bring together various works from disaster research and show what 
possibilities network research offers for gaining an understanding of the dynamic and structural 
relationships and interactions in disaster response, recovery and adaptation (Jones and Faas, 
2017b). As part of the book, Varda (2017) examines methodological frameworks for describing 
social networks in disaster settings. She presents and compares the different units of analysis 
as well as their methods of evaluation. Based on the dynamic nature of disaster networks, she 
describes the importance of dynamic observations in the analysis of networks and their 
visualizations. She also discusses which decisions have to be made before the analysis in order 
to obtain a relevant result. In particular, the author describes the importance of identifying the 
relevant types of relationships and the associated definition of system boundaries and research 
questions while proposing that this is often the greatest methodological difficulty. 
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5.2. Social Network Analysis within Risk and Criticality Research 
In addition to the more social-scientifically oriented field of organizational and disaster 
research, network analysis as a methodology also plays an important role in risk and 
vulnerability assessment. Cadini et al. (2008), for example, researched the protection of large-
scale infrastructure networks and attempted to identify critical nodes in a power transmission 
network with the help of social network analysis. In doing so, they drew on the concept of 
centrality as a descriptive analysis methodology and extended it to include the reliability of 
networks. They argued that an infrastructure is more ‘safety-efficient’ if the individual nodes 
are connected via more reliable paths.  
Eusgeld et al. (2009) also made use of a social network approach in order to conduct an initial 
screening of the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures using the shortest path between all 
nodes in a static network. They argued that the approach is very well suited for the first 
screening because it is quick to compute and easy to implement. However, they deemed the 
limitations of the approach problematic as the dynamic behavior of the system was not 
considered. Also, the topological model did not take the load distribution in the system into 
account.  
Kröger and Zio (2011) explain that complex network analysis is a common modeling technique 
for vulnerability analysis in critical infrastructures. It is used to identify vulnerabilities and 
critical elements and can provide insights into in-depth analyses. In particular, the abstract 
modeling paradigms allow the simulation of cascade effects. The authors argue that network 
topology can have a major influence on the development of disturbances and that the analysis 
of cascade effects must therefore address the dynamics of the system and its complexity. In the 
analysis of vulnerabilities, centrality plays an important role. The degree and betweenness 
centrality in particular are applicable measurements for this purpose. The authors evaluate the 
method positively and state that it contributes to a good system understanding and allows a 
quantification of vulnerability indicators. 
The argumentation of LaRocca and Guikema (2011) follows that of Kröger and Zio (2011) in 
many respects. In their literature review, they describe the benefit of network analysis in 
relation to infrastructures in that it allows them to be mapped even when detailed data on 
individual systems is not available. This makes it possible to perform simulations and to gain 
an understanding of the topology effects in relation to vulnerabilities. They also stated that the 
importance of nodes is usually determined by degree and betweenness centrality.  
An approach of using network theory to assess risk interactions in large engineering projects 
was presented by Fang et al. (2012). The authors attempted to identify how risks in projects 
are interdependent and to what extent, regardless of the potential impact of one risk, risks can 
be triggered by other risks. For their evaluation cause-effect relationships were defined to each 
of which they assigned a value between 0 and 10. The topological analysis was done using the 
betweenness centrality. The authors concluded that the method is a good complement to 
classical analyses of project risks and provides valuable information for further decision making. 
In his dissertation, Ongkowijoyo (2017) also investigated risk relations using social network 
analysis. He argued that risk and resilience analyses complement each other and should 
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therefore be considered in a holistic approach. He presented a framework that combined 
different quantitative methods in one process. The methodology of network analysis was 
employed, specifically the concept of centrality, to investigate the dynamic risk causalities of 
infrastructures. He concluded that the chosen approach is useful for modeling and simulating 
risk interactions and that network visualization additionally helps to develop an understanding 
of the risks. In his findings he argued that network analysis has the ability “[...] to delve into 
root impact pattern of risks, to help observe the various processes of coping, and to understand 
which type of interventions might require coordination or integration” (Ongkowijoyo, 2017, p. 
226). 
The research of Clark-Ginsberg (2017) focused more on the visualization character of networks. 
Based on participatory data sets and the methods and tools of network analysis, he developed 
network maps and discussed their usefulness in planning risk mitigation strategies. The 
technique he presented enabled the identification of risks and an assessment of the relationships 
between them within a discussion-based stakeholder workshop. He explained that the 
visualization of networks has often been shown to be an important supporting feature in the 
analysis of networks. In terms of risk understanding, he explained that network visualization 
supports the user in understanding the causes and consequences of disaster risks. The 
visualization thus offers a great potential for a deeper understanding of network structures and 
helps in the planning of necessary measures. 
The methods and techniques of social network analysis are also used in various research 
projects. For example, the “SIMKAS 3D” project dealt with the simulation of interactions and 
cascade effects of operators of critical infrastructures using the example of the city of Berlin, 
Germany (Bartels et al., 2014). The project partners relied on a network theoretical approach 
and specifically investigated the relationships that are important in the case of intersectoral 
cascade effects in order to better understand the effects of failures of individual infrastructures 
(ibid.). In the project, scenario analyses were carried out at various operators to provide a basis 
for the simulations (Dierich et al., 2012). As one result, a software tool in the form of an ArcGIS 
extension was developed in the project. This enabled a three-dimensional situation 
representation of the relationships and the execution of spatial analyses to identify 
vulnerabilities. This then made it possible to detect overlaps of infrastructures, which helped 
operators and other involved actors to derive decisions. The analyses results were used as a 
basis for exercise scenarios (Bartels et al., 2014).  
Another example is the “FORTRESS” project. This project dealt with tools to predict cascading 
effects in crises (Hempel and Pelzer, 2019). Two software tools were designed to assist with 
scenario planning in the phase of crisis preparation (ibid.). The tools were created to support 
the cooperation of infrastructure managers and first responders and were used to identify and 
visualize the interdependencies of infrastructure networks (Hempel et al., 2018). The two 
software tools followed an approach of dynamic criticality in the analysis of cascade effects 
resulting from the topological relationship patterns between the systems under consideration 
(Hempel et al., 2018; Hempel and Pelzer, 2019). The first tool, the “FORTRESS Model Builder” 
is a web-based modelling tool for the creation of scenarios in the form of static, multiplex 
infrastructure networks (Hempel and Pelzer, 2019). Within the project, five relationship types 
such as the resource or the interference relation were identified as relevant. Based on these five 
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relationship types, the criticality for possible cascade effects of individual nodes was calculated. 
For this purpose, measures of centrality, specifically betweenness and outdegree centrality, 
were applied. Changes in the criticality of individual nodes over time could be considered by 
the construction of the networks at different points in time (ibid.). Hempel et al. (2018) 
explained that the results of the analysis of criticality cannot be regarded as conclusive, but 
should rather lead to further discussions between the actors involved in order to obtain a 
common picture of the scenario or the complex dependencies it contains. The Model Builder 
implemented in the project supports multigraphs and enables the user to store node coordinates 
for geographical representation (Hempel and Pelzer, 2019). Additionally, buffer times which 
describe the time a relation can be maintained in case of a malfunction can be stored for the 
individual relations (ibid.). The developed networks can be imported in the second software 
tool, the “FORTRESS Incident Evolution Tool”. In this tool, which is also implemented as a web 
application, faults or failures of individual nodes can be defined and the effects of cascades can 
be analyzed on the basis of the stored buffer times so that mitigation strategies can be discussed 
(ibid.). Hempel and Pelzer (2019) explained that the implemented tools support a joint 
cooperation of actors based on the developed scenarios. However, this form of crisis prevention 
requires specific skills, which the teams have to obtain in trainings and workshops in order to 
gain an understanding of the possibilities and the identified results. The authors further argued 
that the availability of data to adequately map scenarios is elementary. 
 
5.3. Social Network Analysis in Exercise Planning and Evaluation 
The presented works and projects give an overview of the areas of application and issues that 
can be investigated with the help of social network analysis. In summary, the methods of 
network analysis are assessed positively overall. In particular, the usefulness for analyses of the 
topology or structure of the relationship networks is pointed out. On the one hand, the abstract 
representation in networks as well as the different network visualizations promote a better 
structural understanding of the systems under consideration and their inherent relationships 
and interactions; on the other hand, network analysis with its different measures of centrality 
offers the potential to identify central or well-positioned actors and makes it possible to compare 
actors in the same network with each other. In the case of the centrality measures, the works 
considered show that there is no one right approach. While degree and betweenness centrality 
are often used as relevant measures in risk and vulnerability analyses, a combination of different 
centrality measures is commonly positively assessed in the analysis of communication or 
interaction networks. 
In general, it is emphasized that for the analysis of the structures of dynamic systems such as 
teams and organizations or technical systems such as infrastructures, an assessment of static 
networks can provide initial conclusions but quickly reaches its limits. Rather, a dynamic 
analysis should be carried out when the appropriate data is available. This can show the changes 
over time and allows for more sensitive statements to be made. Previous research also indicates 
that by taking multilayer networks into account, more in-depth analyses can be carried out and 
correlations can be revealed. Network analysis is seen as a powerful tool for practitioners and 
policy makers. Nevertheless, the studies point out that analyses of this kind have so far been 
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carried out almost exclusively by researchers, thus confirming the assessment from practice (see 
section 3.5). Some authors, such as Cross et al. (2002), argue that in order for the methodology 
to become more relevant to practitioners, it needs to be designed and specified for the respective 
context. Hempel and Pelzer (2019) also move in this direction in their description of the project 
results, arguing that for social network analysis to be used profitably, hands-on training is 
needed and expertise must be developed through growing experience.  
In the literature it is seen as problematic, especially regarding the analysis of communication 
networks, that social network analysis does not differentiate between effective and ineffective 
communication. For example, the results of the centrality of different actors may be distorted 
due to ‘wrong’ communication. Furthermore, in the context of risk and vulnerability analyses 
for e.g. infrastructure networks one has to be aware of the limitations of network analysis. For 
example, in addition to the consideration of the relationships and dependencies factors such as 
load management, which would be useful for more in-depth analyses, are not taken into 
account here. In conclusion, the literature for the considered areas states that the methodology 
of social network analysis is particularly suitable for two main purposes. On the one hand, it 
enables the user to obtain a first impression or a basic understanding of the structures and the 
relevant actors. Here, network visualizations can take on a supporting and expanding function. 
On the other hand, the network analysis can be used very well for specific questions, which are 
based on the interrelationships of the actors in the network. For example, as Kapucu and Hu 
(2016) showed, it can be examined to what extent existing friendship relationships affect 
cooperation in a crisis. For this case, Varda (2017) identifies the definition of the relevant 
relationship types and the resulting system boundaries as the greatest difficulties in applying 
the method. 
With regard to the question of what potential the methodology of social network analysis holds 
for exercises in civil protection and disaster response, the analysis of the examined work can 
provide important insights. First of all, three types of networks can be characterized based on 
previous research that seem to be useful for the exercise context: communication networks, 
dependency networks and scenario networks. In communication networks, all communications 
that have occurred between the actors involved during an exercise are recorded. By using 
multilayer networks, different forms of communication such as questions or information 
transfer can be mapped. Since communication during an exercise has not yet been recorded 
according to the statements made in the interviews on the current exercise situation (see section 
3.5), these networks can create added value because they offer possibilities for visualizing and 
evaluating communication. An example of dependency networks are infrastructure networks 
such as those used by Eusgeld et al. (2009) or Ongkowijoyo (2017) in the context of risk 
analysis. These networks can be used to model systems relevant for an exercise scenario. For 
example, in a planned blackout scenario, the regional power supply can be modeled in a 
network to get a better picture of the dependencies and to provide support in defining the 
exercise boundaries. The scenario networks are a hybrid of the two above mentioned. They are 
used to model and map the entire scenario or specific areas of it including all relevant actors 
and interactions. In this way, an abstract overall picture of the scenario or a section of it can be 
generated and analyzed. This form of network, which is for instance used by Hempel and Pelzer 
(2019), enables to visualize and analyze dependencies between technical systems and 
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organizational structures as well as training procedures. In all three network variants, the 
definition of multiple relationship types is possible in order to enable a more in-depth analysis, 
if the data basis is available. All the forms described are also suitable for both static and dynamic 
networks. 
According to the statements made in the interviews (see section 3.5), the methodology of social 
network analysis is particularly interesting for the planning and evaluation phases of the 
exercise. In the planning of exercises, the potential of social network analysis lies in the 
possibility of developing an abstract picture of the exercise to be planned. For example, systems 
belonging to the scenario as well as their dependencies can be modeled and illustrated or the 
scenario can be thought through with visual and analytical support. In particular, the method 
can support the definition of exercise boundaries and the development of the scenario and the 
associated injects. As a tool for scenario development, the methodology offers the possibility to 
define expectation values, i.e. network representations or sociograms that reflect an ideal or 
expected pattern of relationships and interactions of a certain situation in the scenario. This 
way, exercise goals can be evaluated or it can be examined in advance whether actors could be 
potentially overwhelmed by too many interactions. It can be assumed that the method is well 
suited for combination with the practices used so far. For example, the scenario script can also 
be used as a data basis for the network to be modeled, or conversely, sociograms can be created 
for injects to provide visual support for the planners. By modeling and analyzing networks as a 
support in exercise planning, further difficulties mentioned by practitioners can be taken on. 
For example, it can facilitate the work with a common mental model if an abstract model with 
corresponding visualizations exists. Furthermore, such a network can be used to carry out 
further simulations, if they are relevant to the scenario. 
For exercise evaluation, the use of network analysis also reveals some potential. For example, 
by analyzing the network structure and the positions of the actors in the network via e.g. 
centrality, it offers a possibility for systematic evaluation which has not been common in 
practice so far. Based on the results of the related work, it can be assumed that the visualization 
of the exercise structures in a network supports the participants through an intuitive way of 
presentation. Furthermore, depending on the data collected, different possibilities for 
evaluation are given. For example, the communication that took place during the exercise can 
be analyzed and evaluated with regard to the intended command structure. It is also possible 
to review dependencies and processes retrospectively and compare them with the expected 
value. If multilayer relationships were recorded during the exercise, these can be related to each 
other and changes in the course of the exercise may also be considered. The social network 
analysis can be combined well with previously used evaluation methods. For example, 
deficiencies that have arisen in evaluation questionnaires can be compared with the data in the 
network and, if applicable, network analysis can help to better understand and justify them. It 
is also feasible to use networks as visual support in the debriefing following the exercise. 
A particularly relevant aspect for the use of social network analysis in the context of the exercise 
is the possibility of collaboratively developing scenarios as networks both in the planning and 
in the exercise follow-up. On the one hand, it is possible to work out common scenarios in the 
planning of the exercise and to check the exercise goals through simulation and discussion, on 
the other hand, the exercise or the scenario can be collaboratively reflected upon in the 
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evaluation. Based on the analysis, it can be assumed that the use of social network analysis for 
the planning and evaluation of exercises in civil protection provides manifold added value and 
can contribute to a standardization and a better comparability in the exercise operation. The 
added value for the exercises is particularly evident when social network analysis is used as a 
tool in combination with the methods already established in practice for planning and 
evaluation. This leads to the main idea of this thesis to use social network analysis as a 
methodology and tool for creating interpretation possibilities for exercises in civil protection 
and disaster control. It serves as a tool to visualize and explain different situations from the 
exercise, either planned or experienced. Network analysis enables different perspectives or 
focus points regarding the exercise or specific situations from it by means of different 
visualization possibilities and structural analyses. It further helps in understanding the complex 
relationship structures and their temporal dynamics. With reference to the limitations described 
in the literature, such as the inability to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant 
communication, network analysis is seen as a tool in the sense of a preliminary examination or 
screening. In the planning phase, it offers support in the execution of simulations and the 
definition of expected values and exercise boundaries and thus supports the planner in the 
development of a realistic scenario. Furthermore, it creates possibilities for the visualization of 
mental models and can serve as a basis for discussion. In evaluation, it enables an assessment 
and analysis of the structures both for communication and for the exercise itself. Individual 
actors are given the opportunity to review their situation from the outside and to classify their 
role in the overall network.  
 
5.4. Requirements and Existing Software 
In order for practitioners to derive added value from utilizing social network analysis as a 
methodology for planning and evaluating exercises, software systems need to be created that 
meet the specific requirements for that particular use case. In the context of this thesis, these 
requirements were determined by interviews with experts from the practice and the analysis of 
the relevant literature. General requirements regarding systems for planning and exercise 
support are described by Pottebaum and Schäfer (2018) in their work on IT systems in crisis 
management. They suggest that the processing of information contributes significantly to 
mastering tasks in crisis situations and that units and decision makers must be enabled by 
software to interpret information and events. Therefore, they listed specifically the possibility 
of integrating all relevant data, the simulation of possible hazards or processes and the 
visualization of past events and exercise scenarios for incorporation into planning as specific 
requirements for planning support systems. They explained that the goal of exercises is to 
ensure experience-based learning and that decision makers and trainers must be enabled to 
estimate events, resource movements and interactions within the exercise during the planning 
process. Software systems must be able to create scenarios and run simulations with little effort. 
With regard to the evaluation of exercises, the authors consider it crucial that visualizations of 
situations in the exercise are already available to the persons involved during the debriefing. 
These should be goal-oriented and offer the participants an opportunity to illustrate the effects 
of certain actions.  
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An important requirement from practice is that the software offers support during the entire 
planning process, and in particular during scenario development (Interview 2, 2019, personal 
communication, 05 March). The visualization of the scenario as a network should be in the 
foreground and the software should be able to map dynamic actors and relationships, so that 
the user can work intuitively. Analogous to the work with exercise scripts processes, measures 
and information should always be presented with a temporal reference and possibilities should 
be given to assign relationships to specific situations or processes (Interview 4, 2019, personal 
communication, 18 March). In addition to these relationship associations it should be possible 
to filter individual processes to display path dependencies. With these features the software 
would offer to verify individual processes (Interview 2, 2019, personal communication, 05 
March) and to trace communication flows (Interview 1, 2019, personal communication, 26 
February). Depending on the scenario at hand different actors and relationship types must be 
able to be modeled by the software. In particular, it must be able to define communication and 
resource relationships and to perform simulations to represent functional failures and cascade 
effects (Interview 2, 2019, personal communication, 05 March). The software must also be able 
to map multiple relationships between two actors. To reduce the time required for modelling 
the scenario, the application should allow the creation and import of templates (Interview 2, 
2019, personal communication, 05 March). This way, fixed constellations of actors and 
relationships such as local infrastructure networks or fixed organizational structures can be 
created once and then be reused in different scenarios. For the representation of exercises with 
actors on several levels or different sub-scenarios, the software should provide possibilities for 
linking (Interview 1, 2019, personal communication, 26 February).  
With regard to exercise evaluation, one requirement for the software is that it should provide 
functions for filtering and highlighting individual actors (Interview 4, 2019, personal 
communication, 18 March). In doing so, both a detailed view of the relations and interactions 
of the individuals and their roles in the scenario can be reflected. Visualizations provided by the 
application should be simple and not overload the user (Interview 1, 2019, personal 
communication, 26 February). In order for the application to be used by personnel not familiar 
with social network analysis, the application should have documentation on all features and 
their usage (Interview 4, 2019, personal communication, 18 March).  
Today, a large number of software applications and software libraries providing functions and 
common algorithms for network analysis are available (Newman, 2018). One example is 
UCINET, a standard application for the analysis of social networks, which offers a multitude of 
functions and is mainly used in research (Borgatti et al., 2002). UCINET is a menu-based 
Windows software that offers a variety of functions for the analysis of networks and integrates 
the software NetDraw for visualization (Borgatti, 2002). An example of a software library is the 
Python package NetworkX which provides a large number of methods for modeling complex 
networks and calculating network properties and structures (Hagberg et al., 2008). Although 
NetworkX also offers possibilities for network visualization, the focus of the available functions 
lies on the analysis. By using common data formats such as GraphML, CSV or GEXF it is possible 
to port network data between different applications. NetworkX also offers this export option so 
that users can visualize the data in programs specifically developed for this purpose. Besides 
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the mentioned applications there are a lot of other tools available. A comparison and in-depth 
review with regard to social network analysis is given in Huisman and van Duijn (2014).  
Most of the software applications available on the market for both analysis and visualization 
are generic solutions that can be used for different problems and contexts. However, there are 
also some solutions for specific use cases such as the analysis of crime networks (Devaux, 
2019a). One problem Newman (2018) describes with regard to the use of existing software is 
that researchers tend to only answer questions that can be answered with existing solutions, 
neglecting potentially interesting questions. He argues that software should be oriented towards 
the application context and the questions and not vice versa. This argument is supported by 
Cross et al. (2002) with reference to the use of social network analysis as a methodology in 
practice. They argue that tools must be more oriented towards the requirements of the end 
users or approach them contextually so that the methodology can establish itself in practice.  
As can be seen from the requirements mentioned above, visualization is a central aspect to 
obtain a deeper understanding of networks for the application of exercises in civil protection 
and disaster response. Therefore, for a software application to be relevant for users in practice, 
network visualization should always be in the foreground and also all analyses should be 
supported by it. As Devaux (2019b, 2019c) shows in her listing of software applications and 
libraries, there are also many applications that focus on the visualization of networks, many of 
which also provide algorithms for analysis. Up to now there is no software that offers network 
analysis functionalities specifically for exercises in civil protection and disaster response with 
their specific requirements for a support tool. Therefore, this thesis pursues the conception and 
development of a corresponding application. As a basis for the software concept, the three 
existing software applications Gephi, KeyLines and the FORTRESS Model Builder are briefly 
described below with respect to their usefulness in the planning and evaluation of exercises and 
their strengths and limitations are explained.  
Gephi is an open source visualization software for the analysis of graphs and networks (Bastian 
et al., 2009). It offers a variety of possibilities for the interactive visualization of networks and 
includes many common algorithms for analysis, especially for the determination of centrality 
(ibid.). The software provides different layouts and filters with the possibility to configure them. 
Furthermore, nodes and edges can be adjusted in their color and size among other things (ibid.). 
Thereby the software allows an adjustment based on a specific metric. For example, the size of 
the nodes can be displayed in relation to their centrality, thus enabling a direct visual analysis. 
Gephi also supports the visualization of dynamic networks using network slices, which can be 
displayed as movie sequences in a timeline (ibid.). The biggest limitations of Gephi as a software 
tool for exercise operations lie in the lack of multiplexity, simulation and the enhancement of 
nodes with additional data. For instance, the software does not allow multiedges and does not 
differentiate between different types of relationships. Additionally, no simulations based on 
existing relationships can be performed using Gephi, as the software primarily focuses on 
visualization. Although it is possible to create and delete nodes and edges directly in the 
drawing area, no additional information can be attached to the elements. Therefore, it is always 
necessary to change the view to the datasheet. In the graphical display, individual nodes can be 
distinguished only on the basis of their label. 
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KeyLines is a commercial JavaScript library for the visualization of networks (Cambridge 
Intelligence, 2019a). KeyLines also implements common algorithms especially for the analysis 
for the centrality of the different nodes. The software package offers different layouts with 
corresponding information (ibid.). In order to further promote the understanding of the 
networks, the software provides various possibilities for manipulating the data (ibid.). For 
example, nodes can be adjusted in size and color or represented by images. In addition, filters 
can be defined that, for example, hide nodes below a certain centrality value from the 
interactive visualization. Nodes can also be combined into groups and the centrality values can 
be determined based on these groups. Users can be presented with additional information 
through optional animations of nodes or fade-ins. KeyLines has a time bar function which allows 
the visualization of dynamic network data and the ability to display selected data sets 
(Cambridge Intelligence, 2019b). Here, too, there are possibilities to visualize the network 
dynamics by means of a movie sequence (ibid.). Similar to Gephi, KeyLines does not support 
network simulations nor does it offer functions for the visually supported setup and editing of 
nodes and edges. Instead, the software is designed to be linked to existing graph databases and 
to map the data from these databases. These limitations, as well as the limited possibilities for 
displaying multiplex relationships, do not facilitate a direct use for the exercise context.  
The FORTRESS Model Builder is a web-based application for cooperative scenario development 
in crisis preparation and planning (Hempel and Pelzer, 2019). The tool was developed within 
the EU project FORTRESS. It enables the modeling and analysis of cascade effects using 
predefined multiplex relationships (ibid.). With the help of the software, users can develop the 
scenario with visual support and, by calculating the centrality, analyze and discuss the structural 
dependencies (ibid.). Unlike the two solutions mentioned above, the Model Builder focuses more 
specifically on the scenario development and simulation. However, its use in the context of the 
exercise is limited, since the software cannot model dynamic scenarios natively and the 
visualization of the networks is not supported by the use of layouts, filters or grouping 
functionalities. 
The software solutions presented already include some analysis functions and visualization 
techniques relevant for the planning and evaluation of exercises in civil protection and disaster 
response. However, the specific requirements for the context are not completely fulfilled by any 
software, so that over the course of this work a software concept for an exemplary tool was 
developed. The concept will be explained in the following chapter and the different functions 
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6. Software Concept for the ScenarioBuilder BOS – A Network-based Tool for 
Exercise Planning and Evaluation 
After discussing the potentials of social network analysis as a methodology for the planning and 
evaluation phase of the exercise in civil protection and disaster response in the last chapter, this 
chapter will develop a concept for a corresponding software application. The concept takes up 
the previously described practical requirements as well as practices and functions from existing 
software and extends them for the relevant use cases in order to support the user as best as 
possible. First of all, this chapter addresses the objectives of the software and the use cases that 
are to be implemented with the application. The functions and conditions for the development 
of scenarios are then explained, followed by those for the scenario analysis. Special emphasis is 
given to the simulation and structural network analysis by means of centrality calculation. At 
the end of the chapter an exemplary use of the application in a discussion-based and an 
operation-based exercise is outlined and possible conceptual extensions are discussed. 
 
6.1. Software Objectives and Use Cases 
The aim of the conceptualized application, which is called ScenarioBuilder BOS, is to develop, 
model and analyze exercises scenarios on the basis of multilayer graph networks and their 
analyses. The visualization and analysis of these exercise or scenario networks are intended to 
show the user various possibilities of interpretation of the entire scenario or individual 
sequences thereof, thus making them more tangible. In other words, the user should be able to 
view a scenario or certain situations from different perspectives and to examine and evaluate 
them on the basis of different questions. The software thus makes it possible to anticipate the 
characteristics and processes of an exercise as early as during the planning phase or to simulate 
events and reactions that have occurred in the course of the evaluation. 
The ScenarioBuilder BOS is intended to support users from practice in the exercise operation 
and therefore considers all people involved in the exercise, but especially the exercise planners 
and controllers, as its central stakeholders. Based on the previously defined requirements, the 
concept provides a number of design criteria for the application. In particular, the aspect of 
visualization is to be mentioned here, which is the focus of the application. Thus, the software 
is used to model and depict exercises in the form of graph networks which represent the 
relationships between different actors within an exercise. The basic elements used are nodes 
and edges or relations (see also section 4.1). Nodes usually represent individual actors, groups 
or organizations, but can also represent material things such as vehicles or infrastructures. It is 
also possible for a node to describe a phenomenon such as a thunderstorm in order to be able 
to map scenarios as flexibly as possible. The relations between two nodes are represented by 
their edges. Different types of relationships can also be represented here. Communication and 
interaction relationships, resource relationships and responsibility relationships are particularly 
relevant for the exercise context.  
Another design criterion is the assumption of dynamic systems. Thus, following the practical 
exercise, the concept assumes that every graph network modeled is a dynamic one. This implies 
that nodes and relations can change over time and therefore different network structures can 
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be formed. In this concept and application, these dynamic networks are referred to as 
‘scenarios’. With regard to exercises in civil protection and disaster response, they can be 
categorized into three different types of scenarios as described in section 5.3 that are relevant 
for the software. These are communication scenarios focusing on the different interactions of 
the exercise participants, dependency scenarios which mainly involve resource relationships to 
represent interdependencies as well as scenarios that represent the actual exercise scenario. In 
the latter case, the number of different types of relationships can be significantly larger, 
depending on the scope of the scenario. Here, the sequences of actions specified in the script 
are modelled with the interactions required both for them and the underlying dependencies. 
The decision which form of the scenario is used is left to the user and should be based on the 
requirements of the exercise.  
The objective of the software application to provide the user with interpretation possibilities for 
situations or aspects within an exercise requires a further aspect that is incorporated into the 
software concept, namely a high degree of flexibility and adaptability. This includes in 
particular adaptability regarding the visualization but also flexibility in the analysis as well as 
in the use and working with the tool. The intention of the ScenarioBuilder BOS is not to deliver 
absolute results for a scenario as in the case of expert systems, for example. Rather, the 
application is intended to enable a reflective and discursive approach to a scenario and thus 
functions as an exercise support tool in the planning and evaluation phase. The necessary 
process of classification and evaluation of the results further enables collaborative work. 
Flexibility in the analysis ensures that a scenario can not only be evaluated as a whole but that 
certain aspects can be prioritized and individual situations can be examined in a targeted 
manner. 
The software is based on the two main use cases scenario development and scenario analysis, 
each of which is enhanced by different software functionalities. An overview of these two 
superordinate use cases as well as their subordinate use cases can be seen in the UML diagram 
in Figure 6.1. If the user wants to develop a new scenario (see section 6.2) the specific boundary 
conditions as well as the relationship types and types of nodes to be used must first be defined. 
Once this has been done the user must create nodes and relations that are the basic elements 
through which a scenario may be described. These can be further described by defining specific 
capacities and requirements. The user may also load predefined scenario templates to aid with 
development and external events extending the scenario may be defined. Scenario development 
can also take place with an existing scenario. In this case, the user loads the scenario and creates 
additional nodes, relationships and events as required. Existing elements can be edited using 
different manipulation options. Furthermore, scenarios can be linked to each other in order to 
differentiate between different levels for example. 
If the user wants to analyze an existing scenario (see section 6.3) he/she has various options 
available after loading the scenario from the database. The user can combine these analysis 
options as he/she wishes and draw conclusions from them. This includes visualizing the 
scenario through combinations of relationship types and variations of time horizons as well as 
calculating the centrality of the individual nodes in different ways. Furthermore, he/she can 
view the scenario network in different layouts and investigate specific path dependencies. If 
capacities and requirements are defined in the scenario, the user has the possibility to 
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investigate cascading effects and malfunctions over time by simulating the scenario. It is also 
possible for the user to filter individual nodes from the view or to combine them into groups. 
Finally, the user can play the scenario as a film sequence to get an insight into its dynamics.  
 
Figure 6.1: Use case diagram according to UML notation for the network-based tool to support the planning and 
evaluation of exercises  
The user has the possibility to switch back and forth between the two use cases. For example, 
incomplete scenarios can be analyzed while still in development and errors identified during 
analysis may be corrected at any time by switching to development mode. In the following 
sections the functions and approaches defined here for the two superordinate use cases are 
described in detail and their implications are explained. 
 
6.2. Scenario Development 
Defining Boundary Conditions 
Before a scenario can be analyzed, it must first be created or developed with the ScenarioBuilder 
BOS application. This is independent of the question of whether the application is intended to 
support the actual development of an exercise scenario in the planning phase or whether it is 
used in the context of evaluation. In both cases, the scenario must first be modeled before 
further analyses and discussions for interpretation can follow. At the beginning of the scenario 
development there is always the definition of the boundary conditions. This includes the 
definition of the exercise objectives, the time frame and the name of the exercise. For the use 
of the application, it must also be specified which form of scenario is to be modeled (see section 



















































to be practiced with the relevant action sequences. Based on this question it must be decided 
whether the relationships to be depicted are directed or undirected relationships. For most 
exercises directed relations are used because they enable a clear assignment of sender and 
receiver of for example information, which is usually important for the investigation, especially 
in communication networks. In cases in which the sole interest is in knowing between which 
actors a relationship existed and not from whom it originated, these can be represented by 
undirected relationships (although it is also possible to work with two oppositely directed 
relationships in such cases).  
Defining Node and Relationship Types 
In addition to the definition of the boundary conditions, the user must also decide which data 
is to be collected for the scenario and how it should be visualized at the beginning of the 
scenario development. Here, one has to distinguish between the considered actors and the 
considered relationships. With regard to the actors, the user must specify which actors or nodes 
are relevant for the scenario and how they can be categorized. By assigning them to a category 
different groups of actors can be visualized in the same way, thus allowing the user to directly 
assign individual nodes and actors to each other without overloading the scenario visually. 
Moreover, a layered categorization with superordinate and subcategories is often useful. A 
power plant node may serve as an example. For a power plant, ‘infrastructure’ can be defined 
as a top category, while a corresponding subcategory could be ‘energy infrastructure’ and 
underneath that a more detailed description such as ‘energy infrastructure for production’ 
would be appropriate. Another example would be an S1 from the crisis management staff of 
the fire department (see section 2.3). As a superordinate category one could specify a ‘unit’. A 
more precise categorization could be given by the organization ‘fire brigade’ and the assignment 
to the ‘crisis management staff’. The visualization of different categories in the ScenarioBuilder 
BOS is done by varying the color, shape and size of the nodes (see section 4.4). Examples for 
different nodes are shown in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Examples of different representations of node and relationship types 
 
A visualization in case of a layered categorization as described in the examples mentioned above 
is made possible by the combination of, for example, shape and color. For instance, the user 
can define that infrastructures are always displayed as box-shaped nodes. Different colors are 
used depending on the infrastructure in question. For example, energy infrastructures could be 
represented as yellow box-shaped nodes while water infrastructure is displayed using blue color 
Styles Examples
Nodes
▪ Infrastructures → box-shaped nodes
(energy → yellow, water → blue)
▪ Units → cirle-shaped nodes
(fire brigade → red, ems → green)
Relations
▪ Resources → solid line
(people → black, water → blue)
▪  ommunication → dashed line
(command → blue, question → orange)
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coding. Furthermore, actors that are particularly relevant for a scenario can be displayed larger 
than the remaining actors to allow for further visual differentiation.  
In addition to deciding which actors are relevant for the scenario and under which categories 
they can be grouped, the user must also decide which types of relationships should be mapped 
within the scenario. Through this process the user determines the degree of multiplexity of the 
scenario and defines the system boundaries. Similar to the categorization of nodes, it can also 
be useful to categorize relationships in order to enable a more detailed view if required. 
Categories of relationships that are of interest for the civil protection and disaster response 
exercise are mainly communication or resource relationships. A distinction within the group of 
communication relationships can be made, for example, with regard to operational reports. 
Here, communications are differentiated between general information or messages, commands, 
requests and questions. Resource relationships can be differentiated according to the type of 
resource, for example. Possible subcategories include but are not limited to water, electricity, 
or human resources (e.g. task forces or man-power). In the software application, different 
categories of relationships are visualized by different colors and shapes of arrows (see section 
4.4). Examples are shown in Table 6.1. As with the nodes, layered categories can be achieved 
for relationships by a combination of shape and color. Using the example of communication 
relations, all corresponding relations could be shown with a dotted line. Depending on the type 
of communication, the color could be varied. For example, a command relationship would be 
represented by a blue dotted line, while a communicated request would be represented by a 
black dotted line. This enables the user to see at first glance which relationships correspond to 
the types depicted in the scenario and allows for easy deduction of first qualitative findings 
from the perception of the scenario network.  
When defining the node and relationship types, it must be taken into account that the 
complexity of the scenario increases with increasing multiplexity and depth of detail. On the 
one hand this enables a more detailed examination of the modeled scenario network, but on 
the other hand it also increases the effort required for data collection. Furthermore, it must be 
remembered that a too large number of different visualizations can also lead to confusion. 
However, this can be alleviated during the evaluation phase by using filters or grouping nodes 
and relationships. In general, the definition of the relevant node and relationship types should 
always be based on the exercise objectives and the questions of interest to the user. If the 
software is used several times across different exercises, it makes sense to develop a uniform 
definition of types and categories to achieve better comparability between different scenarios. 
Creating and Manipulating Nodes and Relations 
After the boundary conditions for the scenario and the categories of nodes and relationships 
used have been defined the dynamic scenario can be developed step by step. The underlying 
dynamics are displayed in the ScenarioBuilder BOS in the form of a relative time scale where 
the time 𝑡 = 0 corresponds to the start time of the exercise defined in the boundary conditions. 
Which real time span is covered with one time step depends on the needs of the user and should 
be defined in the course of the determination of the boundary conditions. Since most exercises 
last less than five to six hours, time steps in the lower minute range are usually sufficient (1-15 
minutes). During scenario development, the application always visualizes the currently selected 
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time of the scenario. All elements that are defined for that time are displayed. For a better 
overview, the user can switch between different time steps at any time, which updates the 
displayed scenario network. An example of an imaginary scenario at different times is shown 
in Figure 6.2. The diagram lists five time steps (𝑡 = 0 to 𝑡 = 4). In the last part of the figure 
(bottom left), the individual time steps were merged and displayed in a single static network. 
When developing and modeling the scenario with the application, the user usually starts with 
the description of the initial situation (𝑡 = 0). For each newly created node, a unique name 
must be defined and assigned to a predefined node type. The name serves as an identifier and 
label at the same time and is intended to prevent the user from having to work with numerical 
IDs and to ensure a uniform name throughout the entire work with the scenario. Next to the 
name, the specification of a start and end time ensures that the node is only visualized in the 
time period of the scenario for which it is relevant. Users can also link additional attributes to 
a node. For example, it can be useful to store coordinates to give the node a geographical 
reference.  
The conditions for creating relationships are similar to those for nodes. They must also have 
unique names and be assigned to a specific relationship type. In communications networks, for 
example, relationships can be initiated by one actor to several receiving actors at the same time. 
This means, however, that more flexibility is required here with regard to naming and labels 
than is the case with nodes. With the ScenarioBuilder BOS, the user has the option of flexibly 
adjusting the labels of relationships or deactivating them completely. It is also possible to 
duplicate relationships with all their properties whereby the application provides the previously 
mentioned name with an additional index in order to guarantee unambiguousness in naming. 
Analogous to the creation of nodes relations must also have a defined period of time for which 
they are valid. The time period of relations can sometimes vary greatly in a scenario depending 
on their relationship type. While communication relationships often only have a very short 
activity phase resource relationships between two nodes, for example, tend to have a longer-
term effect. When creating a relationship a reference to the origin and target nodes is required 
in addition to the attributes mentioned above. Furthermore, references to relationships that 
have already been created can be stored in a relationship for the later display of path 
dependencies. Figure 6.2 again serves as an example. If one assumes that the shown 
communication scenario describes a path dependency, the reference relation is the command 
relationship (blue dotted line) from time step 𝑡 = 0. All relations from time step 𝑡 = 1 refer to 
just this command and would not have been established without it. The same applies 
equivalently for all the further time steps.  
 













Figure 6.2: Example of an imaginary dynamic communication scenario for the times t=0 (top left) to t=4 (bottom left) 
and merged for the time range t={0,1,…,4} (bottom right) 
Actor from the fire brigade 
gives an order (blue line) to 
an actor from the THW
Actor from the THW passes a 
request (red line) to two of his 
colleagues and a question to a 
consultant (yellow line)
Two actors from the THW 
have a discussion (purple line) 
and the consultant replies to 
the question with some 
information (black line)
Actor from the THW replies to 
the request with some 
information (black line)
Actor from the THW replies to 
the command with some 
information
All communication relations 
of the five time steps are 
merged in a static graph
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In the event that changes occur in already modeled nodes or edges during the development of 
the scenario, the ScenarioBuilder BOS provides functions for editing and manipulation. 
Individual relationships can be deleted or changed. In particular, start and end times can be 
edited or a reference to other relationships can be created or removed. It is also possible to 
assign a relationship to another relationship type. The manipulation of a node is possible in the 
same way as for relationships. Here too, its start and end time or other attributes can be 
updated. Since relationships are always assigned to an origin and a target node, they are 
automatically deleted when a node is removed from the scenario, provided they are linked to 
it. For data storage and handling the application uses an integrated database that stores all 
changes made by the user and makes them available again when loading the application at a 
later time. Furthermore, the ScenarioBuilder BOS provides functionality to export and import 
both the database as well as individual data from it. This enables the user to work with 
applications he is familiar with. For example, they can also define node and relationship types 
outside the application using spreadsheet programs for instance. 
Defining Capacities and Requirements for the Scenario 
Especially in the planning phase of exercises, the possible effects of events are not so easy to 
assess for the planners and make the development of the scenario more difficult (see section 
3.5). This is especially true for scenarios that should include cascade events in socio-technical 
systems such as infrastructures. Here it is helpful for users if they can use simulation approaches 
to calculate and simulate the effects of these systems on the overall scenario and derive 
consequences for the development. In this way, more realistic exercises can be achieved, which 
leads to an increase in motivation and acceptance of said exercises (see section 3.5 and section 
5.4). In order to enable the user to develop such scenarios, the ScenarioBuilder BOS provides 
concepts for extending a scenario so that possible problems and consequences can be simulated. 
The approach taken by the application assumes that nodes may have specific capacities, load 
limits and requirements. These in turn can change depending on the time and the situation in 
which the node is in. Under the assumption that the types of capacities and requirements always 
correspond to the relationship types defined in the respective scenario and that the scenario is 
a one build upon directed relationships, the approach further assumes that the relationships 
(especially resource relationships) in the scenario act as carriers of such capacities. This 
approach can be illustrated using two examples:  
• A city hospital (node) has a patient capacity of 200 people during normal operation, that it 
can provide for as long as sufficient staff and the necessary infrastructure are available. 
Here, each admission of patients (incoming relationship) leads to a reduction of the 
available capacity while a discharge of patients (outgoing relationship) results in an 
increase. A change in the situation might mean that normal operation can no longer be 
guaranteed. For example, in the event of a power failure, it can be assumed that patient 
capacity will decrease because the hospital can only provide emergency care. 
• A forest fire scenario requires a certain amount of extinguishing water that can be provided 
in different ways. For example, a fire truck (node) has a limited capacity with a water tank 
of 2000 liters. If on the other hand a fire pond or hydrants are available in the immediate 
vicinity, the water availability is much greater. In both cases, the capacity attribute of the 
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relationship specifies how much water can be transported per time step from the source 
node to the target node. 
In order to implement such scenarios and to allow for simulation later on, the applied approach 
assumes that nodes can be in different states, i.e. different conditions of a system. Each of these 
states is linked to specific capacities and requirements that can be defined individually. The 
ScenarioBuilder BOS enables the user to specify multiple states for each node and their 
corresponding attributes such as output capacities, i.e. functions that can be performed by the 
node, intake capacities or load limits and requirements. This can be illustrated via the hospital 
example mentioned above. Two different states can be identified, namely the ‘normal state’ and 
the ‘emergency state’. No output capacities are described for the normal state, but there is an 
intake capacity of 200 persons to be treated. There are also some requirements for the hospital 
to function in the normal state. In particular, there is a requirement for the resource electricity. 
For the emergency state there is also no output capacity defined and here too there is an intake 
capacity for persons to be treated, but it will be considerably smaller than in the normal state. 
In order to maintain hospital operation in the emergency state, i.e. diesel generators are 
required for emergency power generation and thus the resource diesel is a requirement.  
Since relationships in the context of simulation map the transport of resources and other 
relationship types from one node to another, the user needs to define exactly one capacity for 
each relation to be used for this purpose. This shows the ‘flow’ that exists between the origin 
and the target node, meaning in particular, the type of relationship that exists between the two 
nodes and the quantity that the relationship transfers per time step. With the ScenarioBuilder 
BOS it is also possible to edit or remove individual capacities and requirements as well as entire 
states. While yes/no relationships are possible and will appear in rare cases, the above examples 
have shown that capacities and requirements are almost always more complex. Especially in 
the case of resource dependencies such as electricity or water quantity-specific information is 
required that can also take dynamic changes into account. Therefore, the application stipulates 
that for capacities and requirements based on resource relationships a mathematical function 
is specified for the user to describe the corresponding quantity and dynamics. Different function 
types are available to the user. The application distinguishes between constant, linear and non-
linear operations. An overview of the available functions including an example is given in Table 
6.2. While the parameter 𝑡 represents the current time step the scenario is in, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are 
parameters that the user has to select to describe the functions in more detail. In some cases, 
the start time 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 of the respective node or relationship is relevant as well in order to reflect 
the true value of the function. 
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Table 6.2: Overview of the types of functions used by the ScenarioBuilder BOS to describe capacities and requirements 
 
Creating and Manipulating Events 
In addition to the nodes and relationships, events are introduced as a further basic element in 
the ScenarioBuilder BOS to support the development and analysis of scenarios. Events describe 
external occurrences that can have a negative effect on the entire system described in the 
scenario or individual nodes from it. An example of events are disasters such as floods or 
earthquakes. Events like these can have a direct effect on nodes within their temporal and 
spatial scope of influence and can limit or completely destroy their functionality. For example, 
a gas station damaged in an earthquake may not be able to operate at all or only to a very 
limited extent. In the application, events are indirectly visualized through the nodes affected by 
them. As soon as a node is restricted in its function or completely destroyed by an event, it and 
all relationships originating from it are outlined with a red frame as demonstrated on the left 
side of Figure 6.3. The application supports the creation, manipulation and deletion of events. 
When creating an event, the user must define a name for identification purposes, a period of 
time within which the event will affect the respective nodes as well as the affected nodes 
themselves. Furthermore, for each node it must be specified if its function is impacted only 
during the active time of the event or whether or not the effects linger afterwards. Different 
events can exist within the same time frame and also affect the same nodes. 
 
Figure 6.3: Functional (right) and non-functional (red outlined) nodes and relationships (left) 
Type of Function Formula Example
Constant 𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑝1 A water tank has a specific, constant 
capacity of e.g. 2000 litres, regardless of 
the time.
Infinite 𝑓 𝑡 = ∞ A special form of a constant capacity 
where the quantity is in any case 
sufficient or unlimited, e.g. a hydrant.
Linear 𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑝1(𝑡 − 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡) + 𝑝2 A linear rise in the water level at a dike 
due to constant rain.
Exponential 𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑝1𝑒
( 2(𝑡−𝑡     )) The availability of volunteers in the 
initial phase of an emergency after the 
alert or the spread of an epidemic.
Logarithmic 𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑝1   (𝑝2(𝑡 − 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡)) The pump capacity or the amount of 
water delivered during the pump start-
up phase.
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Linking Scenarios to Each Other 
When planning exercises it is not uncommon for there to be a request to involve various 
organizations and hierarchical levels in the exercise and to develop an appropriate scenario. 
Since these different stakeholders sometimes define different goals for their own teams and 
may have very different procedures, the development of an overall scenario is very complex and 
time-consuming. An example of such an exercise is the regularly held LÜKEX (see section 3.4). 
This exercise, which takes place under one central scenario, contains a multitude of smaller 
subordinate scenarios involving a subset of the participating organizations, authorities and 
companies. For example, at LÜKEX 18 which simulated a gas shortage situation in Germany as 
a central exercise scenario (BBK, 2019b) different sub-scenarios were developed and processed 
by the participating states and authorities that more specifically reflected their own needs and 
exercise objectives. This can make the analysis of the scenarios more complicated since each 
sub-scenario is an independent scenario but while being influenced by the higher-level one. On 
the other hand, incidents in a sub-scenario can also have an impact on a higher level. 
Another example intending to illustrate how the ScenarioBuilder BOS deals with such linked 
scenarios is visualized in Figure 6.4. The figure shows an excerpt from a disaster scenario of an 
urban damage event in which communication is to be examined on two levels. On the 
superordinate level (top part of the figure) the interactions between different urban actors are 
shown. The bottom part of the figure specifically considers the interactions within the disaster 
management staff (KatS-Stab) and thus represents the subordinate level of the scenario. The 
difference to an unlinked scenario is the node “External”. This is, so to speak, a mirror image of 
the node “KatS-Stab” and its relationships from the superordinate level. Incoming relationships 
in the superordinate level are displayed as outgoing relationships in the subordinate level and 
vice versa. With the possibility of linking scenarios, the application can be used to reduce the 
complexity of such scenarios and map multi-layered scenarios. However, it is necessary that the 
boundary conditions, especially the time reference, are the same for the different scenarios. If 
a node within a scenario refers to a higher-level or lower-level network, the user can recognize 
this by the extension ‘Linked’ in the node label. Switching between the different scenarios can 




Figure 6.4: Example of a linked disaster scenario visualizing the communication relationships between the urban 
actors (black nodes) in the superordinate scenario (top) and within the disaster management staff (red nodes) in the 
subordinate scenario (bottom) 
Importing Scenario Templates 
The planning of exercises and especially the development of scenarios is a very time-consuming 
process for the exercise planners. In order to reduce this time expenditure, many organizations 
collect exercises that have been planned previously so that they can be reused in a similar or 
modified form at a later date. The ScenarioBuilder BOS picks up this concept and gives the user 
the possibility to save already developed scenarios as templates and reuse them in later 
exercises. In particular, it enables the import of one or multiple templates in a scenario and thus 
supports an efficient design of the relevant situation. When importing, all nodes and their 
relationship structures are transferred to the new scenario so that they can be directly reused 
and known dependencies do not have to be created again in order to be included in the analysis. 
Templates are particularly suitable for static systems and structures that do not vary greatly, 
such as the energy network of a district or the units of the supra-regionally deployed Medical 
Task Force (MTF) (BBK, 2018). When using templates attention must be paid to the temporal 


















Superordinate scenario – 
communication between urban 
actors during a disaster
Subordinate scenario – 
communication within the 
"KatS-Stab"
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definition of the time span per time step must be consistent between the scenarios so that there 
is no distortion of relationships and capacities. 
 
6.3. Scenario Analysis 
As soon as a first version of a given scenario is developed, the user can switch back and forth 
between the scenario development and its analysis. The ScenarioBuilder BOS offers different 
options for analyzing the scenario that may be utilized by the user depending on the defined 
exercise objectives and the phase in which the application was used. For example, the scenario 
can only be simulated if the required data has been stored. Also grouping or filtering of nodes 
is especially interesting for complex scenarios with many nodes. Since the application always 
saves all created scenarios, the analysis can be performed temporally independent and a 
comparison of different scenarios can be carried out at any time. 
Reviewing the Network in Different Layouts 
A central goal of the software is to enable the user to view the scenario from different 
perspectives. This should aid in obtaining a better overall picture of the scenario or exercise and 
in grasping connections that have not yet been considered. One way in which the 
ScenarioBuilder BOS allows the user to view the scenario from different perspectives is to 
analyze the scenario through different layouts. These are one of the most important elements 
of network visualization (see section 4.4) and support the user’s understanding of structural 
relationships. The application provides the user with a number of layouts that offer advantages 
for different use cases. These include but are not limited to:  
Auto-generated layout: With the auto-generated layout, a dynamic force-directed layout such 
as the Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) algorithm is used by the application to support the 
user, especially in scenario development (see section 4.4). Since the algorithm determines the 
placement of the nodes with the aim of achieving the greatest possible clarity, newly generated 
nodes are distributed sensibly in the user’s field of view and a minimization of edge crossings 
is aimed at. In this way, even with a large number of nodes a uniform picture of the situation 
is possible and the user can identify groups or clusters of well-networked actors more easily. 
The layout is disadvantageous in networks with several components (see section 4.2), especially 
when components consist of only one node because they repel each other and thus components 
tend to be focused on the corners of the drawing area. Figure 6.5 (a) illustrates the auto-
generated layout using an example scenario. 
Sociograms: Sociograms form a group of layouts that serve to support human perception in 
understanding network or scenario information. This is made possible by positioning the nodes 
according to defined criteria such as the node centrality or the category to which a node belongs. 
For the exercise context in civil protection and disaster response three types of sociograms are 
of particular interest, namely the circular layout, the radial layout and the group layout, that are 
all supported by the ScenarioBuilder BOS (see section 4.4). The circular layout can be used very 
well for comparisons. By arranging all nodes in a circle, the user can easily identify what the 
direct outreach of a node is and which neighbors it has (see Figure 6.5 (b)). In addition, the 
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nodes are sorted according to a selected criterion so that comparisons between two nodes can 
be made quickly. For example, the relevance of two nodes can be compared using the degree 
centrality (see section 4.3) as shown in Figure 6.5 (c). ). With the radial layout it is just as easy 
to compare different nodes based on a selected criterion such as centrality. In particular, the 
specific arrangement of nodes in concentric circles makes it possible to identify properties that 
are of similar or even equal value for the associated nodes in a given circle. The group layout 
offers another possibility of representation for questions concerning, for example, the 
relationship structures within and between teams. Here, nodes are placed according to their 
node type, or in other words, their category. Each category forms a cluster of nodes which are 
positioned close to each other while the distance to other clusters is as large as possible. The 
focus of the display is therefore on the interaction between node types or actor groups which is 









Figure 6.5: Example network with seven actors (nodes) from three different teams (each color represents one team) 
in different layouts: (a) auto-generated layout, (b) circular layout, (c) circular layout with degree dependent node 
size and (d) group layout (grouping according to team membership) 
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Geo-layout: The Geo-layout or situation layout is based on the principle of the situation map 
and places nodes according to their coordinates on a background map view. To use the layout, 
the coordinates must be stored as attributes in the nodes and a geo-referenced map with the 
area of the scenario must be available. The advantages of the layout are its spatial arrangement 
directly reflecting a real-world situation and the associated clarity about the distribution of the 
nodes in the exercise area. This makes it interesting for questions that relate to the spatial 
distribution of, for example, operational forces within the scenario. For instance, one could look 
into the question of whether or not there are more interactions with nearby actors than with 
those located further away in a scenario.  
User-specified layout: With the user-specified layout, the ScenarioBuilder BOS offers a layout 
that does not follow a special algorithm or a fixed arrangement of nodes but instead flexibly 
responds to the needs of the user. The layout is initially based on a random layout that places 
the nodes randomly in the drawing area. Starting from this configuration, the user can vary the 
position of the nodes as required. The application saves the position changes made so that the 
user can return to his selected configuration even when changing the layout. The user-specified 
layout is suitable, for example, for displaying and checking the chains of command in a 
communication network of a fire brigade. In this case the free arrangement makes it possible 
to display the nodes in the defined hierarchy levels and to get an immediate understanding of 
the communication paths between all levels. 
Playing Scenario Sequences and Analyzing Path Dependencies 
The application enables the user to move within the dynamic scenario network by changing the 
time step. If a different time step is selected, the ScenarioBuilder BOS updates the visual 
representation of the network graph with all nodes and relationships defined for this point in 
time. The previously selected layout is also adopted, so that the display remains the same when 
time steps change. To make it easier for the user to understand the perception of the scenario’s 
temporality, the application further provides the possibility to ‘play’ the scenario as a sequence. 
In this case, the ScenarioBuilder BOS automatically runs through the individual time steps with 
a delay defined by the user so that he or she can view the scenario as a film and examine it for 
its changes. The application supports two different procedures, namely the playback of time 
steps or of combined time periods. While the former starts with the time step 𝑡 = 0 and iterates 
over each individual time step, the latter uses a time span defined by the user. In this case, all 
nodes and relationships defined in the time span are combined into a static network and the 
application iterates over them. For example, if the user has defined 15 time steps as the span to 
be examined, the first network of the sequence is composed of the nodes and relationships of 
the scenario from 𝑡 = {0,1,… ,14}, the second of those from 𝑡 = {15,16,… ,29}, and so on. Using 
a time span is especially useful if only a few relationships between nodes are defined per time 
step. 
A special form of analysis over time provided by the ScenarioBuilder BOS is that of path 
dependencies. When analyzing these path dependencies, the user can examine how the scenario 
has developed in relation to a specific interaction between two nodes. This can be interesting, 
for example, if the user wants to investigate how and at what point in time information was 
communicated between certain members of a team and what reactions this information 
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triggered. Here, questions such as if the information had reached the relevant actors and if the 
reactions to it where in accordance with the corresponding expectations can be answered. Path 
dependency analysis can also be used to evaluate the efficiency of processes. For example, is a 
process completed by three interactions or was a longer path necessary and how much time 
elapsed until completion? Using the ScenarioBuilder BOS, the user can obtain an overview of 
the paths defined during the scenario development and select them. The corresponding path is 
then filtered out of the scenario and visualized. For each time step in which a relation to the 
path exists, a network representation is generated and presented to the user in form of a 
sequence (see Figure 6.2). In addition, a summary of that sequence is provided by visualizing a 
merged static network consisting of all nodes and relationships involved in the path as shown 
in the lower right part of Figure 6.2. This gives the user an overview of the nodes involved in 
the path as well as the amount of relationships. 
Simulating Cascading Effects 
As shown in section 5.2, the network-based representation of technical systems is very well 
suited for the simulation of cascade effects as well as risk analysis. These capabilities also 
represent an important quality for exercises in civil protection and disaster response when 
working with scenarios. Especially in planning, scenario simulations can support the user in 
defining system boundaries or in identifying potential problematic areas or situations. The 
application’s approach to scenario simulation is based on the definition of capacities and 
requirements that can then be assigned to nodes in order to map their specific capabilities and 
functions but also their limits and resource demands (see section 6.2). It is also assumed that 
relationships symbolize the exchange of resources and information and also have a capacity 
that characterizes the amount of exchange per time step. Since the systems considered in 
exercises are often dynamic and sometimes vary significantly the approach further assumes that 
nodes have different states in which their capacities and requirements can deviate. Capacities 
and requirements are specified by mathematical functions to represent time dependencies 
adequately. 
The ScenarioBuilder BOS provides an algorithm for an iterative simulation calculation for each 
time step in the scenario which includes the capacities and requirements stored in the nodes 
and relationships as well as the defined events. The algorithm calculates whether a node can 
fulfill its function taking into account all conditions relevant to the scenario network at that 
time or whether it is damaged. As the basis for the calculation the user first has to provide 
information about the conditions defined for each node. In every case, a node has a ‘default’ 
state which describes its standard conditions. Furthermore, a ‘damaged’ state should also be 
defined for each node that covers the minimum capacities that the node can provide even in a 
defective condition. An example for this can be a water utility plant: In its regular or default 
state it provides a certain amount of water. However, if the water utility plant is damaged, it 
may not be possible to provide any more water yet the employees can still act as experts and 
provide information to other locations. If no ‘damaged’ state is defined in a node it is considered 
to be completely inoperative as long as the node is affected by an event. Defective or fully non-
functional nodes and relationships are visualized with a red border as shown in the left part of 
Figure 6.3 and can have an effect on the rest of the network since no more services can be 
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transmitted by outgoing relationships. Besides the ‘default’ and the ‘damaged’ state any number 
of further states with corresponding capacities and requirements can be defined by the user.  
The iterative algorithm used in the ScenarioBuilder BOS distinguishes between three levels, the 
network level (Figure 6.6), the node level (Figure 6.7) and the state level (Figure 6.8), whose 
functions are further explained in the following.  
 
Figure 6.6: Activity diagram for the calculation of the scenario network simulation (network level)  
A simulation calculation is performed by the ScenarioBuilder BOS each time the scenario 
network is changed. This includes adding or editing an element (node, relationship or event) 
and changing the time step. As shown in Figure 6.6, at least one iteration is performed at the 
network level for the simulation calculation. Each node defined at the current point in time of 
the scenario is calculated individually based on its stored capacities and requirements, the 
relationships connected to it and the existing events. The simulation checks whether there is a 
change to the previous situation of the node. If this is the case for at least one node a new 
iteration is triggered since the change that is now present can in turn affect other nodes in the 
scenario. If there is no change in any of the nodes the calculation for the time step is finished 
and the network visualization can be updated.  
At node level, as shown in Figure 6.7, the situation of the node, i.e. values such as its functional 
readiness, are first stored so that at the end of the calculation they can be compared with the 
new situation and checked to see if there has been a change in the node. Afterwards it is checked 
whether the current node is already completely defective (or marked as ‘totally failing’) in the 
time step in which the scenario is currently in. In this case, no further calculations are necessary 
and the node’s attributes are set to ‘not functioning’. This implies that all outgoing relationships 
must also be declared as ‘inactive’ and cannot transfer any more capacities.  
If a total failure was not already present, it is subsequently checked whether the node is affected 
by one or more events in the current time step. If this is the case, it is then examined whether 
at least one of the events affecting the node leads to its complete failure. If this check is 
affirmative the attributes of the corresponding node are marked as ‘totally failing’ and the 
calculation for the node in the current iteration is finished. Since in this case a change in the 
node has taken place another iteration of calculations at network level is triggered after 
computing the remaining nodes of the current iteration (see Figure 6.6). 
If the node is neither affected by an event nor does any of the events affecting it lead to a 
complete failure of its function a calculation on the state level is necessary, provided that states 
are stored in the node (see Figure 6.8). It is differentiated whether the node is affected by at 
least one event. If this is the case, the node is transferred to the ‘damaged’ state and the 
associated effects of capacities and requirements on the scenario are calculated at state level. 








possible state is selected and the node is transferred to it. In case of several possible options, 
the best possible state is selected according to an order defined by the user when creating the 
states, whereby the ‘default’ state is always preferred.  
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After the state calculation, the situation of the node must be compared with the situation stored 
at the beginning of the node calculation. If the node was functioning before and is no longer 
functional it is updated and in case of a total failure the nodes attributes are marked 
accordingly. All outgoing relationships are marked as ‘inactive’ and a new iteration of the 
calculation is required. In the event of an output failure, only the affected outgoing relationships 
are set to ‘inactive’ and, if the node was not previously functional, it is updated. In any case, 
there is a node change. For nodes that are functional after the state calculation, it is checked 
whether they were also functional before. If this is the case, there are no changes for the node. 
Otherwise, its outgoing relationships must first be activated and its attributes need to be 
updated. 
At state level, the effects of capacities and requirements on the nodes in the respective state are 
calculated as shown in Figure 6.8. The existing capacities and requirements given for the state 
are compared with the incoming and outgoing quantities in the relationships. This is done 
individually for each relationship type. After that, the verification takes place sequentially 
checking for exceedance of the intake capacity, fulfillment of the requirement and exceedance 
of the output capacity. A distinction is made between flow-based relationship types (especially 
resource relationships such as water, energy, etc.) and others. While with flow-based 
relationships the actual quantities are added up, all others are only recorded categorically. For 
example, an information that is passed from a node by an outgoing relationship can be passed 
on an unlimited number of times, even if it has only been transmitted once to the node. On the 
other hand, a node can only provide an output of water, for example, in the quantity that it has 
at its disposal or that was made available to it via incoming relationships.  
 
Figure 6.8: Activity diagram for the calculation of the scenario network simulation (state level)  
The intake capacity for a specific relationship type is exceeded if there is a maximum capacity 
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𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑥 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑥 > 𝐶𝑥
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 (6.1) 
where:  
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑥: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑥 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑥: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑥 
𝐶𝑥
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑥 
If in the state under consideration there is at least one intake capacity of a relationship type 
that has been exceeded and which was not declared reversible by the user when it was created, 
the node in this state is considered completely non-functional and the state is updated 
accordingly. If this is not the case, but there are one or more exceeded intake capacities that 
are reversible, the node for this state is only declared as ‘not functioning’ and not as ‘totally 
failing’. If both of these cases do not apply and no intake capacity has been exceeded, the system 
checks whether all requirements have been fulfilled. A requirement is not fulfilled if: 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑥 < 𝑅𝑥 (6.2) 
where:  
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑥: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑥 
𝑅𝑥: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑥 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 
If a requirement defined in the state under consideration is not fulfilled and there is no buffer 
capacity for it, the node cannot perform its function in this state and the state is declared as 
‘not functioning’. Finally, the algorithm checks whether an output capacity for a relationship 
type has been defined and exceeded. For this the following condition is used: 
𝐶𝑥
𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑢𝑡
< 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑥 (6.3) 
where:  
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑥: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑥 
𝐶𝑥
𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑢𝑡
: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑥 
If the output capacity for at least one relationship type is exceeded, the status for the node in 
the currently considered state is updated accordingly. Otherwise, all checks are successful and 
the state is marked with the attribute ‘functioning’. 
As soon as there are no more changes in any node the simulation calculation for the current 
time step is completed and the visualization of the scenario network can be updated. In addition 
to the general simulation calculation, which takes into account the capacities and requirements 
described in states as well as the events existing in the scenario, the user has the option of 
running a partial simulation. Depending on one’s preference, this only includes one of the two 
aspects mentioned above in the simulation. Thus, the user can deactivate the simulation of 
events, which means that the calculation of states follows directly after the check of a complete 
failure of the node. The simulation of states can also be deactivated. In this case, a node that is 
affected by an event and thus not completely disabled will be declared as ‘not functioning’. 
Likewise, if no event affects the node it is considered functional. In case the simulation of states 
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is activated but a node does not have a damaged state, the algorithm assumes that the node has 
no capacities when it is damaged and directly declares it as ‘not functioning’ without further 
calculations. 
Furthermore, in order to enable the simulation being compatible with the user’s ability to switch 
between any two time steps (even if they are not consecutive) of the scenario a special 
consideration has to be made: Since this incurs the need to differentiate between a ‘damaged’ 
and a ‘totally failing’ node, the application performs a one-time simulation calculation for all 
time steps within the time range of the scenario defined in the boundary conditions. In this 
calculation the ScenarioBuilder BOS determines the respective time step for which each node is 
affected by a total failure for the first time, considering that the nodes are affected by an 
irreversible intake capacity and/or an event. In the course of this calculation, these time steps 
are stored in the corresponding nodes and are included in the general simulation calculations 
for a single time step when checking the occurrence of a total failure (see Figure 6.7). To further 
take into account cases where the failure of a requirement may be compensated for a certain 
time by appropriate buffer capacities, the application enables the user to specify a buffer time 
when creating requirements within a state. An example for such a buffer capacity can be the 
already mentioned hospital example. Here, it can generally be assumed that the hospital can 
only treat patients if a power source is available. However, if the hospital has an emergency 
power supply it can guarantee the treatment for a certain time even in case of a power failure. 
The ScenarioBuilder BOS assumes that a defined buffer is only used once and calculates the 
respective times when a node is no longer functioning accordingly during the one-time 
simulation through all time steps.  
Combining different relationship types in varying time horizons 
Exercise scenarios often extend over periods of several hours and include a large number of 
independent and/or interrelated procedures and processes, some of which are carried out in 
parallel, e.g. by different teams, while others are carried out in a consecutive manner. For the 
analysis of specific questions within a scenario this results in very different time horizons that 
have to be considered. For example, if the analysis is focused on the consecutive steps of a 
process, individual time steps considered one after the other or replaying the time range as a 
sequence can already enable initial understanding and interpretation approaches. If, however, 
questions are to be answered that relate to specific time periods such as the question of the 
interconnectedness of the actors within a given situation, it is necessary to obtain a combined 
representation of the relevant relations within that time period. To meet this requirement the 
ScenarioBuilder BOS offers the user the possibility to select different time horizons, visualize 
them in a bundled way and analyze them further. For the visualization of these time horizons 
the user can choose between different display formats which are illustrated in Figure 6.9. It 
shows an example communication scenario with six actors from two different teams (one team 
represented by blue box-shaped nodes and the other by red circle-shaped nodes). All relations 
describe information relationships. While Figure 6.9 (a) shows the relationships from the 
individual time step 𝑡 = 0 and thus the very beginning of the scenario, Figure 6.9 (b) to (d) 
illustrate the communication within the first twenty minutes of the scenario (𝑡 = {0,1, . . . ,19}). 
Here, the resulting network graph contains all nodes and relationships of the scenario for which 
the following applies: 
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𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≤ 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑  ∨  𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 > 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 (6.4) 
where:  
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) 
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) 
𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
The representation of nodes and relationships for the time domain can be in the form of a 
multigraph (Figure 6.9 (b)), an overlap network (Figure 6.9 (c)) or a projected network (Figure 










Figure 6.9: Example scenario for visualizing the communication of actors from two teams (blue box-shaped nodes 
and red circle-shaped nodes) in different time horizons; information relationships in (a) a single time step t=0 and for 
the time range t={0,1,...,19} represented by (b) a multigraph network, (c) an overlap network and (d) a projected 
network 
As can be seen in the illustration, all three variants have their strengths and weaknesses, which 
must be weighed up when selecting the form of presentation. The representation as a 
multigraph makes it possible to identify all relationships individually and, if necessary, to assign 
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them easily to the respective situations of the exercise or to the times in which they occurred 
by means of additional information in the label. The representation can promote the 
interpretability of the scenario through meta information. A disadvantage of the display in 
multigraphs is that it is not easy to understand and the user may be overwhelmed, especially 
when a large number of interactions occur. Secondly, the advantages of the presentation in an 
overlap network on the other hand are the greater clarity of the visualization and the possibility 
to easily compare interactions between actors. Here, the thickness of a relationship makes it 
easy to identify how often an actor has interacted with another actor without the user having 
to count the corresponding relationships. The user can be supported by additional information 
like the interaction frequency, which can be added as a label. A disadvantage in comparison to 
the multigraph is that individual relationships including their detailed information can no 
longer be allocated. As a third option, the representation in a projected network offers a very 
reduced and clear presentation, which is well suited for the investigation of questions such as 
the aforementioned interconnectedness of the actors or the outreach an individual situation 
may have in a scenario. A particular disadvantage here is that information on both individual 
relationships as well as their frequency is lost (see section 4.2).  
In addition to the knowledge gained from the temporality of the scenario and the resulting 
possibilities for analyzing different time horizons, multiplexity is also an important criterion for 
the analysis of the scenario. Thus, each relationship type can have different implications for the 
situations in the scenario and a parallel representation of different types of relationships can 
provide the user with a detailed overall picture. Multiplex scenarios allow a more in-depth 
analysis of the exercise as they provide different perspectives on the situations they contain. In 
a communication network, for example, it is possible to not only determine which actors were 
involved in a situation, but also to draw conclusions about their roles in the team. More specific 
questions can also be examined. For example, it is possible to distinguish whether a situation 
was clearly understandable to all actors and only a general exchange of information took place, 
or whether a situation led to discussions within the team. Basically, it depends on the question 
under investigation which types of relationships have to be considered in the analysis and 
whether they should be evaluated separately or in combination. Here, too, the ScenarioBuilder 
BOS offers the user various options for analysis.  
As illustrated in Figure 6.10 (a) to (c), individual relationship types can be viewed and analyzed 
separately or they can be combined in one network graph for the analysis as shown in Figure 
6.10 (d). The figure uses the time range 𝑡 = {0,1, . . . ,9} from the exemplary communication 
network for better clarity and distinguishes between three types of communication 
relationships, namely general information exchange represented by black lines (Figure 6.10 
(a)), discussions represented by orange lines (Figure 6.10 (b)) and questions represented by 
purple lines (Figure 6.10 (c)). If one looks exclusively at the information relationships, it 
becomes clear that here all six actors are linked with each other and information is well 
distributed in the network. This is different when looking at the discussion relationships: Here, 
two groups that discuss the situation separately from each other can be identified in the time 
period. The combination of the two in conjunction with the question relationships provides an 











Figure 6.10: Example scenario for visualizing the multiplex communication of actors from two teams (blue box-shaped 
nodes and red circle-shaped nodes) for the time range t={0,1,...,9} including (a) information relations (black lines), 
(b) discussions (orange lines), (c) questions (purple) and (d) a multigraph representation of all communication 
relationships 
The combination of different relationship types can be flexibly selected by the user. In addition 
to the explicit selection of individual types or the combination of all types used in the scenario, 
two or more relationship types can also be combined via the application in order to investigate 
specific questions. Their superordinate categories are often suitable for combining relationship 
types. For example, questions often refer to all communication relationships in an exercise 
scenario, or a deeper look at the entirety of resource relationships is required to understand the 
existing dependencies. As with the representation of different time horizons when considering 
individual relationship types, the ScenarioBuilder BOS also offers the user various options for 
the representation of multilayer networks that contain relationships of different types as well 
as of multiple time steps. Among these is the representation in a multigraph as used in Figure 
6.10 (d). With this form of representation all interactions and the information derived from 
them are directly presented to the user. Since that might, however, have a negative effect on 
the clarity of the representation the user can also use one of the display formats shown in Figure 
6.11 for the same example scenario as before, which each combine individual relationships in 
 
  Page 83 
order to increase clarity. The graph network can be represented in a weighted multigraph 
(Figure 6.11 (a)), in which all relationships of the same type and the same direction between 
two nodes are merged and weighted depending on the number of relations. Furthermore, 
analogous to the visualization options for monoplex networks, there is also an option to display 
the relationships as overlap networks (Figure 6.11 (b)) or projected networks (Figure 6.11 (c)). 







Figure 6.11: Different options for visualizing combined relationship types in a multilayer communication scenario with 
actors from two teams (blue box-shaped nodes and red circle-shaped nodes) for the time range t={0,1,...,9}; (a) 
weighted multigraph (relationship types can be differentiated by color: general information – black, discussions – 
orange and questions – purple), (b) overlap network and (c) projected network (bundled relations of differnet types 
are represented with grey lines) 
While the analysis of combinations of different types of relationships can be very useful for the 
understanding of exercises in civil protection and disaster response, it is important that the user 
develops an understanding of the possible analysis errors. This can be well explained using the 
example of communication networks. In these networks, the distinction between different types 
of relationships can be very helpful, because, for example, connections between discussions and 
information relationships can be established. Another example is the combination of request 
and command relationships, which can be used to check the communication structures in an 
 
Page 84 
organization and determine if they are correct and if certain actors obtain a specific role. 
However, if one combines communication relationships such as information interactions with 
resource relationships, conclusions cannot be generalized to the same extent. For example, it 
cannot automatically be assumed that the network promotes a distribution of information 
between actors simply because it has multiple resource relationships. Therefore, for the analysis 
of scenarios, the combinations of relationship types should be chosen sensibly and 
interpretations should be questioned and, if necessary, verified by other combinations or the 
analysis of individual relationship types. In this way, the ScenarioBuilder BOS allows the 
scenario networks to be examined from different perspectives. 
Calculating node centralities 
A central function of the application, which in most cases is performed in combination with the 
analysis of temporality and multiplexity, is the calculation and evaluation of the centrality of 
the nodes or actors in the scenario network. As explained in section 4.3, centrality is one of the 
most frequently used concepts for the analysis of social networks. With its help, the relevance 
of different actors within a scenario can be examined and compared to other actors. By being 
able to carry out the calculation for specific time horizons and likewise consider different 
multiplex relationship structures, the user can use the application to investigate centralities 
including dynamic centralities that have been classified as particularly relevant in the research 
literature (see sections 5.1 and 5.2). The ScenarioBuilder BOS supports many common centrality 
measures such as degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality as well as 
derivatives such as the PageRank (see section 4.3).  
The degree centrality can be used to highlight and examine nodes that are particularly well 
connected or have a lot of activity on a local level. When analyzing exercise scenarios it can be 
used, for example, to examine the relevance of the crisis team in operational planning and 
implementation and thereby check the correctness of predefined hierarchical structures. It is 
also suitable for identifying actors that may potentially be challenged too much or too little. For 
example, if an actor is only rarely involved in a scenario and due to that has few interactions 
with other actors, this can have a negative effect on his exercise experience. In addition to this, 
degree centrality can also be used to identify initiators and recipients of relationships by 
differentiating between indegree and outdegree centrality. This in turn can be helpful for 
questions such as command and control. If the scenario has a large number of nodes or if the 
user wants to identify which actors have acted as superior decision-makers or initiators, 
centrality concepts such as the eigenvector centrality or the PageRank can be used. These 
examine the relevance of actors not only on the basis of direct (local) relationships, but also 
include indirect relationships and thus the extended network. Crisis teams again provide a good 
example for exercises in civil protection and disaster response. Especially in large exercises such 
as functional exercises or framework exercises (see section 3.2) staff structures and their 
integration into the various crisis concepts should be practiced. In order to assess their 
functionality and structural position the centrality calculation based on eigenvector centrality 
and PageRank offer a feasible approach. 
Closeness centrality, which considers a node to be relevant if it has the shortest possible path 
to all other nodes, is a good indicator for actors in a scenario who have a good overview of the 
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network under consideration. For the exercise context it is therefore suitable for determining 
positions for exercise observers, for example. In communication networks, closeness centrality 
can further be used in the analysis of miscommunication. Here it is assumed that 
miscommunication occurs when the recipient of a message understands it differently than the 
sender intended and subsequently passes it on incorrectly. Therefore, the probability of 
miscommunication increases with increasing intermediate stations at which the message is 
shared. In addition to communication networks the topic of cascade effects, i.e. the 
consequential damage or failure of systems starting from a failure or damage of another 
connected system, is repeatedly addressed in exercises. For the analysis of such cascade effects, 
betweenness centrality is a good choice. It measures how strongly actors in a network connect 
different network areas with each other. Thus, it can support the user in identifying bottlenecks 
or show him critical intersections and transitions between well connected areas. In 
communication networks, actors with a high betweenness centrality take over important 
functions in the transfer of information between local clusters. For example, in crisis teams it 
can be examined which subject areas bring others together in the processing of tasks and are 
correspondingly strongly involved themselves. 
The examples given for the respective centrality measures provide a small overview of possible 
questions that can be analyzed in the course of an exercise. The user should bear in mind that 
when analyzing centrality on the basis of a single measure, it is not always possible to make a 
definitive statement. Instead, interpretation approaches should be developed on the basis of 
different measures and the relevance of individual actors should always be evaluated with 
regard to different perspectives. By additionally considering multilayer graph networks with 
diverse temporal aspects as well as different combinations of types of relationships, the user 
can gain specific insights from the situations of the scenario and compare them with his/her 
own experiences from previous exercises as well as with what he/she has witnessed during the 
scenario. This can be illustrated using an imaginary example: During the analysis of an exercise, 
it is noted that a group of actors were not well integrated into the general exercise structure 
and that this resulted in that group not feeling challenged. The integration should have 
happened via an actor A, who connects the group with the rest of the network. The analysis of 
betweenness centrality confirms that A has a bridge function in the network but does not yet 
explain why no integration took place. Only the additional analysis of degree centrality shows 
that A was involved in a large number of interactions in the network and was potentially 
overwhelmed by the number of tasks assigned to him. This can be confirmed by the comparison 
of his indegree and outdegree. While many interactions were addressed to A, some of which 
should have been passed on to the group, only a few of them actually go out to the group. 
For the calculation of centrality, the ScenarioBuilder BOS uses the currently examined scenario 
network with the defined time horizon and the relationship types selected by the user. 
Furthermore, the calculation also takes the selected display format into account. The results are 
subsequently visualized by the size of the respective nodes and an additional representation of 
the centrality value in the node label. This presentation format can be easily understood by the 
user and supports his/her ability to develop interpretations of the data. In order to avoid 
challenges caused by nodes that are too large, the application defines a maximum and minimum 
value for the size and adjusts each node depending on its centrality value. As an example, Figure 
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6.12 shows the results of the degree centrality calculation using the previously introduced 
communication network with the relationship types information, discussion and questions. The 
values shown in the labels are normalized so that they all have values between 0.0 and 1.0. 
Looking at the four different forms of presentation, some differences can be seen in the results. 
For example, node E is much less prominent in the representation of the scenario as a 
multigraph than it is in the representation using the overlay network. This is due to the fact 
that the calculation of the degree centrality in the present case is based exclusively on the 
number of incoming and outgoing relationships and no edge weights (which in this case 
represent occurrences) are included in the calculation. If the degree centrality is calculated in 
such a way that it integrates not only the number but also the weight of the relationships (as 
shown in Table 6.3), the results are the same for multigraphs, weighted multigraphs and overlay 
networks. Only the representation in a projected network is different, which is logical 
considering the nature of this representation format because it allows at most one relationship 









Figure 6.12: Different options for visualizing (degree) centrality calculations of a multilayer communication scenario 
with actors from two teams (blue box-shaped nodes and red circle-shaped nodes) and node size depending on the 
centrality value for the time range t={0,1,...,9}; (a) multigraph, (b) weighted multigraph (relationship types can be 
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differentiated by color: general information – black, discussions – orange and questions – purple), (c) overlap 
network and (d) projected network (bundled relations of differnet types are represented with grey lines) 
Table 6.3: Degree centrality calculations (including relationship weights) of a multilayer communication scenario for 
the time range t={0,1,...,9} and different forms of representation 
 
In addition to the degree centrality, other measures of centrality can also produce different 
results when looking at the different forms of presentation, as illustrated in Table 6.4 and Table 
6.5 using betweenness centrality as an example. While Table 6.4 includes the weight of the 
relationships in the calculation of betweenness, Table 6.5 uses an algorithm that excludes the 
weight. Comparing the two tables it can be seen that in Table 6.5 the approximate relationship 
or order of centrality of the nodes remains the same throughout all forms of representation 
although some of the values are different. In Table 6.4, different centrality values for the same 
node in different forms of representation can also be seen but what is particularly striking here 
is the high relevance of Node D in the overlay network compared to the other forms of 
representation, which can be attributed to the consideration of the weight. The problem that 
arises is that the question regarding the meaning of the weight is determined by the 
implemented algorithm. As it is the case in the ScenarioBuilder BOS, the weight can represent 
the frequency of a relationship and therefore be evaluated positively (higher weight means that 
the node has more connections within the network). However, if the weight of a relationship 
represents, for example, the distance between two nodes, as is often the case when calculating 
the shortest routes in logistics, then the weight is assigned a negative attribution. This negative 
attribution is again reflected in the calculation of centrality as shown in the example of Table 
6.4.  
Table 6.4: Betweenness centrality calculations including relationship weights of a multilayer communication scenario 
for the time range t={0,1,...,9} and different forms of representation 
 
A B C D E F
Multigraph 0.64 0.91 1.00 0.64 0.73 1.00
Weighted Multigraph 0.64 0.91 1.00 0.64 0.73 1.00
Overlay Network 0.64 0.91 1.00 0.64 0.73 1.00
Projected Network 0.71 0.57 0.86 0.71 1.00 1.00
A B C D E F
Multigraph 0.16 0.00 0.62 0.34 0.98 1.00
Weighted Multigraph 0.16 0.00 0.52 0.32 0.97 1.00
Overlay Network 0.18 0.00 0.55 0.64 1.00 0.82
Projected Network 0.18 0.00 0.61 0.43 1.00 1.00
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Table 6.5: Betweenness centrality calculations of a multilayer communication scenario for the time range t={0,1,...,9} 
and different forms of representation 
 
As it is not necessarily clear to the user which underlying view of the networks represented is 
considered by an algorithm when using the centrality as analysis paradigm, it is recommended 
to use different forms of representation and measures when analyzing them for scenarios. In 
order to further reduce uncertainties regarding the meaning of weights, interpretations should 
be based on the representation as a multigraph or, for some questions, on that of the projected 
network. As described in section 4.3, the interpretation of the centrality calculation results 
should be directed at the network under consideration. The results of centrality are always 
dimensionless and should only be used in comparison with other results of the same network 
and not considered individually. With normalized results as in Figure 6.12 or in Table 6.3, Table 
6.4 and Table 6.5, the centrality values are always between 0.0 and 1.0. Without normalization, 
they take values from positive real numbers. In the literature, the mean value and the standard 
deviation are often used to assess the centrality of individual actors or nodes. Nodes whose 
centrality is above the mean value of all nodes in the considered network or above the 1-sigma 
environment (mean value plus simple standard deviation) are considered to be central (Diviák 
et al., 2019; Houghton et al., 2006). Often several measures of centrality are used together to 
interpret the relevance of nodes in the network. Furthermore, centrality can be used to make 
statements about dynamic changes in the network. For example, it can be analyzed whether 
the centrality of a node changes over time or whether the number of relationships in the overall 
network increases or decreases. For the example network from the figures and table above, 
node F in particular can be identified as very central. Due to its high degree-value, this node 
shows a strong local networking capability (see Figure 6.12) and continues to function as a 
mediator or bridge in the overall network, which is shown by its high betweenness-value (see 
Table 6.5). Nodes B, C and E also occupy special positions in the network, but these are not as 
prominent as those of node F. 
In addition to selecting the centrality measure in the ScenarioBuilder BOS, the user can choose 
whether the results should be normalized to be interpreted more easily. Furthermore, the user 
can determine that nodes and their associated relationships should not be included in the 
calculation if they are affected by an event or otherwise not functioning. To provide the user 
with a possibility to use and further investigate the centrality data of the scenario in other 
software besides the graphical analysis within the application, it is possible to export the results 
of the centrality calculation for the current scenario network as a CSV file. This is especially 
useful for creating analysis reports during the evaluation of exercises or in the context of 
planning. During the export, the centrality calculation is performed for all display formats 
A B C D E F
Multigraph 0.16 0.00 0.62 0.34 0.98 1.00
Weighted Multigraph 0.16 0.00 0.52 0.32 0.90 1.00
Overlay Network 0.18 0.00 0.61 0.43 1.00 1.00
Projected Network 0.18 0.00 0.61 0.43 1.00 1.00
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(multigraph, weighted multigraph, overlay network and projected network) and written to the 
CSV file one after the other. In addition, if the currently considered scenario network contains 
several relationship types, the centrality vectors (see section 4.3) of all nodes are calculated and 
also written to the CSV file. For the calculation, the ScenarioBuilder BOS creates a monoplex 
network in the background for each relationship type and performs the different centrality 
calculations on it. Thus, the user receives the centrality results for the combined scenario 
network as well as for its individual monoplex parts when exporting. The considered time range 
always remains the same and no further combinations of relationship types are included. 
Grouping and filtering nodes 
The analysis functions described so far always referred to the entire scenario network or to all 
nodes and relationships within the selected time horizon and the specified relationship types. 
In some situations, however, specific areas of the network may be of particular interest to the 
user or additional information on individual nodes may be required. To support the user in 
these situations, the ScenarioBuilder BOS provides a number of additional help functions. For 
example, the user can display all relevant information on individual nodes in an overview at 
any time. The information listed includes status information such as:  
• the name and type of the node,  
• the time period for which it is defined  
• and a list of incoming and outgoing relationships. 
In addition, information relevant to the simulation or centrality calculation, if available and 
relevant, is displayed. These include:  
• the current state and condition of the node,  
• a list of its available capacities and the necessary requirements at the current time  
• and its centrality and the node degree. 
Furthermore, the user can interact with individual nodes using filter and grouping functions 
(see section 4.4). The filtering of nodes is provided through two approaches. Firstly, nodes can 
be activated and deactivated individually. This can be used to increase clarity in complex 
scenario networks or to quickly check how the network would behave and develop if the node 
would not work or not exist at all. This can be used, for example, to question if required 
information would still be transmitted or if it would be missing entirely in a given situation. In 
the latter case, the problem could be taken up during the planning phase and solutions may be 
developed. The second way of filtering nodes is the extraction of so-called ‘ego networks’. The 
application displays only the direct relationships and the corresponding neighbors of a selected 
node (the ‘ego’). In addition, the relationships between the displayed neighbors are also 
mapped. Ego networks can be used, for example, in the evaluation of exercises to make 
individual participants aware of their local (communication) relationships and the associated 
role/position in the scenario. The visualization of ego networks also enables the user to compare 
different actors and their interactions in a situation.  
Grouping can be used to combine different nodes into one. This increases the clarity of the 
scenario network and/or highlights specific aspects. For example, all actors of a team can be 
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combined into one node in order to examine the interactions and the related role of the team 
in comparison to the rest of the scenario. When grouping, the user selects all nodes he wants to 
combine and defines a name for the group. All relationships between one of the nodes involved 
and an external one are then reassigned by the application. With the defined groups, further 
analyses can then be performed, such as calculating the centrality. 
 
6.4. Practical Use of the ScenarioBuilder BOS and Possibilities for Enhancement 
The designed application is intended to support the user in modeling and analyzing scenario-
based exercises and to give him/her possibilities to understand and interpret individual 
occurrences or entire scenarios. The concept follows a generalized approach to make the 
ScenarioBuilder BOS usable for a variety of exercises. In the foreground are the analysis of 
relationship structures based on centralities and path dependencies as well as the simulation of 
states and capacities of individual nodes caused by dependencies defined by relationships and 
resulting cascade effects. Not all modeling and analysis functions are relevant and practical for 
all exercises. Generally, it can be assumed that the simulation functions are more suitable for 
the representation and analysis of technical systems, for example in exercises that deal with 
infrastructure failures. Simulations can also be beneficial for exercises where the scenario is 
composed of several situations with different dependencies and where strategic aspects or the 
implementation of predefined processes are in the foreground. The analysis of centralities on 
the other hand is particularly interesting for exercises in which communication is to be 
examined. This is especially true for exercises that practice the establishment and operation of 
staffs or in which a large number of different groups and teams work together and the 
communication structures in the team and beyond are of interest. 
The use of the ScenarioBuilder BOS can be interesting for both discussion-based and operation-
based exercises. The actual use and the functions applied depend on the orientation of the 
exercise and the phase in which the application is used. For example, it could be used to conduct 
a discussion-based exercise such as the table top exercise (see also section 3.2). For example, a 
scenario could be outlined to the participants from which they are supposed to extract the 
critical situations as well as their implications and develop solutions and strategies for action. 
The participants could use the application to model the outlined scenario and run simulations 
based on defined dependencies. This form of visualization can support the development of a 
common mental model and promote discussions during the exercise. The ScenarioBuilder BOS 
can also provide support in the evaluation of such exercises. For example, an observer or the 
exercise controller can record the communication of the participants during the exercise and 
subsequently evaluate the communication structures created together with the participants.  
In the case of operation-based exercises, the application can support the development of the 
scenario, for example. The use of simulations can help planners to overcome difficulties 
regarding foresighted thinking and the definition of system boundaries. In addition, the analysis 
of the centrality can be used to evaluate how involved individual actors are. As with discussion-
based exercises, the conceptualized application can also support the evaluation of operation-
based exercises. In particular, communication or scenario networks can be evaluated using the 
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recorded data of exercise observers, from used staff software or from transmitted messages. In 
these cases, the analysis of path dependencies and relationship structures as well as their 
visualization are of primary interest.  
In comparison to the current situation in practice, ScenarioBuilder BOS offers the opportunity 
to bundle all dependencies and interactions that occur in the context of an exercise scenario. In 
doing so, the application can fall back on many already existing systems and structures and thus 
enables a condensation of the actual state in a network graph, especially in the context of 
exercise evaluation. Among the data that can be used for an automatic creation of the scenario 
are software systems for communication like digital radio, telephone, fax or e-mail as well as 
various staff software. These systems are often used to transmit messages with general 
information, requirements and orders or questions, which can be transferred to the application 
through corresponding interfaces in the form of communication relationships. These data can 
be supplemented by hand-recorded relationships, for example of exercise observers or planners. 
In addition to the automatic recording of communication relationships, dependencies within 
technical systems can also be recorded automatically through interfaces to corresponding 
software applications or digitized network plans. In addition to existing software systems, the 
application can also benefit from predefined processes and structures. For example, the alarm 
and emergency regulations of the local authorities and states contain a preset configuration of 
emergency forces that are used for certain operations. These predefined structures can be 
particularly helpful to exercise planners during scenario development. There are also fixed 
command structures or networks specifically for communication, which are well suited for 
comparison with the actual situation from the exercise and can therefore be used to support 
both the planning and evaluation of the exercise. 
The presented software concept offers a basis for enabling the user to have different 
perspectives on a scenario. However, the concept and the corresponding application are not 
limited to the functions described here but can be adapted and extended according to the needs 
of the user. For example, further centrality measures or specific layout algorithms can be added, 
which can further enhance interpretations of individual situations. As the concept is based on 
social network theory and consequently on graph theory, the concepts and algorithms used in 
these areas could easily be added to the application. Examples that should provide added value 
are alternative grouping functions such as ‘k-cores’ or the integration of algorithms for 
comparing different networks (Newman, 2018).  
In addition to these extensions based on the theoretical foundation, those that are more related 
to systems already in use by the user are also of interest. For example, it is possible to integrate 
interfaces to personnel and material databases and corresponding software to facilitate scenario 
creation and the definition of specific node capacities and requirements. Also, the inclusion of 
functionalities for documentation and logging could furthermore support the creation of reports 
and subsequent post-processing. In order to apply and evaluate the concept and the social 
network analysis as a methodology in the context of the exercise in civil protection and disaster 
response, an exemplary demonstrator application was implemented in this work, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. In particular, the user interface and the underlying data model 
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7. Android-based Implementation of the ScenarioBuilder BOS 
In the last chapter a conceptual design for the ScenarioBuilder BOS, a software application that 
serves as a support tool for scenario-based exercises in civil protection and disaster response, 
was presented. The concept is based on social network theory and provides functions for the 
modeling and analysis of exercise scenarios using multilayer graph networks. With the help of 
the designed application, users from the practice are to be enabled to develop interpretation 
approaches for exercises that are in the planning stage or have already been carried out. In the 
context of this work the concept was implemented in the form of a demonstrator application 
for validation and evaluation purposes, which will be discussed further in this chapter. First of 
all, the general implementation decisions as well as the choice for a mobile application are 
explained. Furthermore, the system requirements and the libraries used are described. 
Subsequently, the chapter addresses the data structure on which the application is based. 
Finally, the structure in conjunction with the user interface are explained. 
 
7.1. General Implementation Decisions 
In order to technically verify the concept for the ScenarioBuilder BOS described in the previous 
chapter and to test it in real exercises, it was implemented in an exemplary demonstrator 
application. It was decided to realize the concept as an Android-based mobile application so 
that the software could be presented and used in interviews and informal discussions with 
practitioners as well as during various exercises. Since it could not be assumed that a connection 
to the Internet could be established during an exercise it was also decided to implement the 
software as a native application with local data storage and internal data analysis.  
The implementation was done in the programming language Java using the integrated 
development environment Android Studio1. To ensure a high code quality and readability, 
various naming conventions and implementation standards were defined at the beginning of 
the development. For example, constants are always written in capital letters and with an 
underscore for word separation and XML files used to define layouts always start with a type 
description followed by a unique name such as “fragment_add_event_dialog.xml”. 
Furthermore, a uniform project package structure was introduced where the packages are 
arranged hierarchically by functional groups. For example, all classes that contain code for the 
user interface are located in the package “ui”, which in turn is divided into functional sub-
packages such as the package “node” for user interface classes related to nodes. Lastly, class 
names were chosen so that the basic functionalities associated with the class can be directly 
derived from them on top of all classes following a uniform structure.  
The standard programming paradigm used in the application is object-oriented programming. 
In addition, functional programming concepts (for example, for filter or sorting functions) are 
used for objects from the group of collections or maps, which the application uses to represent 
graph and network structures. For this purpose, the application uses the Java Stream API which 




was introduced in Java 8 and results in Java 8 being a prerequisite for the application (Oracle 
Corp., n.d.). The architecture of the application strictly follows the principle of separation of 
concerns. Thus, all activity and fragment classes contain only the program logic required for 
handling user interface components. Calculations and database access are done in specially 
designed classes. For data storage, the application uses the relational database SQLite which is 
integrated in Android. The database is accessed using the Room Persistence Library as an 
abstraction layer (Google Inc., 2020). To ensure a good user experience a non-blocking user 
interface design approach was chosen in the application, where all long running calculations 
and analyzes are processed in asynchronous worker threads. The GraphStream library was 
utilized and extended to represent and visualize scenario networks. GraphStream is a Java-
based library for the representation of dynamic graphs which will be further introduced in the 
following sub-section (Dutot et al., 2007). 
GraphStream – A Dynamic Graph Library 
GraphStream is a Java library for the generation and manipulation of dynamic graphs with the 
goal to make them analyzable and use them in simulations (Dutot et al., 2007). The main 
underlying assumption is that graphs and networks can change over time. Changes in the graph 
are considered to be a changing set of nodes, through means of deletion and generation, but 
also changed node characteristics. Equivalent to this, changes in the set of edges or changing 
edge characteristics are also considered as changes in the graph (ibid). GraphStream contains 
packages for representing networks, their automated generation and analysis using common 
algorithms of graph theory, the possibility of importing and exporting networks in file formats, 
and possibilities for visualizing networks (ibid).  
The GraphStream library uses a pipeline approach to represent and visualize graphs and 
networks (Dutot et al., n.d.). A component is considered a source if it can generate graph events 
and a sink if it receives these graph events. GraphStream always uses two components, the 
graph object and the viewer (Dutot et al., n.d.). The graph object component on the one hand 
reflects the actual representation of the network with its nodes and edges that is used for 
calculations and runs in the main thread of the application. The viewer component on the other 
hand is used for the pure graphical representation (or graph drawing) of the network and runs 
in its own thread to enable a non-blocking user interface design (ibid.). Once a network created 
with the library is supposed to be visualized, the viewer component is automatically added to 
the graph object as a sink, whereby the inter-thread communication between the two 
components is done via so called pipes. In order to ensure that interactions within the graphical 
representation of the network in the viewer component, such as changes in the position of nodes 
due to touch or drag interactions of the user, are also represented in the graph object, 
GraphStream can be used to define a second pipe with the viewer as source and the graph object 
as sink (ibid.).  
GraphStream offers several ways to visualize networks. For example, the shape, size or color of 
nodes or edges can be changed or labels can be displayed in different ways (Dutot et al., 2007). 
For the visualization the library uses a principle that is similar to the cascading style sheets for 
HTML. Hereby, specific styles can either be defined via a stylesheet or set as attributes in nodes 
and edges (Dutot et al., n.d.). In addition to these display properties, GraphStream provides a 
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force-based standard layout that automatically aligns nodes and edges in a way that minimizes 
edge crossings (Dutot et al., 2007). This automated layout can be disabled so that other layouts 
can be implemented and applied. In addition to visualization, the library provides 
implementations of various graph theory algorithms that can either be used directly or in newly 
implemented procedures (ibid.). With respect to the concept of centrality (see section 4.3) an 
implementation for the measures degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector and PageRank is 
already available. However, it must be taken into account that not every algorithm is suitable 
for all use cases of the ScenarioBuilder BOS application. For example, the implementation of 
betweenness centrality available in the library does not support multigraphs or directed 
networks (Dutot et al., n.d.). In order to implement an appropriate algorithm, inbuilt methods 
such as determining the shortest path between two nodes can be utilized.  
 
7.2. Data Structure 
In order to implement the functions described in the concept chapter for modeling and 
analyzing scenario networks in the ScenarioBuilder BOS application, a data structure with a 
total of 12 entities was defined. The structure was described in classes within the application 
and transferred to a local SQLite database using the Android Room Persistency Library. To be 
able to save the data and exchange it between different devices functions for importing and 
exporting both the entire database as well as individual tables were implemented. The entity-
relationship model of the defined database is shown in Figure 7.1 and is explained below. 
 
Figure 7.1: Entity-relationship model of the database structure for the ScenarioBuilder BOS 
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The root entity of the data structure is the scenario. It contains all relevant information for the 
general exercise scenario including its name and a timestamp that provides information 
regarding the starting time of the exercise. The style as well as the type attributes are relevant 
for the network representation using GraphStream. If a specific style for the visualized scenario 
network (e.g. the background color or the color scheme for the different elements) is required, 
a text-based stylesheet can be added. By further providing a network type, it can be specified 
whether a multigraph or any other form of graph representation should be used. The default 
type is always a multigraph. Each scenario consists of several nodes and relations that further 
describe the situations within the exercise.  
As described in section 6.2, a node represents actors, objects or phenomena that are able to 
enter into relationships with other actors, objects or phenomena. Similar to the scenario, each 
node is identified by its name and has a start time as well as an end time defined. A node can 
further be located at a specific location described by coordinates (latitude and longitude). In the 
application, the coordinates of the center point are used for simplification and the spatial 
extension is not specified more precisely. In addition to the aforementioned attributes, each 
node is assigned with a node type that further categorizes it. For this categorization the node 
type differentiates between a category, a subcategory and a name. For each node type certain 
style characteristics are defined for visualization with the GraphStream library. These include 
the size, color and shape of all nodes of that type. If an individual node has a specific 
requirement regarding its appearance, then this can be stored in the style attribute of that node. 
An example of this would be special forces that have a dedicated operational symbol which 
should be used as a display format. 
During its lifecycle in a scenario a node can be in multiple states. Each state is defined by a 
name. Whenever a node is created, the application automatically adds a ‘Default’ state so that 
a node always consists of at least one state. Within each of those states a node can have varying 
capabilities or needs (see subsection ‘Defining Capacities and Requirements for the Scenario’ 
within section 6.2). Both capacities and requirements have a type that further describes them 
and optionally a function and/or description. In addition to that, each capacity has a necessary 
Boolean value indicating if it is an intake capacity (e.g. a dike has a limit in how much water it 
can hold back) or an output capacity (e.g. a power plant has a limit in the amount of energy it 
can provide). If a capacity represents an intake capacity it must further be declared if a failure 
caused by the exceedance of the capacity limit is reversible. With the definition of a buffer time, 
requirements also have another mandatory attribute that indicates how long a node in its 
current state can still provide its function even if the specific requirement is not fulfilled. Similar 
to the node type, capacity and requirement types also differentiate between a category and a 
name to describe capabilities and needs more precisely. For each type further style information 
needs to be provided for the visualization through GraphStream. This includes line attributes 
such as color and style as well as the arrow shape. If a function is used to describe dynamics in 
capacities and requirements a function type and two parameter values p1 and p2 have to be 
provided. 
Relations describe how one node affects or relates to another and are an equivalent to edges in 
graph theory. Next to a name each relation is expected to have a reference to an origin and a 
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target node as well as a Boolean value representing whether or not the relation is directed, 
meaning only valid in the defined direction, which is the default for most relations in a scenario 
in civil protection and disaster response. Like the nodes all relations also have indications for 
the time period for which they are relevant in the scenario (stated by the start and end times). 
Similar to nodes, specific requirements for the visualization can be defined for relations through 
the style attribute. Since a relation by definition maps the effect of one node on another, it can 
only exist if this effect is described in more detail using a corresponding capacity. This capacity 
is always an output capacity, since it reflects “how much” of a resource, information or similar 
is passed from one node to another. To examine path dependencies in scenarios, a relation can 
be assigned to a path. Each path is defined by a name and a description. 
Finally, in order to model external events in a scenario, information about the name of the event 
and period of time when the event is effective have to be provided. Events can further be 
specified by a description and must have a reference to the nodes that are affected by them. 
Multiple nodes can be damaged by the same event and a given node may be affected by multiple 
events. The effect on a node can either be a partial or a total failure. In order for a node to 
represent that an event has caused a partial failure of its function, a corresponding state with 
possibly changed capacities and dependencies should be defined within the application.  
 
7.3. User Interface 
The user interface of the ScenarioBuilder BOS focuses on the visualization of the scenario 
network. This means that the selected scenario is always in the user's view and takes up most 
of the screen area. This provides the necessary space for the clearest possible presentation, even 
in complex scenarios. The user interface of the application is based on the Material Design2, a 
flat and uniformly clear design that works with different layout levels and is applied throughout 
the entire application. After starting the app, the user is first prompted to select the scenario to 
be processed or analyzed. This can be done by selecting an existing scenario from the database 
or by creating a new one. Furthermore, the user has the possibility to import a database stored 
as a file on the device. In particular, this can be interesting, for example, if a base scenario for 
an exercise was created on one device and observations are recorded during the exercise with 
several devices that use the base scenario. 
As soon as a scenario has been selected or a new one has been created, the user is taken to the 
main view of the ScenarioBuilder BOS application (see Figure 7.2). The main view displays the 
scenario network for a specific time range selected by the user. In the initial view after loading 
or creating a scenario, it is first visualized for the time step 𝑡 = 0. The network view is interactive 
and responds to user actions. For example, the user can move nodes as required to change the 
layout according to his or her needs. Further possibilities for interaction with the scenario are 
provided at the bottom of the screen. For example, the user can play the scenario as a dynamic 
sequence using the “play” button (left) or simply switch between different time steps using the 




slider or the “next” and “previous” buttons (see section 6.3). With the “add” button (right) new 
elements such as nodes, relations or events can be added. In addition to the interaction options, 
further information on the scenario network is displayed to the user in the main view below the 
app bar. Both the current scenario time and a list of effective events are displayed here, provided 
the events are defined in the time under consideration. 
 
Figure 7.2: Main view of the ScenarioBuilder BOS application 
The application has a navigation menu that can be accessed from the left-hand side in the main 
view and may be used to start various functions for editing and analyzing the scenario as can 
be seen in Figure 7.3. The menu is visually divided into different sections for a better overview. 
The upper section contains general functions that may be relevant for the user in any phase of 
the scenario. For example, different layouts can be selected for the scenario representation or 
the touch feedback for nodes can be activated and deactivated to display an information dialog 
with all relevant information about a node when it is touched. Furthermore, the user can switch 
between the functions for developing or editing the scenario and those for analysis. During 
scenario development, the focus is on creating and editing the scenario elements, especially the 
nodes or actors, the relationships between them as well as the external events. Likewise, data 
can be imported and exported or scenarios can be saved as templates for future use. For the 
analysis, the focus shifts towards the functions for viewing different time periods and 
dimensions of the scenario as well as the calculation of centrality. Nodes can also be combined 
into groups and analysis tables can be exported. In the lower area of the navigation menu, the 
user has various settings available which are particularly relevant for the simulation of the 
scenario. For example, events or the simulation of capacities and requirements (in-depth 
simulation) can be activated and deactivated. 
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Figure 7.3: User interface of the ScenarioBuilder BOS navigation drawer (a) in editing mode and (b) in analysis mode 
The scenario simulation, which was explained in the sub-section “Simulating Cascading Effects” 
within section 6.3, is implemented in the ScenarioBuilder BOS in such a way that it is always 
calculated during the scenario development as well as the analysis, provided it has been 
activated in the settings. Thus, the user receives direct feedback on plausibility during the 
development of the scenario and can experiment with different scenario variations. 
Furthermore, the simulation results can be considered in the further analysis of the centralities. 
Here, non-functional nodes and inactive relationships are not included in the calculation of the 
centrality, thus allowing a statement on the relevance of only functional actors. Through further 
settings in the navigation menu, the user can decide whether the simulation calculation should 
only refer to the current time step or to all previous time steps and whether non-functional 
nodes and inactive relationships should be grayed out or not be visualized at all in the analysis. 
For the analysis of multilayer networks with varying time horizons and multiplex relationship 
structures as well as for the analysis of centrality, the ScenarioBuilder BOS uses multigraphs as 
representation form by default. This is illustrated in Figure 7.4 using an example of the 




Figure 7.4: User interface when analyzing multilayer networks and centrality with the ScenarioBuilder BOS 
For user entries, as in the above example for selecting the scenario when starting the 
application, the ScenarioBuilder BOS follows a workflow concept based on dialogs. This concept 
attempts to divide the potentially large amount of information that the user has to provide for 
creating or editing an element as well as for specifying a function into small individual queries 
and display them clearly. Depending on the input or selection, the user thus receives a series of 
consecutive dialogs that guide him/her step-by-step through the inputs needed for the given 
process. The concept is presented below using two examples from the application. First, as 
shown in the workflow diagram in Figure 7.5 (a), the process for editing a node with input of 
capacities and requirements within the scenario development is explained. Next, the process 
for calculating centrality is given as an example of scenario analysis, which the workflow shown 
in Figure 7.5 (b) illustrates. 
To edit a node from the scenario, the user first selects it from the list of all nodes available in 
the dialog (see Figure 7.6 (a)) or by tapping it in the visualized network if touch feedback is 
activated. After selecting the node, the user has to specify whether the node type or one of the 
states of the node is to be edited, the end time of the node is to be defined or the node is to be 
deleted entirely (see Figure 7.6 (b)). In case the node should not be edited, another dialog is 
displayed where the user selects the delete action to be performed. It should be noted that 
deleting the node from the scenario will also delete all relationships it is involved in and other 
information based on the node. Specifying the end time is particularly relevant if the node no 
longer participates in the scenario starting with the currently selected time step and should 
therefore not be visualized anymore. Since the exact end time is not always necessarily known 
when the node is created, it is initially set automatically by the application until the end of the 
Selected time horizon 
for the analysis
Selected centrality 
measure and relationship 
types to be considered in 
the analysis
Node size depending on 
centrality (centrality value 
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Black dotted lines – information
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scenario and may later be set, for example, to the currently selected time step using the 
workflow described here. When the end time is changed, all relationships that are connected to 
the respective node are also adjusted since they cannot exist beyond the life span of the node. 
If the user chooses to edit the node, the following dialog, which is also the initial dialog when 
creating a new node, offers the possibility to define or check a name and to specify the node 
type (see Figure 7.6 (c)). It is not possible to change the name when editing the node because 
it is used as an identifier in the database. To support the user, for example in choosing the 
correct node type, text fields with autocomplete functionality are used throughout the 
application (see Figure 7.6 (d)). They filter the data from the database and make appropriate 
suggestions to the user based on the input.  
After defining the name and type of the node, the user is asked to select the state to be edited 
(see Figure 7.7 (a)) or to create a new state (see Figure 7.7 (b)). Following that, the user is 
presented with three dialogs in sequence, each with an overview list of already defined output 
capacities, intake capacities and requirements (see Figure 7.7 (c)). Furthermore, the user can 
delete previously defined capacities or requirements or create new ones (see Figure 7.7 (d)). If 
he or she does not want to make any further changes, the system switches to the next overview. 
If no more changes are to be made to the requirements, the editing process of the node is 
finished and the changes are stored in the database and applied to the visualization. 
In order to perform and display a centrality calculation (see section 4.3) for the scenario 
network, the user first selects the appropriate method for the problem or question at hand. In 
case the chosen method is degree centrality, it has to be further specified which degree measure 
should be applied (indegree, outdegree or degree). Following the selection, the user is 
presented with a dialogue with the most important information in order to gain a better 
understanding of the chosen procedure. Afterwards the user has to further specify which 
relations should be considered in the calculation. To do this, the user first selects whether the 
analysis should refer to a single type of relationship (monoplex network analysis) or a 
combination of several types (multiplex network analysis). Depending on the decision, the 
application lists either all relationship types used in the scenario or the corresponding categories 
of types. This leaves the user with three options to choose from: analyze exactly one type, a 
group of types such as all communication relationships or all types of relationships used in the 
scenario. After selecting the relationship types, the user is required to also further specify the 
time that the calculation is based on. Options include the consideration of relationships from 
the currently selected time step only or the specification of a time range. The definition of the 
time range and the considered relationship types determine which nodes and relationships are 
included in the calculation. Finally, the user can select the normalization procedure for the 
calculation after which the calculation is performed and the results are displayed in the 
network. The workflows described above exemplify the user guidance and assistance when 
developing scenarios with the ScenarioBuilder BOS implemented in this work. The application 
was tested in various civil protection and disaster response exercises to evaluate the software 
and to assess the methodology of social network analysis in the field. The results of this 






Figure 7.5: User interface workflows for (a) editing a node and (b) calculating centrality in the ScenarioBuilder BOS 
 









Figure 7.6: Dialog workflow for editing nodes step 1; (a) select node, (b) choose action, (c) review name and (d) 











Figure 7.7: Dialog workflow for editing nodes step 2; (a) select an existing state, (b) add a new state, (c) review 
existing capacities and requirements and (d) add new capacities and requirements 
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8. Evaluation 
In the last chapter the ScenarioBulider BOS, an Android-based demonstrator application to 
support the planning and evaluation phase of exercises in civil protection and disaster response, 
was presented and the user interface along with possible interactions was explained. The 
application was tested and evaluated in different use cases in the context of this work, which 
will be discussed further in this chapter. At first, an overview of the observed use cases is 
provided and then each case is illustrated and discussed individually. While the first use case 
represents a validation of the simulation functionalities of the application and offers a fictitious 
example for its use in exercise planning, the remaining three use cases are examples from real 
exercises of different organizations that are used to review the application in the context of 
exercise evaluation. In the last section of the chapter, the individual use cases and the 
corresponding feedback from practitioners are summarized and the added value of the 
application and social network analysis as a methodology for exercises in civil protection and 
disaster response is discussed. 
 
8.1. Introduction into the Use Cases 
The evaluation of ScenarioBuilder BOS is intended to validate the functionalities of the 
application on the one hand and to evaluate the practical use of the tool and the methodology 
for planning and evaluating civil protection and disaster response exercises on the other hand. 
In the following sections, four use cases are presented in which the ScenarioBuilder BOS was 
used either during the planning or alternatively as part of the evaluation of an exercise. In the 
first use case, called “Flooded City”, the application is used as a support tool for planning the 
exercise, especially for developing the scenario. While it was designed without the cooperation 
of practitioners, this fictitious scenario is mainly intended to validate the simulation functions 
of the application as well as describe a possible future use of the conceptualized software in 
scenario development.  
The other three use cases serve to assess the supporting character of the ScenarioBuilder BOS in 
the evaluation of exercises. For this purpose, three disaster control exercises of different 
organizations were observed and evaluated using the application between 2018 and 2019. 
These include the “Winterübung TEL” exercise of the city of Darmstadt, the “Wesersturm” 
exercise of the district of Höxter and the “KatKom 2-2019” exercise of the state of Berlin. In all 
three cases, the exercises were observed without prior involvement in the planning process. 
Furthermore, in all observed exercises the objectives and the respective scenario were 
communicated before the start, but no introduction to the organizational structures and the 
specific tasks of the individual actors was given. During the exercises, the respective exercise 
leaders made no demands regarding observation.  
The data collection for the following analysis for the “Wesersturm” exercise and the “KatKom 
2-2019” exercise was based on a systematic observation of the communication relationships 
between the actors under consideration. For the “Winterübung TEL” exercise, the 
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communication data from the CENARIO® ilias3 staff software was used as data for the evaluation 
and supplemented by observations of actions and communications. The data of all exercises 
was entered into the ScenarioBuilder BOS and for each exercise both an exemplary evaluation 
was performed and an evaluation report was written. The evaluations using ScenarioBuilder 
BOS were carried out independently of the regular exercise evaluations of the respective 
organization and without the involvement of the exercise leaders or other participants. The 
evaluations specifically examined the communication structures of the observed areas and 
related them to the corresponding situations of the exercise. Furthermore, preliminary 
interpretation and explanation approaches for the given interrelationships were formulated in 
the evaluation reports. Each evaluation report was divided into the following sections: 
• Contact information 
• Background of the doctoral project and research questions 
• Observation and evaluation methodology 
• Descriptive evaluation 
• Further analysis 
• Remarks 
The resulting reports were made available to the exercise leaders and discussed using telephone 
interviews and a feedback questionnaire.  
 
8.2. Scenario Development for the “ looded City” Exercise 
The “Flooded City” exercise is a fictional exercise to validate the application’s scenario 
simulation functionalities and to describe how these functionalities can be used to support 
scenario development. The underlying base scenario takes place in a medium-sized city with a 
river running through it. After continuous heavy rainfall, a flood event has occurred in the city 
area. Two areas of the city are particularly affected by the flood, a residential area and a mixed 
district of residential and commercial buildings. The latter’s energy distribution grid, among 
other things, also supplies the local hospital. Between the river and the mixed area there is a 
dyke for permanent flood protection, but it is already close to its capacity limit. In the residential 
area, the authorities have installed mobile walls that are supposed to hold back the water for a 
period of time. The basic scenario is visualized with the ScenarioBuilder BOS as shown in Figure 
8.1. A total of eight nodes with corresponding characteristics such as states as well as capacities 
and requirements are defined for the representation. In detail, the scenario consists of the 
following elements:  
• The “Flood” node is a phenomenon from the group of natural hazards and defined with 
only one state. It has an output capacity of the resource water with a presumed 
unlimited quantity.  
                                               
3 https://www.cenario.de/produkte/krisenmanagement/cenario-ilias/  
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• The “Dyke” also only has one state and is a type of safety structure. It has the ability to 
provide flood protection, but can only hold off a water level of 300 𝑐𝑚 before it breaks 
down. 
• As a node, the “Mobile Wall” is almost identical to the “Dyke” in its properties, but its 
ability to hold off water is limited to a water height of 200 𝑐𝑚.  
• The nodes “House A”, “House B” and “House C” are all structures from the building 
category and each have a requirement for flood protection defined.  
• The “Energy distribution grid”, which also has only one state in the entire scenario, is 
an infrastructure type from the energy distribution category. If the node has sufficient 
flood protection, it can distribute the resource energy in unlimited quantities. 
• The “Hospital” of the service structure type is the only node in the scenario that has two 
states. While it can supply 800 patients in the regular state with a given power supply 
of 100 𝑘𝑊/ℎ, the number of people that can be supplied is reduced to 200 in the 
emergency power state. To be able to operate the generator for emergency power supply 
however, the node is dependent on a continuous supply of diesel. 
 
Figure 8.1: Base scenario for time step t=0 of the "Flooded City" exercise 
As Figure 8.1 further shows some relationships are given in addition to the defined nodes to 
describe the initial situation of the scenario. For example, the “Flood” node provides a resource 
relationship to the nodes “Mobile Wall” and “Dyke”, both of which have a capacity of 10 𝑐𝑚 
water height per time step. Thus, in both cases a linear function is present that describes how 
much water flows from the flood onto the two protective structures. Furthermore, a total of 
four flood protection relationships are defined, which act from the “Dyke” and the “Mobile Wall” 
on the surrounding nodes. These descriptive relationships are not defined by any functions and 
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are active as long as the “Dyke” or the “Mobile Wall” can provide safety for the surrounding 
structures. Finally, the scenario defines a resource relationship to describe the constant energy 
supply from the “Energy distribution grid” to the “Hospital”. Under the given circumstances, the 
simulation of the scenario shows that at time step 𝑡 = 21 the capacity limit of the “Mobile Wall” 
is reached first and at the time step 𝑡 = 31 the capacity limit of the “Dyke” is reached as well. 
As subsequently shown in Figure 8.2, starting at time step t=31 both nodes have failed, which 
has cascading effects on the surrounding nodes, since flood protection is no longer guaranteed. 
 
Figure 8.2:  ase scenario of the “ looded  ity” exercise at time step t=31 if no measures are taken 
Once the basic scenario has been created and the critical points in time have been identified, 
ScenarioBuilder BOS can be used as a support tool to further develop the scenario or plan the 
injections. Since the simulation calculates the effects of each change to an element on the 
overall scenario, ScenarioBuilder BOS offers a way to guide the user through different options 
for measures and develop suitable combinations for the exercise objectives. For the “Flooded 
City” exercise, two main areas of deployment are defined as examples. Firstly, the use of pumps 
is intended to delay the overload of the mobile walls to at least one hour after the beginning of 
the flood in order to organize an evacuation of the residential area or to set up further protective 
measures (in the scenario a time step is equal to a minute in real time). On the other hand, an 
emergency power supply for the local hospital is to be ensured through the supply of diesel fuel. 
The measures can be implemented with the ScenarioBuilder BOS based on the units available 
in the organization. In the case at hand, a node “Fire Truck 12” is defined for time step 𝑡 = 10, 
which has a water pump capacity of −8 𝑐𝑚 per time step and is therefore able to pump out a 
quantity of water that leads to a reduction in water height of 8 cm per time step. In addition to 
the node, a corresponding relationship is defined between the “Fire Truck 12” and the “Mobile 
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Wall” with the same capacity. This measure delays the capacity limit of the “Mobile Wall” to 
the time step 𝑡 = 61. In addition, from time step 𝑡 = 40 onwards, the newly defined node “Fire 
Truck” and a corresponding relationship provide a diesel supply of the “Hospital” node. As a 
result, this node changes to the “Emergency Power” state and can now support a limited number 
of patients as described above. Figure 8.3 shows the scenario after the implementation of the 
measures in time step 𝑡 = 40. Similar to these measures, the scenario can be further developed 
and simulated as necessary. 
 
Figure 8.3: Example scenario development for the "Flooded City" exercise at time step t=40 after some measures have 
been applied 
 
8.3.  valuation of the “Winterübung T  ”  xercise 
Scenario and Exercise Objectives 
The “Winterübung TEL” exercise took place on February 18, 2018 in Darmstadt and was a joint 
disaster control exercise of the professional fire brigade, the voluntary fire brigades, the various 
rescue service providers, the Technical Relief Agency and the psychosocial emergency care. The 
exercise was based on the scenario of a severe thunderstorm that swept over the city of 
Darmstadt and caused major damage to various buildings. In addition, there were power and 
water supply failures in large parts of the city and people were injured (Wickel, 2018). In order 
to ensure a long-term supply of the emergency forces, a technical operations management (TEL) 
and various operational sections (EA) were set up on the site of the former Cambrai-Fritsch 
barracks and the units were to provide medical care, food, etc. for approximately 500 
emergency forces (ibid.). The objectives of the exercise were to establish a command and 
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step. This means that the capacity limit of 




control organization for commanding larger units as well as an autonomous supply center. In 
addition, the cooperation of the various civil protection and disaster response units was to be 
practiced and the functionality of the corresponding equipment tested. An impression of the 
exercise and the construction of an autonomous supply center for the disaster response teams 
is given in Figure 8.4.  
 
Figure 8.4: Construction of the supply center for the disaster response teams during the “Winterübung TEL” 
Observation and Evaluation Methodology 
For the “Winterübung TEL” exercise, the messages transmitted by means of the CENARIO® ilias 
staff software were analyzed and mapped in the form of communication relationships between 
the individual actors in the exercise. A total of twelve actors were identified and subsequently 
represented as nodes in the ScenarioBuilder BOS. From the staff software, 513 communication 
relationships could be extracted between the defined actors, which were assigned to different 
relationship types. A distinction was made between (see Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6): 
• Requirements/requests (red dotted lines) 
• Assignments/commands (blue dotted lines) 
• Questions (orange dotted lines) 
• General information exchange (black dotted lines) 
The resulting scenario network described an interaction network of the teams communicating 
via CENARIO® ilias over the period of the exercise.  
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Since some of the individual actors were not actively involved in the exercise the whole time, 
events were defined in the application so that a distinction could be made in the evaluation 
between active and non-active actors. In the visualization using ScenarioBuilder BOS, each 
relationship shown corresponded to a message between a sender and a receiver. In several 
cases, the sender of a message in CENARIO® ilias did not specify a receiver, so that the staff 
software transmitted the message to all other actors. This behavior was transferred to the 
ScenarioBuilder BOS when the data was imported, so that multiple relationships were defined 
for a message to multiple recipients. Also, two relationships were used for assignments or 
commands that should be acknowledged by other teams. The actual command was defined as 
an assignment whereas the acknowledgement was defined as general information for the 
respective recipient. Interactions were always defined for the time in which they took place, so 
that the resulting scenario corresponded to a dynamic network. 
Selected Evaluation Results 
Figure 8.5 shows analysis examples of the resulting ScenarioBuilder BOS scenario for two 
situations from the exercise. The first situation (Figure 8.5 (a)) describes the communication 
processes during the settling phase of the “TEL Süd” immediately before the official start of the 
exercise (3:31 - 4:14 pm). Although the “TEL Süd” had already signaled its readiness, 
communication during this time mostly occurred via the “TEL S2/S3”. Having a degree of 16 
and a PageRank value of 0.21, the “TEL S2/S3” characterized itself as a central actor in the 
situation. Particularly noticeable for the considered time period was the high number of 
interactions of the “EA BR”. A closer look at the interactions showed that the “EA BR” had 
communicated information about newly arrived units four times to the “TEL S2/S3”, the “TEL 
Fme 1” and the “KatS-Stab S3” respectively. By solely using degree centrality, this way of 
communication led to a distortion of the center of the network towards the “EA BR”, which may 
not have been justified in this situation and should be evaluated further. However, as Figure 
8.5 (a) shows, the influence of the “EA BR” in relation to the overall network when considering 
the PageRank was rather small compared to the “TEL S2/S3”. This could be explained by the 
fact that the majority of other actors rather sought communication with the “TEL S2/S3” during 
that time. In the later course of the exercise, the center of communications had clearly shifted 
to the “TEL Süd”, as shown in Figure 8.5 (b), for example. The “TEL Süd” adopted a 
coordination and bridging position between the civil protection staff (here represented by the 
actor “KatS-Stab S3”) and the operational sections, as provided for in the disaster management 
structure in Hessen (see Figure 2.1). Their central role can easily be recognized by the very high 
degree-value and the star structure of the network. 
In addition to the descriptive analysis over the course of the exercise, the data could also be 
used for further investigations. For example, when looking at the communicated assignments 
and requirements over the entire period of the exercise as carried out in Figure 8.6, it was 
possible to examine whether the defined command structures were adhered to. With regard to 
the given exercise one requirement relationship of the “EA Hirten” was immediately apparent 
(see Figure 8.6 (b)), since it was directly addressed to the “KatS-Stab S3” without passing the 
“TEL Süd”. A closer look showed that this requirement was simultaneously made to the “TEL 
Süd” as well and could therefore be neglected. Another striking result from the exercise was 
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shown in the analysis of the general information (black dotted lines) over the time of the 
exercise. The analysis of the outdegree, i.e. the outgoing information, showed that the “EA 
Versorgung” distributed by far the most information into the network. This was due to the fact 
that often no receiver was defined and thus the information was transmitted to all actors. 
However, this form of communication carries the risk that individual, possibly relevant 
information could get lost in the mass of interactions and should be reflected for the individual 
case.  
Practitioner Feedback 
The feedback for the evaluation of the “Winterübung TEL” exercise and the ScenarioBuilder BOS 
as a tool for the evaluation of exercises in civil protection and disaster response was given by 
the exercise leader. For this purpose, a preliminary discussion was held on September 25, 2019, 
which was supplemented by a written feedback based on a questionnaire on November 14, 
2019. It was stated that there was no previous knowledge in the field of social network analysis. 
The application was generally perceived as very useful and able to provide added value. 
According to the exercise leader, the graphical representation of the scenario could be quickly 
grasped by laypersons. However, a supporting text-based evaluation should be carried out in a 
in a language understandable to laymen and, if possible, without the use of technical terms 
from network analysis. It was communicated as particularly positive that the network 
representation of the communication relationships in the application enabled an evaluation of 
the chosen communication paths. In particular, it could be checked whether the participants 
adhered to the specifications of the so-called “Besondere Aufbau-Organisation (BAO)”, a 
predefined structure (incl. communication structure) of the spatial configurations of units for 
better handling of complex emergency situations. Here, the importance of the representation 
of path dependencies was emphasized, since not only a complete communication to 
superordinate management levels but also to subordinate operational sections is necessary and 
the analysis of path dependencies could be used to evaluate this information flow.  
The combination of relationship types and the analysis of different time periods was considered 
important, whereby the temporal view is particularly relevant for an understanding of the 
dynamics of the scenario. The interpretation approaches presented in the evaluation were also 
found to be helpful and could provide a good starting point for own further approaches. 
Especially the questions about the expected value of communication relationships and the 
reflection on the number of interactions and the selection of message recipients were perceived 
as important. According to the exercise leader, the methodology allows for a new type of 
evaluation and enables the observation of interactions that have not been considered before. 
Overall, the tool can contribute to an improvement in the evaluation of the exercise, as the 
evaluation becomes much more meaningful and an anonymous illustration is made possible. 
The high amount of work required to transfer the data into the application is seen as 
problematic. Furthermore, it would be desirable to include other communication channels such 
as telephone calls and radio messages in the evaluation. Possible enhancements were seen in 
particular in the possibility of graphical representation of not allowed interactions. Also, an 
even simpler usability and language would be desirable. Finally, it was communicated that an 
interesting question for future evaluations would be how many and which unnecessary 
interactions are caused by the imprecise wording of orders. 
 





Figure 8.5: Examples of centrality analyses of the actors from the different organizations within the “Winterübung 
TEL” on the basis of all communication relations (general information – black, requirements – red, assignments – 







Figure 8.6: Degree centrality (number of direct interactions) analyses of all communicated (a) assignments (blue 
dotted lines) and (b) requirements (red dotted lines) over the course of the “Winterübung T  ” exercise 
Relationship to be questioned
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8.4.  valuation of the “KatKom 2-2019”  xercise 
Scenario and Exercise Objectives 
The “KatKom 2-2019” exercise took place on June 12, 2019 at various locations in Berlin and 
Potsdam. The exercise was based on a fictitious accident scenario at the research reactor “BER 
II” with an immediate massive release of radioactive material. In the exercise, the processes and 
measures of the disaster control plan (SenInnDS, 2019) were practiced for the area surrounding 
the research reactor. Each of the organizations involved in the exercise defined its own exercise 
objectives. For the radiation monitoring center (Strahlenmessstelle) in Berlin, the focus was on 
the implementation of the processes and the associated tasks. These included alerting and 
contacting all relevant actors, forecasting and the generation of the situation picture, dosimetric 
monitoring for personal of the emergency services and preparation for own measurements. 
Observation and Evaluation Methodology 
For the evaluation of the “KatKom 2-2019”, the communication relationships within the 
radiation monitoring center Berlin observed during the exercise were analyzed. However, since 
the teams of the radiation monitoring center are very spatially distributed and the observation 
of the interactions and relations of all actors by one person could not be guaranteed, it was 
decided to record only those of the staff management. The resulting scenario describes an ego 
network with all outgoing and incoming relationship interactions from the “Stabsleitung SMS”. 
The communications were categorized according to different relationship types. In detail, a 
distinction was made between (see Figure 8.7): 
• Requirements/requests (red dotted lines) 
• Assignments/commands (blue dotted lines) 
• Discussions (purple dotted lines) 
• Questions (orange dotted lines) 
• General information exchange (black dotted lines) 
• Reports (green dotted lines) 
In addition to the “Stabsleitung SMS”, the actors recorded included the various teams of the 
radiation monitoring center as well as a number of external organizations with whom 
communication was carried out by telephone. Also, due to the spatial separation of some actors, 
the teams for the processing of the samples, the vehicles and measurement technology as well 
as for the output and evaluation of the dosimeters were combined in a node “Team 
Dosimeter/Messfahrzeug/UR”. A total of 12 nodes and 108 relationships were recorded for the 
evaluation, excluding the interactions during the briefings. In addition to this data, general 
conspicuous features such as unrest in the staff or ambiguities were also noted. 
Selected Evaluation Results 
Figure 8.7 shows an example of the ego network in two different phases of the exercise. Figure 
8.7 (a) shows the situation shortly before the first briefing. Here, two events in particular had 
a strong impact on the interactions between the actors. On the one hand, a functional failure of 
the ELAN software led to several exchanges of information and the need for clarification on how 
to distribute corresponding information. In addition, there was a lot of exchange about various 
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measurement results with both the internal teams and the various external organizations. On 
the other hand the second situation shown in Figure 8.7 (b) took place after the situation 
described above. During this period, the discussions on the release of radioactive material in 
particular, the determination of the soil concentration after the dispersion and the examination 
of the report of an external organization were formative events. In comparison with the 
illustration of the interactions from Figure 8.7 (a), the communications during this period were 
significantly different. While at the beginning of the exercise, in addition to the orders of the 
“Stabsleitung SMS” to the different teams, the communications mainly manifested themselves 
in the form of information relations, in the later course of the exercise the types of interactions 
were much more diverse. Both internal teams and external organizations made more requests 
to the “Stabsleitung SMS” and, due to an unclear expression of information in one relationship, 
more discussions were held. If one looks at the degree centrality over the course of the exercise 
it can be seen that the number of interactions with the individual teams remained relatively 
constant. Here it became apparent that the tasks of the various teams varied greatly in terms of 
the number of interactions required. While the teams represented by the “Team 
Dosimeter/Messfahrzeug/UR” node worked largely in an independent fashion and therefore 
only few interactions with the “Stabsleitung SMS” were necessary, teams that prepared the 
situation reports or performed various calculations on the situation were more dependent on 
information from other actors and thus interacted much more frequently with the “Stabsleitung 
SMS”.  
In addition to the task-specific interaction patterns of the individual teams, the further 
differentiation of outgoing and incoming relationships allowed a more in-depth examination of 
the communication relationships between the “Stabsleitung SMS” and the other actors. As 
shown in Table 8.1, for example, the information exchange between the “Stabsleitung SMS” 
and the external organizations (represented by the node “Group|Externe”) originated from the 
external parties most of the times (14 out of 17 times) and thus the communication here rather 
served to acquire information from outside. A similar picture emerged for “Team MEVIS” (eigth 
out of 11 relations originated from “Team MEVIS”). Here, regularly updated calculation results 
were presented to the “Stabsleitung SMS” without the need for frequent information coming 
from the staff management. 
Table 8.1: Degree centralities (number of direct interactions) of all actors of the “KatKom 2-2019” exercise on the 
basis of general information exchange over the period of the exercise 
 
Node Degree Indegree Outdegree
Group | Externe 17 4 13
Stabsleitung SMS 57 35 22
Team Lage/ELAN 18 10 8
Team jRodos 6 3 3
Team MEVIS 11 3 8
Team Dosimeter/Messfahrzeug/UR 5 2 3
 





Figure 8.7: Examples of centrality analyses of the actors within the “ at om 2-2019” exercise on the basis of all 
communication relations (general information – black, requirements – red, assignments – blue, discussions – purple 




For the “KatKom 2-2019” exercise, feedback on the evaluation and application was given by the 
team of the radiation monitoring center (Strahlenmessstelle) Berlin. This was done in two steps. 
First, the results of the evaluation report were discussed on the basis of a short written feedback 
and a subsequent telephone conversation on July 30, 2019. In addition, a written questionnaire-
based feedback was given on September 24, 2019 both on the evaluation and on the 
ScenarioBuilder BOS as a tool. In the feedback it was stated that there was no previous 
knowledge of social network analysis. The presentation of the exercise analysis was reflected 
as understandable. However, some teams that were not on the same floor as the “Stabsleitung 
SMS” were not included in the analysis. As the procedures and communication channels of the 
radiation monitoring center are practiced regularly, the visualization via the ScenarioBuilder 
BOS tool did not provide any new insights. The combination and differentiation of the 
relationship types and the time-differentiated consideration of the exercise were classified as 
not absolutely necessary in regards to the radiation monitoring center. However, at the higher 
municipal level in disaster control exercises, this differentiation would be more useful. The 
interpretation approaches and recommendations given on the basis of the analysis were 
considered helpful and coincided with the results of other observers.  
The added value of the application is mainly seen on two levels: On the one hand, in conjunction 
with a staff software used to make obstacles in information transfer and processing visible. On 
the other hand, for balancing the workload of individual staff members or communicators. 
However, the high effort required for data collection is seen as very critical or disproportionate. 
This became particularly clear during the “KatKom 2-2019” exercise, since the spatial separation 
of the individual teams meant that it was not possible to completely record the exercise situation 
in the radiation monitoring center with just one person, so that only an observation from the 
point of view of the “Stabsleitung SMS” was carried out. This inevitably led to less meaningful 
results. With regard to the further development of the application and its use in future exercises, 
special attention should be paid to the marking and tracking of individual information 
relationships (in the sense of visualizing path dependencies). Furthermore, especially in the 
context of the evaluation, the structural organization of the units to be considered should be 
entered in the tool before the exercise begins. Taking these aspects into account, the potential 
of the application as a contribution to an improved exercise evaluation is clearly recognizable. 
This is especially true if an automatic recording of interactions at different nodes would be 
possible in the future.  
According to the team of the radiation monitoring center, ScenarioBuilder BOS could also be 
used in earlier phases of the exercise, especially during the exercise conduct. In this way, 
expected communication relationships could be entered into the application in advance and 
could then be used by the exercise supervisors for a check during the exercise. However, this 
would require an automated recording of the interactions, which should only take place with 
the agreement of the individual actors and should also be controlled by them. 
In addition to the feedback from the radiation monitoring center, an overarching feedback on 
the application could also be provided by the company ESN Sicherheit und Zertifizierung, that 
was commissioned with the evaluation of the overall exercise. As before, this also consisted of 
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a telephone call (October 22, 2019) and a written questionnaire-based feedback. Here, it was 
stated that previous knowledge in the field of social network analysis existed, but the 
methodology had not been used in the context of planning and evaluating exercises. It was 
further said that the representations of the ScenarioBuilder BOS for scenario analysis are 
understandable and that it is very useful to examine different relationship types and their 
combinations as well as to consider different time periods. An added value of the application 
was seen in two areas: On the one hand, the investigation of path dependencies offers the 
potential to analyze how a communication develops and what effects it has. On the other hand, 
the combination of the personal perception of the actors, the structure of the organizations and 
the consideration of the centrality of communication relationships could be used to draw 
conclusions for the analysis of the effectiveness of an organization. Thereby, the greatest 
challenge was considered in the collection of data, which is why functions for automatic 
collection should be a subject of discussion in the future. 
 
8.5.  valuation of the “Wesersturm”  xercise 
Scenario and Exercise Objectives 
The "Wesersturm" exercise took place on June 01, 2019 in Höxter and was a supra-regional 
disaster control exercise with about 700 emergency forces. The starting point was a storm that 
had moved across the district of Höxter the previous night and had led to a collapsed roof in a 
hazardous materials processing plant (Robrecht, 2019). It was assumed that hazardous material 
containers were damaged. In addition, there had been a collision due to the storm between two 
ships on the Weser river, one of which had chemicals on board and was moored in the port of 
Corvey. The second ship was drifted off the river. A number of people were injured. The storm 
also caused trees to fall and blocked roads, so that not all routes were passable by the emergency 
services (ibid.). Section command lines were set up in the affected towns of the district and the 
“Mobile Führungsunterstützung von Stäben (MoFüSt)” of the administrative district of Detmold 
was alerted and was to take over the leadership of the section city of Höxter in the morning. 
The MoFüSt is a mobile crisis management unit organized as a staff. The exercise was intended 
to practice the alerting processes and the reporting system as well as the different disaster 
management concepts of the state and the district of Höxter. In particular, it was about 
integrating the supra-regional forces into the local operational structure and practicing 
procedures and communication between the operational sections. The procedures were also 
rehearsed in the local hospital. 
Observation and Evaluation Methodology 
The data basis for the evaluation of the “Wesersturm” exercise was formed by the observed 
communication relationships between the individual actors of the MoFüSt. With the exception 
of the interactions during the situation meetings, the relationships were recorded over the 
course of the exercise and categorized in different relationship types. The information within 
the situation meeting was not recorded, as it followed a pre-defined pattern. This means that 
the information was passed on in sequence through each subject area and was always directed 
to all actors. In total, ScenarioBuilder BOS was used to define a communication network 
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consisting of eight nodes and 245 relationships. As previously described, a distinction was made 
between the following types (see Figure 8.8 and Figure 8.9):  
• Requirements/requests (red dotted lines) 
• Assignments/commands (blue dotted lines) 
• Discussions (purple dotted lines) 
• Questions (orange dotted lines) 
• General information exchange (black dotted lines) 
For discussions, which are often characterized by several mutual exchanges of information, two 
connections were used, one incoming and one outgoing. In the course of the exercise, a person 
from the S1 team changed to the S3 team as a support and a resource relationship (black line) 
was added to represent this action. In addition to the systematic recording of the interactions, 
general conspicuous features such as unrest in the staff or ambiguities were recorded. As with 
the previously discussed examples, the “Wesersturm” exercise represented a dynamic network 
with interactions that varied over time. 
Selected Evaluation Results 
With the help of the ScenarioBuilder BOS the data of the exercise was analyzed and evaluated. 
Figure 8.8 shows two examples of the analysis of centrality at different times in the exercise. 
Figure 8.8 (a) illustrates the situation within the MoFüSt at the beginning of the exercise. At 
this time, impulses were given by the “Stabsleitung” (head of staff) through information about 
the exercise and two discussions took place. The centrality observations of the communication 
relations for this period focus in particular on two actors: the “Stabsleitung” and the “S2” 
(situation management). The “Stabsleitung” was involved in the most of the interactions during 
this period compared to all other actors (degree value of 24). For the interaction network, it 
had a special relevance since almost all interactions in which it was involved originated from it, 
resulting in a very large influence on the network. In this role, the “Stabsleitung” integrated in 
particular the “S4” (supply management) and the “FB San” (consultant), who were otherwise 
not involved in any further interactions. Interesting here was also the way in which information 
was conveyed: Often the communication took place via announcements to all actors and thus 
had a high degree of accessibility. At the same time the “S2” took on a special role as a 
‘communication bridge’, as can be seen by the results of the betweenness centrality calculation 
(see Figure 8.8 (a)). This can be further explained by the fact that in this phase the staff 
concentrated on ‘getting out in front of the situation’ and the development of the situation map, 
which was one of the central tasks of the “S2”. Figure 8.8 (b) portrays the situation 90 minutes 
later. At this time, the increasingly central role of “S3” (deployment management) had become 
clearly visible, as its major task was to coordinate planned measures and communicate orders 
to the subordinate teams. With a degree of 27, the number of its interactions was clearly above 
the 1-sigma environment (18.36) that can be seen as an indicator of a central actor in the 
network (see section 6.3). Since the majority of the interactions emanated from the “S3”, it had 
a high influence on its environment at that time, which was supported by its high betweenness 
value, ensuring a continuous flow of information.  
 
 





Figure 8.8: Examples of centrality analyses of the actors within the “Wesersturm” exercise on the basis of all 
communication relations (general information – black, requirements – red, assignments – blue, discussions – purple 
and questions – orange) using (a) betweenness and (b) degree centrality 
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Looking at the discussions and assignments communicated throughout the exercise as shown 
in Figure 8.9, it is noticeable that the “S2”, “S3” and “S6” teams were the ones mainly involved 
in the upcoming discussions, but that the “S2” team discussed with most of the other actors. 
When considering assignments, the picture was very clear since all assignments were given by 
the “Stabsleitung”. Another interesting aspect of the exercise is that of interaction density. It 
was at its highest when problems for the staff caused by uncertainties in one of the operational 
sections occurred. Towards the end, when the scenario changed into a static situation, the 
number of interactions among each other decreased significantly. Furthermore, the involvement 
of the consultants requested by the staff, especially for the “FB San”, happened almost 
exclusively in the situation meetings. From the second half of the exercise onwards, the “FB 
DLRG” was much more involved in the planning of the measures. 
Practitioner Feedback 
The feedback for the “Wesersturm” exercise was given by the crisis management department of 
the Detmold district government which also supervised the MoFüSt during the exercise. As 
before, the feedback was given in an initial discussion on February 10, 2020 and a written 
questionnaire-based feedback on February 21, 2020. The practice partners stated that they had 
no previous knowledge in the field of social network analysis. The network-based presentation 
of the analysis results by the ScenarioBuilder BOS was seen as a new yet understandable form 
of presentation and was in line with the findings of the exercise. These could thus be confirmed 
with the application. A combination of different relationship types and the analysis of the 
scenario at different times was perceived as very useful, since an analysis in the given depth 
would otherwise not have been possible.  
The practice partners assessed the added value of the tool for one-time exercises as rather low, 
since a high effort has to be made for the collection of the data if it is to be used for an error 
analysis. For regular exercises with the same personnel and different scenarios or the same 
scenario and different personnel, they considered the tool to be an important and valuable part 
of the evaluation. The practice partners saw the difficulties in using the tool and the 
methodology not only in the effort required to collect the data, but above all in the fact that the 
presentation of the communication relationships alone does not show whether they are goal-
oriented or sufficient because there is no indication of the quality of the communication. 
Therefore, an analysis based solely on the existence of the relationships could lead to 
misinterpretations. Accordingly, they saw the user assistance in the evaluation of individual 
communication relationships as a relevant function for the future. In summary, they concluded 
that the tool can contribute to an improvement in the evaluation of exercises, depending on the 
preconditions. However, its use in planning is only relevant if the focus of the exercise lies on 
the analysis of the communication relationships. 
 
 





Figure 8.9: Degree centrality analysis of all discussions (purple dotted lines) (a) and communicated assignments (blue 




Looking at the four use cases for the validation and evaluation of the ScenarioBuilder BOS in 
their entirety, conclusions can be drawn for the questions underlying the work on the usefulness 
of social network analysis methods in civil protection and disaster response exercises. Since in 
the course of the work an evaluation including the involvement of practitioners was only 
possible in the phase of evaluation of exercises, the conclusions primarily refer to this area. For 
the evaluation of the added value of the application within the planning of exercises only 
hypotheses can be formulated with the available results. The three real-world use cases 
considered, “Winterübung TEL”, “KatKom2-2019” and “Wesersturm” are very different in their 
characteristics. Although they all describe communication networks, they reflect three different 
levels of communication. Whereas in the “KatKom 2-2019” exercise the network is built up as 
an ego-network around a person and its interactions with other persons and teams, the 
“Wesersturm” exercise considers a cooperating group with staff structures and its internal 
communication processes. Finally, the “Winterübung TEL” exercise examines a superordinate 
level in which all actors of the exercise who have communicated with each other via the 
CENARIO® ilias staff software are considered. From an organizational perspective, the fire 
brigade is the focus of both the “Winterübung TEL” and the “Wesersturm” exercise, while the 
“KatKom 2-2019” exercise focused on a specialized authority, namely the radiation monitoring 
center. Last but not least, a systematic observation of the communications was used as the data 
basis for both the “Wesersturm” and the “KatKom 2-2019” exercises, while the “Winterübung 
TEL” scenario used data from the staff software. Despite their differences, the analysis in all 
exercises was carried out following the same systematic approach and the same functions of the 
ScenarioBuilder BOS were used. The analysis of the scenarios focused on the possibility to 
analyze different time horizons and different combinations of relationship types. In addition, 
various centrality measures were used to develop interpretation approaches that reflect 
relationship patterns differently.  
The application was positively evaluated in all cases. The visualization of the communication 
structures was presented in a way that was understandable for the users and could confirm 
their own findings or even offer new insights into the different situations. The consideration of 
the exercise as a dynamic scenario with different communication relationships and the resulting 
varying interaction patterns was perceived as an enrichment and allowed for a more in-depth 
examination of arising problems. By analyzing the centralities of individual actors, 
interpretation approaches could be developed that in most cases provided added value for the 
evaluation. Although all practice partners stated that they see a great potential for the 
evaluation of future exercises in the application, distinctions can be found. For example, it was 
determined that the added value of the application is perceived as being significantly stronger 
when the patterns of interaction are more complex and not obvious at first glance. For example, 
the interaction patterns in an ego-network in which only the direct exchange between two 
actors is represented are easier to understand than when several actors are interlinked, as can 
be observed in staff structures or when the entire exercise communication is considered. This is 
all the more true when the given structures within an organization or authority are frequently 
practiced with the same persons as can be seen in the example of the radiation monitoring 
center. Nevertheless, an added value can be found in these as well as in the analysis and 
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visualization of communication on the basis of networks. Thus, especially when examining the 
different types of communication and viewing them over different time horizons, it is possible 
to take an in-depth look at the workload of personnel and to make more far-reaching and thus 
more complex analyses. If the same scenario is practiced more often or if expectation values for 
communication structures in certain situations are defined beforehand in the planning phase, a 
more in-depth analysis can also be carried out to deal with any problems that arise, as the 
different networks can be compared and deviations identified.  
An evaluation of communication interactions, as pursued by the ScenarioBuilder BOS using a 
network-theoretical approach, is largely unknown in the current practice of exercises in civil 
protection and disaster response, but offers very different possibilities for analysis. In addition 
to the evaluation of the workload of individual actors mentioned above, statements can also be 
made about chains of command and the structural set-up of the organizations observed. By 
analyzing different time periods and relationship types, exercises can be illustrated from a 
retrospective point of view and divided into individual situations, enabling the user to analyze 
the role of various actors. The concept of centrality is also very much in evidence here as it 
allows different perspectives on a situation. From the discussions and the written feedback 
regarding the application, it can be concluded that the added value of the application can be 
maximized if it is interactively included in the evaluation process. Although individual aspects 
can be captured in reports by means of illustrations and descriptions, this form of presentation 
has its limitations and the available functions of the application cannot be used to their full 
extent. In the feedback from the practice partners, for example, the demand for a possibility of 
linking different relationships was expressed several times in order to follow information as it 
spreads or to understand the effects of certain interactions. These investigation opportunities 
are made possible by functions such as path dependency or scenario replay, which further 
underlines the argument for using ScenarioBuilder BOS as a support for exercise evaluation.  
The different use cases illustrate that different sources can be used as a data basis for the 
evaluation. In particular, data from systematic observations of formal and informal 
communications are of particular relevance. In addition, communication data from staff 
software, analogue communication via the message form as well as communication via radio, 
telephone or email are suitable. Moreover, it can be assumed that a combination of the different 
sources can lead to more precise statements of interaction patterns. This can be illustrated using 
the example of the “Wesersturm” exercise. Here, only the interactions of the actors in the staff 
were considered for the analysis. A potential addition would have been the incoming messages 
and reports from the operational forces that were received in the individual subject areas. With 
the help of the additional communication data, it would have been possible to link interactions 
between staff members with information and requests from incoming messages and to reflect 
how individual messages affect the work of the staff. The combination of different data sources 
also has the potential to add knowledge of the content of interactions to situations and allow a 
more accurate assessment of the benefits and necessity of individual interactions. Contrarily, a 
lack of such knowledge of the content of interactions is a problem that has been repeatedly 
expressed by practitioners and makes it difficult to analyze and evaluate individual interactions. 
Therefore, possibilities to bypass or mitigate this problem should be the subject of further 
discussion. Initial approaches besides the combination of several data sources mentioned above 
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could be the definition of interaction patterns as an expected value for comparing theoretical 
and real communication. Additionally, it would be possible to conduct an initial analysis of the 
communications with ScenarioBuilder BOS already during the briefing with the participants in 
order to expand the scenario with their additional information.  
The problem most critically reflected by practitioners when using the application and 
methodology of social network analysis in the evaluation of exercises is that of data collection. 
Data collection is especially a problem in the case of distributed actors, since the required 
number of observers is usually not available, as became apparent during the evaluation of the 
“KatKom 2-2019” exercise. This problem can be partly compensated by implementing interfaces 
for a data transfer from staff software to ScenarioBuilder BOS. For example, the staff software 
CENARIO® ilias used in the “Winterübung TEL” exercise offers an export function that exports 
relevant data in a CSV format, thus providing an easy way to automatically enter said data into 
the application. Similar possibilities are also conceivable for other data sources like digital radio 
through technologies such as speech-to-text or for computer vision, but further research is 
needed. Especially data acquisition through systematic observations is difficult to automate 
from today's point of view, which is why a trade-off between costs and benefits must always be 
made. In principle, communications of structures such as staffs appear to be observable even 
with few personnel, as for example the “Wesersturm” exercise has shown. At the same time, 
well-functioning communication is of great importance for these structures, which also often 
work with the same or at least similar personnel, so that a consideration of the existing 
communications appears to be a very meaningful and feasible task.  
Summarizing the results of the three use cases for the evaluation, the use of ScenarioBuilder 
BOS shows a great added value for future exercises. Based on the concepts and methods of 
social network analysis, the application offers a new possibility for the evaluation of exercises 
in civil protection with a special focus on communication relationships that have hardly been 
considered so far. In order to use the application profitably, it is important to provide 
possibilities for automated data acquisition, for example from staff software. Furthermore, more 
advanced concepts should be developed on how nodes and relationships can be enriched by 
annotations in order to highlight errors or to add other information to the scenario and to 
support an interactive evaluation. In order to obtain a high statement quality, it is necessary to 
train observers and exercise instructors so that on the one hand the required data basis is 
available and on the other hand practitioners are enabled to develop their own analyses and 
interpretation approaches based on the network data and corresponding concepts such as 
centrality. 
The use of ScenarioBuilder BOS also offers some potential for the planning phase of exercises, 
but this can only be formulated as hypotheses at this point. In principle, two cases appear to be 
sensible options for use: Analogous to the possible uses of the application in the evaluation, 
expectation values for communication patterns in certain situations can be created in the 
planning phase in order to use them to examine the workload of individual participants in 
advance from a planning perspective, for example. From the statements of the practitioners it 
can be concluded that this case is however only interesting for planning if an examination of 
the communication structures is defined as an exercise goal, since otherwise the comparatively 
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small benefit would not warrant the additional effort and exercise planners will commonly 
rather rely on empirical values. The second case for which the use of the application in planning 
appears to be useful is the one described with the use case “Flooded City”. Trough simulations 
and calculating cascading effects, the ScenarioBuilder BOS can support exercise planners in 
foresighted thinking when developing scenarios as well as when defining the exercise 
boundaries. This case seems to make sense especially in the context of the increasing number 
of large-scale exercises, since scenarios for these exercises can reach a high complexity and 
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9. Conclusion and Future Work 
In the course of this dissertation, it was investigated to what extent software applications can 
be used to support exercises in civil protection and disaster response. This was done by 
considering the emergency sector as a critical infrastructure and with reference to the concepts 
of preparedness and prevention as well as criticality. An approach based on network theory was 
chosen and an attempt was made to model and examine scenario-based exercises in multilayer 
graph networks of different types of relationships. The work contributes to various areas of 
research on critical infrastructure and in particular to the role of exercises in civil protection 
and disaster response.  
Starting from the definition of critical infrastructures, the thesis addresses the emergency sector 
and explains its dual role in the infrastructure system. As a critical socio-economic service 
infrastructure on the one hand and as the main actor for all measures to protect the population 
and other critical infrastructures on the other hand, the emergency sector has a central role to 
play. An important element of the sector's preparedness and prevention strategy is the exercise, 
especially that of civil protection and disaster response, which is characterized by inter-
organizational cooperation, since it focuses on people as the sector's most important asset and 
enables them to act in crisis situations.  
In order to gain an understanding of the structural characteristics of civil protection and the 
exercises that are so important for it, the first step in this work is to identify the responsibilities 
and differences at federal, state and municipal level. In a second step, the work then goes into 
detail about the exercises and elaborates the objectives and methods associated with them on 
the basis of a literature review and interviews with various actors in the field. It turns out that 
each exercise is very different and depends strongly on the needs of the respective organizations 
and authorities. In the further analysis of the exercise methodology and the current situation of 
the exercise in practice it becomes clear that especially the planning is very complex and that 
there is a need for supporting tools in the development of the scenarios, while a particular 
attention is drawn to the difficulty of thinking ahead during scenario development. Another 
need can be identified in the context of exercise evaluation: It is apparent that, despite the 
awareness regarding the importance of evaluations, hardly any systematic procedures are 
available, and that the evaluation as a whole is often not carried out with the necessary 
consistency. It is particularly striking that although the review of communication during the 
exercise is a central aspect of the evaluation, communication relationships have not yet been 
recorded and systematically analyzed.  
By evaluating the relevant research literature from the fields of organizational research, 
emergency management as well as risk and criticality research, the potential of social network 
analysis for the aspects of planning and evaluation of exercises is identified and 
comprehensively worked out in the dissertation. Social network analysis enables an intuitive 
representation of the sometimes very complex relationship structures and is equipped with 
concepts and methods that offer possibilities for interpretation and a better understanding of 
the respective situation. In particular, the aspects of visualizing networks and their 
representation in the form of multilayer graph structures with different relationship types and 
temporalities are emphasized. It is also shown that the concept of centrality, which is applied 
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in a variety of related works, can be evaluated as very useful for the application context. On the 
basis of the comparative work and the previous analysis of the exercise situation, three forms 
of networks are identified that are suitable for the exercise context. These include 
communication networks, dependency networks and scenario networks as a combination of the 
aforementioned. Based on the findings on the use of social network analysis in the planning 
and evaluation of exercises, the dissertation formulates requirements for a software application 
that refer to aspects of the literature as well as to contents and problems conveyed by 
practitioners of the emergency sector. In addition, different available software solutions are 
examined with regard to their possibilities in the exercise context. It is found that no currently 
available solution meets the requirements that arise for exercises in civil protection and disaster 
response.  
In order to meet the specific requirements of a given exercise, a concept for a network-based 
support software is designed and implemented in a tablet-based demonstrator application 
called ScenarioBuilder BOS. With the help of this software the user is supported in modeling 
and developing exercise scenarios and in analyzing and evaluating them in various ways. The 
aim of the application is to enable the user to develop interpretation approaches and to question 
actions and relationship structures by presenting the scenario from different perspectives. In 
order to achieve this goal, the visualization of the dynamic scenario networks is the center of 
attention. Two superordinate use cases are considered in the application, namely scenario 
development and scenario analysis. For the scenario development the user has the possibility 
to define actors and relationships and to assign them to different types. Furthermore, time 
dependencies can be described so that each scenario is described as a dynamic multilayer 
network. Since the defined requirements have resulted in the need for possibilities to simulate 
scenarios, the application can also be used to describe and evaluate capacities and requirements 
of nodes. In addition to the simulation, a number of functions are available for the analysis of 
the developed scenarios. In particular, the possibility of visualizing different time horizons and 
relationship combinations should be mentioned. Furthermore, central actors in the network can 
be identified and recommendations for action can be derived on the basis of the concepts and 
procedures of centrality. By visualizing path dependencies, the application offers the possibility 
to observe the influence of individual relationships over time and to investigate effects on the 
network. The representation can be influenced by the user through various options, such as the 
choice of different layouts. Through the means of the demonstrative implementation of the 
concept in an Android-based tablet application, the software tool could be used directly for 
practical exercises. To further support the usage of the tool, the user interface is chosen in a 
way that allows easy data entry and editing.  
In order to evaluate the application as well as the usefulness of social network analysis as a 
methodology to support the planning and evaluation of exercises, the dissertation describes 
four use cases, three of which are evaluations of real civil protection and disaster response 
exercises in different organizations and authorities. The fourth case describes the use of the 
application to develop the scenario for a fictitious exercise and serves to validate the simulation 
and other functions of ScenarioBuilder BOS. The evaluations show that the application and the 
associated methodology of social network analysis have great potential, especially for the 
evaluation of exercises. It enables a systematic recording and evaluation of especially 
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communication relationships and can thus make a valuable contribution, for example, to 
assessing the workload of actors, analyzing compliance with command structures or explaining 
dynamics in teams. Furthermore, based on the discussions with practitioners, it can be assumed 
that the tool also offers added value in the planning of exercises, especially as a support in the 
calculation of cascading effects within scenario development. However, in order to achieve the 
formulated added value, solutions and process strategies for the identified problems, for 
example the high workload of data collection, have to be developed and further studies have to 
be carried out. Which possibilities would be conceivable for this and to what extent further 
functions of the application can be added is discussed in the following section. 
Outlook and Further Research Questions 
For the introduction of the ScenarioBuilder BOS in regular exercises additional work is necessary 
in the future. On the one hand, the application should be further developed technically on the 
basis of the problems identified during the evaluation, and on the other hand, it is important 
that subsequent evaluations are carried out in order to identify the potential in the planning 
phase more precisely and to train users in the use of the software. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to plan the use of the tool in the context of an exercise from the start and to 
communicate corresponding requirements regarding recording and evaluation to the observers 
and exercise controllers. When using the software in the context of an evaluation, the actors 
and the organizational structures should also be stored in the application in advance and it 
should be defined where observers are to be positioned and which relationships they are to 
record. In principle, the aim for the evaluation should be that it is carried out interactively, for 
example in the form of an evaluation workshop, so that a discussion about developed 
interpretation approaches can take place and the various participants can develop an 
understanding of their role in the overall context of the scenario network.  
For the further use of the application, it is elementary to create possibilities of simplified and 
automated data acquisition, since the added value of the application might otherwise not be in 
proportion to the effort. Various options are available for this. For example, many staff software 
products have functions to export the data, which would provide a simple way to create 
interfaces or import data. With regard to the simplification of scenario development, interfaces 
to personnel and material databases would also be useful, from which, in particular, derivations 
for capacities and requirements can be drawn. Under strict adherence to data protection and 
with the consent of the respective personnel, it would theoretically be possible to achieve 
automated recording of interactions via telephone and radio or those that arise in direct 
exchange, using technologies such as speech-to-text or similar. However, since there are many 
different problems that can arise when using such an approach, like the recognition of relevant 
information for the application or the removal of radio noise, it should first be examined 
whether the benefits generated by this method justify more in-depth research on the subject or 
whether a discussion in the course of an evaluation workshop would be more productive.  
A further possibility to extend the application is especially given by additional functionalities 
for annotation and the enrichment of scenarios in the context of evaluation. This could be used 
to mark incorrect interactions and provide support for the evaluation. An implementation of 
further methods from graph theory is also conceivable. Here, procedures for the comparison of 
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two graph networks are particularly suitable in order to be able to compare the effects of 
different situations on the relationship structures in a scenario, for example. Another example 
are cluster detection methods that can be used if several teams are represented in a scenario 
and the interactions between the teams are to be examined more closely. Since a report must 
be written at the end of each exercise, including the results of the evaluation, further 
functionalities to support documentation in general and the writing of reports in particular are 
also useful possible enhancements of the application. With regard to the visualization of the 
scenario networks, it can be stated that so far the visualization is exclusively based on a 
representation in two-dimensional graphs. Especially for very complex scenarios, other forms 
of representation such as three-dimensional graphs or the use of virtual reality for 
representation are also conceivable.  
In the long term and with an established data basis, further developments are possible in 
addition to the functions mentioned above and those resulting from the user feedback. For 
example, it could be considered how machine learning might be used to automatically detect 
problematic situations in a scenario on the basis of the given relationship structures or to offer 
recommendations for avoiding them. In this context, the use of the application can provide 
added value both in scenario planning and evaluation, since expected values for relationship 
structures could first be defined in planning and then be compared with the actually given 
structures in the course of the evaluation. This would give rise to further interesting research 
questions, for example, as to which deviations from the expected value can be tolerated without 
restrictions or whether conclusions can be drawn from the exercise regarding the effectiveness 
of the organization. 
Taking into account the possibilities for extending the ScenarioBuilder BOS as presented in this 
section, this dissertation has shown how exercises in civil protection and disaster response can 
benefit from the use of software and methods of social network analysis. It should be noted, 
however, that no software can replace the learning effect that the practical exercise enables. As 
such, the concept presented here is only one of the ways in which exercises that are of great 
importance for the preparedness and prevention of the emergency sector can continue to 
function effectively as an element in the security apparatus. Or to put it in the words of the 
philosopher Will Durant from his work “The Story of Philosophy” (1961): 
“Excellence is an art won by training and habituation: We do not act rightly because we have virtue 
or excellence, but we rather have those because we have acted rightly; [...] we are what we 
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